

THE

3

A R T

OF

NEGOTIATING

WITH

Sovereign Princes.

Of the Usefulness of NEGOTIATIONS;
of the Choice of AMBASSADORS and
ENVOYS; and of the Qualifications
necessary for succeeding in those Im-
ployments.

By Monsieur DE CALLIERES, Counsellor in Ordi-
nary to the King, Secretary of the Cabinet to His
Majesty, heretofore Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary from the late King for the Treaties
of Peace concluded at RYSWICK, and one of the
forty Members of the FRENCH Academy.

Translated from the FRENCH.

The THIRD EDITION.

L O N D O N:


Printed for GEO. STRAHAN, at the Golden Ball
against the Royal Exchange. MDCCLXXVII.

THE
ART
OF
NEGOTIATING
TO
The APPROBATION.

I Have read, by order of my Lord Chancellor, a Book intituled, *The Art of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes; of the Usefulness of Negotiations; of the Choice of Ambassadors and Envoys; and of the Qualifications necessary for succeeding in those Employments*, written by Monsieur De Callieres, Secretary to the King's Cabinet, &c. This Work appeared to me to be very useful, and consequently very worthy to be printed. The Rules which the Author there lays down of that important Art of Negotiating, are so much the truer, and the more certain, in that he has drawn them from his own Experience; and they ought the rather to be followed, because he never separates the Profitable from the Honest Part, nor the able Minister from the truly upright Man. Done at Paris the thirteenth of November, 1715.

DACIER.

7



TO HIS
Royal Highness
The DUKE of
ORLEANS,
Regent of the Kingdom.

My Lord,



THE Design of
this TREATISE,
which I have the
Honour to pre-
sent to your Roy-
al Highness, is to give an Idea
of the Qualifications and Sciences

A 2

that

that are necessary towards forming good Ministers; to point out to them the Course which they ought to steer, and the Rocks which they are to avoid; and to exhort those who design themselves for Embassies, to get themselves duly qualified for Posts of so great Importance and Difficulty, before they engage in them.

THE Honour which the late King did me, in charging me with his Orders, and Full Powers, for several Negotiations; and particularly for those of the Treaties of Peace concluded at *Ryswick*, has increas'd the desire which I ever had from my Infancy, to be inform'd of
the

the Strength, the Rights, and Pretensions of every one of the chief Princes and States of *Europe*; of their different Interests, the Forms of their Government, the Causes of their Friendships, and of their Differences, and the Treaties which they have made one with another; that I might be able to improve the said Knowledge to good Advantage, as occasion should offer, for the Service of the King and State.

After the Loss which *France* has newly sustain'd by the Death of that Great King, whose Reign has been so Glorious and so Triumphant; it wanted the Aid of the Hand of God, which

has always been its Support under its greatest Pressures. It was necessary for supporting the Minority of the King, who has ascended the Throne by Right of Succession, that the same Almighty Hand should have formed a Prince of the same Blood, of an Heroical Courage equal to his Birth, inspir'd with a true Love for the People of this vast Kingdom, of a Genius of so great Prudence and Foresight, as to be able to provide for all their Wants, and to rectify a great many Disorders which the Miseries of a long and burthensome War had introduced towards the end of the last Reign. In a Word, there wanted an Understanding

standing superior to all Employments, a Capacity without Bounds, a clear and quick Penetration, and indefatigable Activity, which increases in proportion to the Necessities of the State; and all this to center in the Person of a Prince, who is always just, always amiable, always doing Good, and which has form'd in him the Character of a true Father of his Country. It is because of these excellent Qualities, which shine so eminently in your *Royal Highness*, that all *France*, with an unanimous Voice, has submitted it self, with an intire Confidence and Security, to your Orders; that it expects

from

A 4

from you all its Tranquillity,
and all its Happiness ; and that
it foretells and promises you
before Hand, as a Reward of
your good Deeds, a Glory
which shall be transmitted
down to latest Posterity. I am
with a profound Respect, and
a singular Zeal and Devotion,

Your Royal Highness's

most humble,

most obedient, and

most faithful Servant,

De Callieres.



P R E F A C E

To the English

R E A D E R.



WHEN I first read the following Treatise, I was highly delighted with the Performance, and thought it would be no unacceptable piece of Service to render it fit for every English Reader. It is written by a Gentleman of great Experience in Publick Negotiations, and who has had a great share in the Transactions of Europe for

A 5

some

some time past. He was sent by the late French King to several Courts of the North, upon Affairs of great Importance. He was the Person chiefly intrusted by him to settle with the Dutch, the Preliminaries of the Peace of Ryswick; and for that end, was sent into Holland, where he resided incognito near two Years before the Congress was opened for the Treaty at Ryswick; when he took upon him the Publick Character of Ambassador and Plenipotentiary. And since that time he has been employ'd in the Quality of Privy Counsellor, and Secretary of the Cabinet to the French King.

The Treatise is a Collection of Rules and Directions to all Foreign Ministers;

Ministers; shewing them, what they are to do in order to qualify themselves rightly for a Post of so great Importance; and how they ought to carry themselves in the discharge of it. The Author has herein collected within a narrow Compass, and digested in a very good Method, the Sum and Substance of what has been written on this Subject by others, in larger Volumes; and has added many judicious Observations, which he has gathered from his own Experience.

Other Authors have been more prolix in asserting the Rights and Privileges of Ambassadors, and settling the Rules of Precedency among them, by a numerous Quotation of Presidents. But as our

Author omits nothing material even in that Point ; so he applies himself chiefly to what others have been defective in ; and that is, to instruct Ministers in the particular Duties of their Function, shewing them, how they are to treat with Men of different Ranks and Conditions, what are the proper Methods to be taken for succeeding in the Affairs with which they are intrusted, and what their Carriage and Behaviour ought to be, in order to gain the Favour and Esteem of their own Sovereign, and likewise of the Prince to whom they are sent. And what is highly valuable in our Author, he recommends nothing to his Minister, but what is consistent with the strictest Rules of Honour

nour and Probity. He cautions him against all manner of Trick and Deceit; assures him that whatever Negotiations are built upon such a sandy Foundation, will be of no lasting Duration; and recommends to him Honesty as the best Policy.

The Directions that are here given for the Choice and Conduct of Publick Ministers, as they must be of use in all Countries, where they are obliged to keep an Intercourse and Correspondence with other Nations; so I think there is no Country where they may be of greater Service than here in Great Britain; the Power and Wealth of this Island depending wholly upon the Commerce it has with other Countries. Foreign Trade is the Life
and

and Soul of this Island. And how is this to be secured, but by cultivating a good Harmony with all our Neighbours, so far as is consistent with our own Safety; by procuring advantageous Treaties and Alliances, by a right understanding the Interests of other Princes and Nations; and by a timely discovery of pernicious Combinations that may be formed by any of our Neighbours, to the Destruction of our Trade and Commerce, and for the Advancement of their own? And how are these Means of our Safety to be attained, unless we have proper Instruments employed in the respective Courts of Europe, who may answer all the great

great Ends for which Embassies are design'd.

The Choice of Persons for these Employments, I know, is generally thought to be matter of no great Concern to the Welfare of the Nation. But this is an Error of a very pernicious Consequence to the State. For I take it, that next to the having Ministers of Integrity and Capacity at the Helm of Affairs at Home, the Welfare and Prosperity of the Kingdom depends, in a great measure, on having Men of sufficient Abilities to take care of our Interests Abroad. Must not our Councils at Home be governed by the Intelligences they have from abroad? And is it not therefore of the highest Importance

to our Safety ; that the Persons, upon whose Advices the Publick Resolutions of the State are to be form'd, should be Men of Judgment, Penetration and Foresight, and well versed in the Interests of all the Princes of Europe !

I cannot but look upon it as a mighty Misfortune to our Nation, and one of the great Evils that attend our Party Divisions, that the Neglect of our Foreign Ministers, both during the time of their Residence in Foreign Courts, and more especially after their Return from their Embassies, has made these Employments to be often slighted by Persons every way qualified for the discharge of them, and who would have been able to have rendred eminent

uent Services to their Country, in that Station, if they had had due Encouragement to accept it. And in this respect I cannot but admire the Policy of the Court of Rome, and, I may add, of other Princes and States of Italy, who are the best serv'd of any Princes in Europe with their Foreign Ministers; and who know to make the best use of their Services, when they recall them from those Employments. It is by this means, and, I may say, by this alone, that the Pope has one of the best constituted Councils in Europe; which consists chiefly of Cardinals who have serv'd as Nuncio's in most of the Courts of Europe, who have spent many Years in Embassies, and have circulated from
one

one Court to another, till they have attained to a thorough Knowledge of the Interests of all the Princes of Europe. What a transcendent Superiority therefore must there needs be in the Councils and Determinations of Persons of so great Experience in Publick Affairs, in comparison of those who have never been any way concerned in Publick Negotiations! And the Prospect of rising to Honours and Preferments this way, makes People of the brightest Parts, and highest Quality in that Country, apply themselves early to Studies proper to qualify them for such Employments.

Among the other Disadvantages which we labour under in England, with respect to Foreign Embassies, this

this is none of the least; that the general Education of our Youth does not lead them so much to the Knowledge of those things which are necessary to qualify them for those Employments, as the Education of the Youth in other Countries does. In all Foreign Countries, most of the Gentry, even those of the highest Rank, and greatest Estates, study at least the first Elements of the Civil Law, and Law of Nations, of History, and of the Interests of the respective Princes of Europe; which Knowledge they find to be of great use to them afterwards when they come to be concern'd in the Management of Publick Treaties. For when a Minister is able to support his Master's Pretensions, by Reasons drawn from

from Equity, from the Law and Practice of Nations, and from History; they will have a much better Appearance in the Eye of the World, and meet with a better Reception, than when they come backed only with a *Sic volo, sic jubeo; stat pro ratione Voluntas*. Which is an Argument that is but too often made use of; when milder Reasons, managed by a skilful Minister, would be more prevalent and successful.

It is therefore the more necessary, that Gentlemen of this Country who design themselves for such Employments, should apply themselves early to such Studies as may best fit them to discharge that important Trust, with the greatest Advantage to their Prince and Country, as well as Credit

dit and Reputation to themselves. And if they follow the Rules which this Author prescribes, both as to their qualifying themselves for the Post, and the due Execution of it ; they cannot fail of Success in their Negotiations.

The Directions which are here given, although they are chiefly calculated for Publick Ministers, who are employ'd in Negotiations between Princes ; yet they are of so great an Extent, and contain so many Prudential Maxims, with respect to an Intercourse between Man and Man, that I dare say, every private Man may receive a great Benefit from them in his private Capacity, and in his particular Concerns.



A
T A B L E
OF THE
C H A P T E R S.

Chap. I.	Page
T HE Design of this Treatise.	1
II. Of the Usefulness of Negotiations.	18
III. Of the Qualifications required in a Minister.	38
V. Of the Knowledge that is necessary and useful to a Minister.	47
VI. Of Ambassadors, Envoys, and Residents.	63
VII. Of Legates, Nuncios, and Internuncios.	76
VIII. Of the Functions of a Minister.	80
IX. Of the Privileges of Foreign Ministers.	96
X. Of	

The CONTENTS.

- X. Of the Ceremonies and Civilities
which are practised among Foreign
Ministers. 109
- XI. Of Credentials, Full-Powers, and
Passports. 118
- XII. Of Instructions. 122
- XIII. What an Ambassador, or an Envoy,
ought to do, before he sets out. 127
- XIV. What a Minister ought to do upon
his arrival in a Foreign Court. 113
- XV. Means of insinuating one's self in-
to the Favour of a Prince, and of his
Ministers. 138
- XVI. Observations on the Ways of Ne-
gotiating. 150
- XVII. Advice to Ambassadors, and o-
ther Ministers, who negotiate in Fo-
reign Countries. 163
- XVIII. Of Treaties and Ratifications. 175
- XIX. Of Dispatches, and what is pro-
per to be observed therein. 179
- XX. Of Letters in Cypher. 195
- XXI. Of the Choice of Ministers. 199
- XXII. Observations touching the Choice
of Ministers. 211
- XXIII. Whe-

The CONTENTS.

XXIII. *Whether it be useful to send many Ministers to the same Country.* 229

XXIV. *Of the Duties peculiar to a Minister.* 234

The End of the Table.



THE



The ART of
NEGOTIATING
WITH
Sovereign Princes.

CHAP. I.
The Design of this Treatise.

THE Art of Negotiating with
Sovereign Princes is of so
great Importance, that the
Fate of the greatest States
often depends on the good
or bad Conduct, and on the Capacity
of the Ministers who are employed there-

in. So that Princes, and their chief Ministers, cannot be too careful in examining into the natural and acquired Endowments of the Persons whom they send into Forreign Countries, to cultivate a good Correspondence between them and their Ministers, to make Treaties of Peace, Alliance and Commerce, and others of the like Nature; to defeat those Treaties which other Princes may be negotiating to the Prejudice of their Sovereign; and in general, to take care of the respective Advantages which may be obtained of Forreigners, according as occasion shall present.

Every Christian Prince ought to lay it down as a principal Maxim of his Government, not to have recourse to Arms for the Maintenance and Defence of his Right, until he has once tried what he can do by the force of Reason and Perswasion; and it is his Interest to join also therewith Favours and good Offices; which is the surest way of all to establish and increase his Power. But it is necessary, that he make Choice of fit Instruments, who know how to apply those Means rightly, in order to gain

gain the Hearts and Inclinations of the Persons they have to deal with : And it is in this chiefly that the Science of Treating and Negotiating consists.

Our Nation is of such a Warlike Disposition, that it hardly knows of any other Glory, or Honours, besides those which are acquired by the Profession of Arms. And hence it is that the greatest part of *Frenchmen*, who have any thing of Birth or Ambition, apply themselves diligently to the Study of such things as may advance them in the Art of War; and neglect to inform themselves of the several Interests which divide *Europe*; and which are the Sources of the many Wars that are kindled in it.

This Inclination and Application, which is so natural to our Nation, is the true Cause of our having frequently amongst us good and experienced Generals; and this ought to be no matter of wonder to us, when we consider that no Man, how great Quality soever he be of, can become a General Officer in the King's Army, until he has passed through the several Military Degrees, where he may have had an Opportunity

of learning perfectly his Trade, by a long Exercise in the Art of War.

We are not upon so good a footing with respect to good Ministers; they are more rare with us; because we have no Discipline, or certain Rules, established for training up fit Persons in the Knowledge of such things as are necessary for those sorts of Employments; and because instead of rising to them gradually, and in Proportion to one's Capacity and Experience, as they do in Military Preferments, we often see Men who were never out of their own Country, who never in the least applied themselves to the Study of State-Affairs, and Men of very indifferent Talents, become all of a sudden Ambassadors to Countries, of which they know neither the Interests, nor the Laws, nor the Customs, nor the Language, nor so much as the Situation.

And yet perhaps, there is no one Employ so difficult to be well discharg'd as that is. A Man ought to have very quick Parts, Dexterity, Cunning, Knowledge of a vast many things, and above all a good discerning Faculty.

And

And it is no Wonder, that Men who engage in those Employments, for the sake of the Title and Salary; and who have not the least Idea of the Duties which are annexed to them, serve an Apprenticeship very hurtful to the Affairs which are intrusted to their Management.


These State-Novices are commonly intoxicated with the Honours that are paid in their Persons to the Dignity of the Masters whom they represent, being like unto the Ais in the Fable, who took to himself all the Incense that was offer'd to the Statue of the Goddess whom he carried. This happens more especially, to those who are sent by a great Prince, to one who is Inferiour to him in Power; they mix in their Discourses odious Comparisons, and indirect Menaces; which makes the Prince to whom they are sent, too sensible of his own Weakness, and which seldom fails of begetting an Aversion in him against the Sovereign whom they pretend to serve; and they are more like to Heralds, than Ambassadors, whose chief Aim ought to be to culti-

vate a good Correspondence between their Master and the Princes to whom they are sent; and who ought never to magnify his Power, to them; otherwise than as a Means of maintaining or enlarging their Power; instead of using it to humble them, and to raise their Jealousie and Resentment.

These Inconveniences, together with many others which we have seen happen through the want of Capacity, and the bad Conduct of many Persons imploy'd by several Princes to negotiate the Affairs of the Publick, give Ground to believe that it will not be unprofitable to write some Observations touching the manner of Negotiating with Sovereign Princes, and their Ministers; touching the Qualifications that are necessary to those who set themselves apart for those kinds of Employments; and touching the ways of making choice of the Persons that are fittest for the Countries to which they are sent, and for the Affairs which are to be negotiated.

But before I enter upon this Detail; it will be proper to explain, how useful
it

It is, nay, even necessary to Sovereigns, and especially to those who govern great States, to keep on Foot constant Negotiations, both in Countries near at hand and remote, either openly or secretly, in time of Peace, and also in time of War.



C H A P. II.

Of the Usefulness of Negotiations.

IN order to know truly the Usefulness of Negotiations, we ought to consider, that all the States of *Europe* have necessary Ties and Commerces one with another, which makes them to be look'd upon as Members of one and the same Commonwealth, and that there can hardly happen any considerable change in some of its Members, but what is capable of disturbing the Quiet of all the others.

The Disputes between Princes even of the lowest Rank, do commonly sow Division among Sovereigns of the first

Magnitude; because of the different Interests which they espouse in those Quarrels, and the Protection which they give to the different and opposite Sides. History is full of the Consequences of those Divisions, which often flow from slender Beginings, which might be easily crushed in the Bud, and which have afterwards occasioned bloody Wars in the principal States of *Christendom*. So that those necessary Ties and Dependences which are between those different States, oblige Sovereigns, and those who sit at the Helm of Government, to keep constantly in those Countries Ministers, in order to discover what is there transacting, and to transmit an exact account thereof from time to time. And I may venture to say, that this is one of the most important and most necessary pieces of Knowledge for the right governing of a State; because the inward Quiet of a Kingdom depends on the good Measures that are taken from without, to make Friends that are able to oppose the Designs of those who would attempt to disturb it; and that there is

no

no State so powerful of it self, but what may stand in need of Allies, for resisting the Force of other Princes, who are either Enemies to it, or jealous of its Prosperity, when they unite themselves against it.

A Minister of good discerning Parts, and of great Application, is useful not only for discovering the Projects and Cabals which are form'd against the Interests of his Master in the Country where he is imploy'd, but likewise for defeating them, by giving his Prince the Advices that may be necessary to prevent their taking Effect. It is an easie Matter to defeat the greatest Enterprizes, when they are discover'd in their Infancy; and considering that a great many Springs are necessary for putting them in Motion, it is hardly possible to conceal them from a prying Minister, who is upon the Spot where they are forming.

An able Minister knows how to take Advantage of the different Dispositions and Changes which happen in the Country where he is, not only in order to traverse the Designs which are con-

trary to the Interests of his Prince ; but even to forward other Designs that may be for his Advantage ; and by his Industry he may bring about Changes that may be favourable to the Business with which he is charged. One bare Conjunction rightly imploy'd, is capable of recompensing the Prince whom he serves a Hundred Fold the small Charges which he may have been at for getting Intelligence of what was doing amongst his Neighbours ; and the Friendships which able well chosen Ministers contract in the several Countries where they have resided, cannot fail to be of very great use to him for several Purposes both for the present, and the time to come.

If a Prince shall defer the sending of a Minister either to Countries that are near or remote, till there happens something of Importance in them, such as hindring the concluding of some Treaty that may be advantageous to another Prince, who is either his Enemy, or Jealous of his Power ; or a Declaration of War against an Ally, who would be thereby rendred useless by the Necessity
he

he would be under to provide for his own Defence ; the Ministers who are sent on these pressing Occasions, have not time to make Acquaintances, and contract such Friendships, as are necessary for changing the Resolutions that are already taken ; unless they bring with them very powerful Motives, which are chargeable to the Prince who furnishes them, and which often prove fruitless when they are made use of too late.

Cardinal Richelieu, who may be proposed as a Model to the greatest Statesmen, and to whom *France* is so much indebted, had Ministers and Agents constantly residing in all sorts of Countries ; and he procured very great Advantages thereby to the State ; as he himself declares in his *Political Testament*. He expresses himself in these Terms.

States reap so many Advantages from continual Negotiations, when they are managed with Prudence, that it is not possible to believe it, where one does not know it by Experience.

I confess, I did not know this Truth, till five or six Years after I had been employed in
the

the Management of the Publick Affairs; but I have now so great Certainty of it, that I may venture to say boldly, that to Negotiate without ceasing openly or secretly, in all Places, and that although no present Benefit should accrue from it, nor any Prospect of future Advantage present it self, is what is absolutely necessary for the good and welfare of States. I am able to say with Certainty, that in my time I have seen the Face of Affairs in France, and in Christendom, entirely changed, by my having, under the King's Authority, practised this Principle, which till then had been wholly neglected in this Kingdom.

He goes on and says, That the Light of Nature teaches every one to make much of his Neighbours, because as their Neighbourhood puts it in their Power to do Hurt, so it gives them likewise the Power of being serviceable; in the same manner as the Outworks of a Fortified Town hinder the Enemy from approaching immediately the Walls of the Place. And he adds, That Spirits of a lower Size confine their Thoughts within the Bounds of the Country where they are born; but those to whom God has given a greater degree

of Light, omit nothing that may be of Defence to them from afar.

The Testimony of this great Genius ought to have the greater Weight, in that the great things which he has done by the means of Negotiations, are convincing Proofs of the Truth of what he advances. There was nothing of any Moment that past in *Europe* during his Ministry, but what he had a very great share in ; and he was the *Primum Mobile* of the principal Revolutions that happened in it whilst he liv'd.

It was he that form'd the Design of the Revolution in *Portugal*, when in the Year 1640. that Kingdom returned to its Obedience under the lawful Heir of the Crown. He laid hold of the Discontent of the *Catalans*, who took up Arms that Year ; he sent into *Africa*, to negotiate with the *Moors*. He had before that laboured very successfully in the North, to persuade *Gustavus Adolphus*, King of *Sweden*, to penetrate into *Germany*, and by that Means to deliver it from under the Servitude of the House of *Austria*, which then reign'd there most despotically, turning out the

the Princes, and disposing of their States and Dignities in favour of its own Friends and Creatures.

* It was to Cardinal *Richelieu* that People attributed the Revolution that was ready to break out in *Bohemia*, by the Measures which had been there taken for restoring that Elective Kingdom to its ancient Rights, and for procuring *Walslein* to be elected King there; which Design was prevented by the Murder of that General.

He form'd and kept on Foot many Confederacies; he procured to *France* considerable Allies, who contributed to the happy Success of his great Designs, and particularly to that of reducing the Exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria*; which was then upon the Point of invading the Liberties of all

* The Emperor *Ferdinand* invested *Maximilian* Duke of *Bavaria* with the Electoral Dignity, and the *Upper Palatinate*; which he had taken from the Count *Palatine* of the *Rhine*. He depriv'd the Duke of *Mecklenburg* of his Territories, and gave them to Count *Walslein*, General of his Armies.

Europe; if the profound Capacity of this great Minister, and the vast Extent of his Genius, which was most fertile in Expedients, had not prevented it, by Negotiations which he set on Foot in all Parts.

But it is not necessary to have recourse to Examples of past Ages, for knowing the Force and Efficacy of Negotiations; every Days Experience furnishes us with sensible Effects thereof. They occasion sudden Revolutions in great States; they arm Princes, and whole Nations, against their own Interests; they raise Seditions, Hatreds, and Jealousies; they form Leagues, and other Treaties of different Natures, among Princes and States who have opposite Interests; they destroy and break the strictest Unions. And it may be said, the Art of Negotiating, according as it is ill or well managed, gives the Form, good or bad, to general Affairs, and likewise to a great number of particular ones; and that it has a greater Power over the Conduct of Men than all the Laws that have been invented. Because that although Mankind were more Religious

ligious than they are in the Observance of the Laws; yet they have left room for an Infinity of Disputes and Pretensions that are undecided, and which cannot be adjusted but by Treaties and Agreements; which Treaties, both general and particular, become more or less advantageous to each of the Parties concern'd, in proportion to the Degree of Skill and Ability of the Persons who are imployed as Managers.

It is therefore easie to conclude, that a small number of Ministers; well chosen, and dispos'd in the several States of Europe, are capable of rendering to the Prince, or State which imployes them very great Services; who with a small Expence do frequently as much Service as standing Armies would be able to do; because they know how to imploy the Forces of the Country where they reside, in favour of the Interests of the Prince whom they serve; and that there is nothing more useful than a seasonable Diversion made by a neighbouring or remote Ally.

It is likewise the Interest of a great Prince, to imploy Ministers to offer
his

his Mediation in Quarrels that arise between Sovereigns, and to procure Peace to them by the Authority of his Mediation. Nothing is more proper to raise the Reputation of his Power, and to make it be respected by all Nations.

A powerful Prince who constantly maintains wise and able Ministers in the several States of *Europe*; and who studies to make Friends among them; and to have good Intelligence of whatever passes, is in a Condition to determine the Fate of his Neighbours, to maintain Peace, or to foment War among them, according as he sees it suit with his own Interests. But seeing these great Effects depend chiefly on the Conduct and Qualifications of the Ministers who are imploy'd in the Negotiations; it will be proper to examine in particular those which are necessary to the Persons who are design'd for these sorts of Employments.

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

*Of the Qualifications and Conduct of
the Minister.*

GOD having endow'd Men with different Talents, one of the most profitable Advices that can be given them, is to examine thoroughly their own Temper and Constitution, before they make choice of the Profession and Employment for which they design themselves. Thus he who intends to apply himself to the Management of Publick Affairs, ought to consider well with himself, before he engages in that Profession, whether he is born with the Talents necessary for succeeding therein.

The Talents required are, a Spirit of Attention and Application, which is not capable of being distracted with Pleasures, and frivolous Amusements; a right Judgment, which may be able to comprehend things clearly as they are,

are, and pursue the main Point by the shortest and most natural Ways, without insisting upon Niceties, and vain Subtilties, which usually discourage those we treat with ; a quick Penetration, to be able to discover the Secrets of Men's Hearts, and to take Advantage of the least Motions of their Countenances, and of the other Effects of their Passions, which escape sometimes even Men of the greatest Dissimulation ; a Spirit fertile in Expedients, for overcoming the Difficulties which arise in adjusting the Interests wherewith one is charg'd ; a Readiness of Mind, to be able to give a proper Answer to Matters that are unforeseen, and by judicious Answers to avoid a slippery Step ; an Evenness of Temper, and a sedate and quiet Disposition, always ready to hear patiently those with whom he treats ; a free Access, courteous, civil and agreeable ; an easie and engaging Carriage, which contributes much to gain the Affections of those with whom we have to do ; whereas a grave and cold Air, and a severe rugged Mien, commonly disgusts, and causes Aversion.

It

It is necessary above all, that a good Minister should have command enough over himself, so as to be able to resist the strong Inclination he may have to speak before he has well consider'd what he ought to say; and that he do not affect the answering off Hand, without Premeditation, the Propositions that are made to him; and that he take care to avoid falling into the Error of a famous Foreign Ambassador in our own Times, who was so hot in Dispute, that when he was a little warmed by Contradiction, he would often disclose Secrets of Importance, the better to maintain his Argument.

He must beware likewise, on the other Hand, not to fall into the opposite Error of certain mysterious Gentlemen, who make a Secret of every thing, and who magnify meer Trifles, as if they were Matters of the greatest Importance. It is a mark of a Littleness of Soul, not to know how to discern things of Consequence from those which are of no Moment; and to be always upon the reserve, is the way to deprive our selves of the Knowledge of what

is

is doing in the World, and of the means of acquiring any share in the Confidence of those Persons with whom we converse.

An able Minister will take care that no Man shall penetrate into his Secret before the proper time; but it is necessary likewise, that he know how to conceal this Reservedness from those with whom he treats; he must appear to be frank and open with them, and to put a Confidence in them, and he must give them real Proofs of it in things that are not contrary to his own Designs; which insensibly engages them to return the same by other marks of Confidence in Matters that are often of much greater Importance. There is between Ministers a Commerce of mutual Intelligence; one must give, in order to receive; and the ablest Man, is he who draws the greatest Advantage from the said Commerce, because he has Views of a larger Extent, and knows how to improve the favourable Occasions that may offer.

It is not enough for forming an able Minister, that he have all the Knowledge,

ledge, all the Dexterity, and other good Qualities of the Mind; he must have moreover those which depend on the Sentiments of the Soul. There is no Employment which requires a greater Degree of Elevation, and Nobleness of Soul, in one's Actions, than this does.

An Ambassador is in some respect like unto a Comedian, exposed upon the Theatre to the Eyes of the World, to act there the Parts of great Personages. As his Employment elevates him above his Condition, and puts him in some Measure upon a level with Kings and Princes, by the right of Representation, which is annex'd to his Employment; and by the particular Commerce which he is suppos'd to have with them, he must pass for a very bad Actor, if he knows not how to support the Dignity of that Rank. But this Obligation is the Rock upon which many Ministers miscarry, because they do not know precisely wherein it consists.

It is not to brave those with whom we treat, by a foolish Haughtiness, and a rude Carriage, to threaten them, openly or indirectly, where there is no Necessity;

cessity ; to raise Pretensions which tend only to gratify a senseless Pride, or to claim new Privileges, which have no other view than the particular advantage of him who claims them, and for which he often exposes very unseasonably his Master's Authority.

Whoever engages in this kind of Employment with a Spirit of Avarice, and a desire to find therein other Advantages than those which attend the Glory of succeeding in his Negotiations, and to gain thereby the Esteem of his Master, and such Recompence for his Services as he shall think him worthy of, will make but a very indifferent Minister ; and if any Negotiation of Importance succeeds in his Hands, the Success of it is wholly to be attributed to the favourable Conjunction, which of it self removes all Obstacles out of the way.

To keep up the Dignity which is inseparably annex'd to these sorts of Employments, it is necessary, that he who is placed in any of them, be liberal and magnificent, but with Judgment and Design ; that his Magnificence appear in his Train, in his Liveries, and the rest

rest of his Equipage; that his Table be serv'd neatly, plentifully, and even delicately; that he give frequent Entertainments and Divertisements to the chief Persons of the Court where he resides, and even to the Prince himself, if he is disposed to partake of them; that he endeavour to get into his Parties of Pleasure, but in a manner that may be agreeable, and no restraint upon him; and that he always appear there with a frank open Air, full of Complaisance and Civility, expressing a constant desire to please him.

If the Usage of the Country where he resides afford him an Opportunity of conversing with the Ladies, he ought not to neglect to get them upon his Side, by entering into their Pleasures, and endeavouring to render himself worthy of their Esteem. The Power of their Charms has often an Influence over the most important Resolutions, on which the greatest Events depend. But whilst he succeeds to please them by his Magnificence, by his Politeness, and even by his Gallantry, he must take care not to engage his Heart. He ought to re-
collect

collect, that Love is ordinarily accompanied with Indiscretion and Imprudence, and that so soon as he subjects himself to the Will of a fair Lady, how wise soever he be, he runs a Hazard of not being any longer Master of his own Secret. We have seen great Inconveniences happen through this kind of Weakness; the greatest Ministers are not exempt from falling into it, and we need go no farther than our own times, to find remarkable Instances of it.

Seeing the surest way of gaining the favour of the Prince in whose Court we reside, is to gain that of the Persons who are in greatest Credit with him; an expert Minister ought therefore to join to a civil, courteous and complaisant Behaviour, certain Expences which contribute much to open his way for gaining the Esteem of the chief Favourites. But those Expences must be laid out with Artifice, so as that the Persons for whom the Presents are intended may be able to receive them with Decency and Safety. Not but that there are Countries, where no great Art is required to

C

per-

perswade them to accept Presents, but it is always prudent and polite in the Person who makes them, or procures them, to heighten the Merit of them by the way and manner of giving them.

There are Customs establish'd in several Countries, which furnish frequent Occasions of giving small Presents; these kind of Expences, although they be but of a slender Value, contribute much to make an Ambassador be esteem'd, and to render him agreeable in the Court where he resides; and they prove often very useful, in helping him to succeed in the Affairs with which he is charg'd.

An expert Minister will likewise not fail to gain, by Gratuities and secret Pensions, certain Persons who have a greater share of Wit than Fortune, who have the Art of insinuating themselves into all Courts, and by whose means he may reap great Advantages, if he knows how to make a right Choice of them. We have seen Musicians and Opera Women, who, by the free Access they had to certain Princes, and
their

their Ministers, have discovered very great Designs. The same Sovereigns have little Officers under them, who are necessary about their Persons, and to whom they are often obliged to disclose their Thoughts, who are not always proof against a Present that is offer'd them in a proper manner. And we find even some of their prime Ministers, who are Complaisant enough not to refuse Presents, when the Giver knows how to tender them with a good Grace.

The same thing happens usually in Negotiations as in War, that Spies well-chosen contribute more than all other things to the good Success of great Enterprizes. There is no readier way to defeat any great Design, than by divulging a Secret at a proper time; and seeing there is no Money better laid out, nor any Expence more necessary, than what is applied this way, it would be an inexcusable Fault in those who are in Business to neglect it. It were a great deal better that a General had one Regiment less in his Army, and that he were well inform'd of the Con-

dition and number of the Army of the Enemy, and of all its Motions; and that an Ambassador retrench'd his superfluous Expences, in order to imploy what he saved that way in discovering what passes in the Councils of the Country where he resides. And yet the greatest part of Ministers spend much more willingly in keeping a great number of Horses, and idle Servants, than in gaining Persons that may be capable to give them Intelligence of Importance. The *Spaniards* heretofore never neglected to find out such Instruments as these; and that is the reason why their Ministers have succeeded in so many important Negotiations, and of the establishing in the Court of *Spain* that wise Custom, of allowing its Ambassadors an extraordinary Fund, for what they call *Gastos Secretos*.

An Ambassador is term'd an honorable Spy; because one of his chief Occupations is to discover the Secrets of the Courts where he resides; and he discharges his Duty very ill, if he does not know how to lay out the necessary Expences for gaining those Per-

Persons who are best able to inform him.

It is therefore necessary that an Ambassador be born with a liberal Disposition, that he may enter chearfully into this sort of Expences; and he ought to be as liberal this way as his Circumstances will allow him, although his Master should not reimburse him; because his chief Aim being to succeed in his Negotiations, that Interest ought to prevail with him more than all the others, if he has any Greatness of Soul, and is truly qualify'd for his Business.

A wise Prince ought not to neglect to furnish his Ministers with the means of procuring him Friends in the Countries where he has his Interests to manage, by giving Gratuities and Pensions to those who are in Credit in their Country. These Expences well applied return with Interest to the Prince who furnishes them, and they remove the greatest part of the Difficulties that lie in the way of his Designs. If he does not make use of this Expedient, his Ministers make but a slender Progress.

gress in their Negotiations ; he acquires but few new Allies, and he runs the Hazard of losing the old ones.

Courage is likewise a Quality that is very necessary to a publick Minister. Although the *Law of Nations* ought to protect him against all manner of Violence ; yet there happen several Occasions where he finds himself exposed to Danger, and where he stands in need of his Courage to extricate himself, and to facilitate the Success of his Negotiations. A Man that is born a Coward, is not capable of managing any great Designs well ; he is easily shaken by Accidents that are unforeseen ; Fear may make him discover his Secret by the visible Impressions it makes on his Countenance, and the disorder it occasions in his Discourse ; it may even make him take Measures that are prejudicial to the Affairs which he has in Hand ; and when the Honour of his Master is attacked, it hinders his maintaining it with that Vigour and Resolution that is so necessary on these Occasions, and repelling the Injury that is offered to him, with that noble Fierceness

ness and Boldness that is inherent in a Man of true Courage.

A Prelate who was Ambassador at *Rome*, from *Francis* the First, King of *France*, drew upon himself the Displeasure of his Master, for not having spoke with Vigour in a Consistory, where the Emperor *Charles* the V. throwing the Blame of all the Misfortunes of the War on the King of *France*, bragged falsely, that he had offer'd to determine it by a single Combat, and that King *Francis* the First had refused it. The King was so highly incensed at it, that he caused the Lye to be given openly to the Emperor; blamed publicly the Conduct of his Ambassador, in that he had not done it on the Spot; and took a Resolution never to send any other Persons as Ambassadors to the Court of *Rome*, but Men of the Sword, as being most proper to maintain the honour of their Character.

A Minister ought to have a Steadiness of Mind as well as Courage; there are some People who are naturally courageous and brave, who have not this sort of Firmness; which con-

sists in closely pursuing a Resolution, when it is once taken after due Deliberation, and not to vary in his Conduct upon the different Ideas which frequently present themselves to Minds that are naturally irresolute. This Weakness is common to Persons of a lively Imagination, whose Penetration goes often beyond the Mark, and makes them foresee all the Accidents which may happen in the Execution of great Designs, which hinders their determining themselves in the choice of the means for effecting them. But Irresolution is very prejudicial in the carrying on of great Designs; they require a decisive Spirit, which, after having weighed several Inconveniences, knows what Resolution to take, and how to pursue it steddily.

It is reported of Cardinal *Richelieu*, that he was the Man of the World who had the most extensive Views in Politick Affairs; but that he was irresolute in determining his Choice, and that Father *Joseph*, the *Capuchin*, who was much inferior in Parts to the Cardinal, was of great help to him, in that he decided

decided boldly, and determined him in the choice of the several Designs which the Cardinal communicated to him.

There are some Genius's that are born with an Elevation of Soul, and a Superiority of Thought, that gives them the Ascendant over those with whom they treat. But a Minister of this Character ought to take heed that he do not confide too much in his own Knowledge, and that he do not make a wrong use of his Superiority, by rendring it grievous and uneasy to others. Persons of ordinary Parts do often get the better of the greater Genius, who is sometimes bubbled by his trusting too much to his own Skill and Ability; which he ought to imploy in rendring himself useful and agreeable to them, if he would make sure of them.

A skilful Negotiator ought never to found the Success of his Negotiations on false Promises, and on breach of Faith. It is an Error, to believe, according to the vulgar Opinion, that an able Minister ought to be a great Master in the Art of Tricking. Tricking is an

C 5

Effect

Effect of the Littleness of Soul in him that practises it ; and it is a Sign that he has not an Understanding large enough to find out the Means of attaining his Ends, by just and reasonable Ways. I agree that by Tricking People often succeed, but still with less Security ; because it leaves a Grudge, and a desire of Revenge, in the Hearts of those who have been tricked, and who sooner or latter make him feel the Effects of it.

And even although Tricking were not so Contemptible as it is to all noble and generous Souls ; yet a Minister ought to consider, that he will have more than one Affair to Negotiate in the course of his Life ; that it is his Interest to establish his Reputation, and that he ought to look upon it as a real Good, seeing it thenceforward tends to promote the Success of his other Negotiations, and makes him to be receiv'd with Esteem, and with Pleasure, in all the Countries where he is known. He ought therefore to establish so thoroughly an Opinion of his Master's Sincerity, and his own, that no Body should

should ever doubt of what he Promises.


And if a Minister is obliged faithfully to observe all the Promises which he makes to those with whom he treats, it is easie to judge what Fidelity he owes to the Prince or State, who employs him. It is a Truth so well known, and a Duty so indispensable, that it seems to be superfluous to recommend it ; although many Ministers have been treacherous enough to fail in it on several important Occasions. But methinks there is one Observation may be made upon this ; and that is, That the Prince or Minister, who is betrayed by an unfaithful Negotiator, has himself been the first Cause of the Prejudice he has receiv'd by him ; because he neglected to make a good Choice. It is not enough to chuse a Man of Skill and Knowledge for the Management of an Affair of Consequence ; but he must likewise be a Man of known Probity and Integrity, if we will secure the Interests that are trusted with him.

It is true, we don't always find a strict Probity join'd with a great degree of Understanding, and with the Knowledge of all things that are necessary for forming an able Minister, and that we must not form to our selves Ideas of *Plato's Republick*, in the choice of Persons who are designed for these kinds of Employments. It may be likewise said, that Princes, and their chief Ministers, are often obliged to make use of divers Instruments for attaining their Ends; that there have been Men of no great stock of Vertue, who have proved very great Ministers, and who have managed the Affairs they were intrusted with successfully; and that Persons of this Kindney, not being with-held by any Scruples, succeed oftner in Negotiations than Men of Probity, who will make use of no other but fair Means. But the Prince who trusts to Negotiators of this kind, ought to rely upon them no longer than his Prosperity lasts. If the Times become difficult, and any Misfortune happens to him, these Masters of Deceit will be the first to undo him by their Treachery; and will always
join

join with the strongest Side. The Necessity of imploying Persons of undoubted Probity on Occasions of Importance, puts me in Mind of an excellent Answer made by *Monsieur de Faber*, who was *Mareschal of France*, to *Cardinal Mazarin*. This Prime Minister had a mind to engage a Person of Distinction in his Interest; he desired *Monsieur de Faber* to make him great Offers, and owned to him at the same time, that he was not in a Condition to perform them. *Monsieur de Faber* refused to carry the Message, and told him, *That he might find People enough to carry false Promises, but that he would have occasion for Men of Probity to carry true ones; and therefore pray'd him to reserve him for this last Imployment.*

It is also hazardous to trust a Negotiation of Importance with a Man that is irregular and disorderly in his Morals, and in his Domestick Concerns; For how can we expect from him better Conduct and Skill in the Management of the Publick Affairs, than he shows in his own Private Concerns; which ought to be looked upon as the Touchstone

stone of his Capacity. Too great an Inclination to Gaming, to Debauchery, and to frivolous Amusements, is not very consistent with the Attention that Business requires; and it is a difficult Thing for those who suffer themselves to be carried away with this Inclination, to be able to discharge all the Duties of their Employments, and to resist the Temptations which their Fidelity may be sometimes exposed to, that they may have wherewithal to gratify their inordinate Desires; which necessarily increase their Wants.



C H A P. IV.

*Of some other Qualifications required
in a Minister.*

A Man that is naturally violent and passionate, is no ways proper to manage rightly a Negotiation of great Importance; it is a hard Matter for him to command his Temper on all Occasions, so as to be able to check the Heat
of

of his Passion on certain unforeseen Accidents, and in Contradictions and Disputes, which often arise in the course of Business, and so as that his Transports of Passion do not exasperate those with whom he treats.

It is also very difficult, for a Man that is easily worked up into a Passion, to keep his Secret, when his Choler is raised, that he do not drop some Words, or Signs, by which his Thoughts may be easily penetrated; which often occasions the Ruin of the greatest Designs.

Cardinal *Mazarine*, before his Promotion to the Dignity of Cardinal, was sent, upon some important Commission, to the Duke of *Feria*, Governor of *Milan*. He wanted to discover the real Sentiments of that Duke touching the Affair he went upon; he had the Dexterity to put him into a Passion, and, by that means, discovered what he could never have been able to have penetrated, if the Duke had known how to have restrained his Passion.

That Cardinal had made himself so absolute Master of all the outward Effects that the Passions are wont to produce,

duce, that neither, by his Discourse, nor by any Alteration in his Countenance, nor by any other Sign, was it possible for any Man to discover his Thought. And this Quality, of which he was Master in the highest Degree, did contribute very much to make him one of the greatest Ministers of his Time:

A Man who has the Command of himself, and is always in a cool sedate Temper, has a great Advantage in treating with one who is hot and fiery; and it may be said, that they do not fight upon the Square. To succeed in these kinds of Employments, one must speak little, and hear a great deal; one must have Flegm, Reservedness, a great deal of Discretion, and Patience in abundance.

This last Quality is an Advantage that the *Spanish* Nation has over ours; which is naturally lively, restless, and which has no sooner begun an Affair, but would willingly see the end of it; that it may engage in another, and so gratify its natural Inconstancy by shifting from one Object to another. But

it has been observed, that commonly a *Spanish* Minister is not much in haste; that he does not think of Ending for Ending's sake, but to end with Profit, and take advantage of all the favourable Conjunctions that offer, and especially of our Impatience.

Italy has likewise produced a great Number of excellent Ministers, who have contributed very much to raise the Temporal Power of the See of *Rome* to the pitch where we now see it.

France has had, over other Nations that lye more to the Northward than it, the same Superiority in the Art of Negotiating, which the *Spaniards* and *Italians* have had over the *French*. So that it would seem, that the Degree of Knowledge has followed in *Europe* the degree of Warmth in the different Climates.

A Man of an odd, uneven Temper, who is not Master of his Humours and Passions, ought not to engage himself in the Business of Negotiations; the War is much more proper for him: As it carries off a great Number of those who make it their Profession, so it is
not.

not so nice in the Choice of the Persons ; it is like those good Stomachs which digest alike all sorts of Food that is given them, and turn every thing to good Account. Not but that excellent Qualities are necessary for forming a good General ; but as there are many Degrees of Military Command in the Army, he who has not Capacity sufficient for attaining the first Degrees, falls short, and becomes a good Subaltern Officer ; who, nevertheless, is very useful in his Sphere.

It is not the same Thing with respect to a Minister ; if he is not skilful in his Business, he marring often all the Affairs that are committed to his Care, and he does irreparable Damage to his Master, or the State, who employs him.

A Minister ought not only not to be subject to any Humours or Freaks of his own, but he ought to know how to accommodate himself to those of others : He ought to be as *Proteus* in the Fable, always ready to put on all sorts of Shapes, according as Occasion and Necessity may require : He must be gay and chearful with young Princes,
who

who love Mirth and Pleasure ; he is to be serious with those who are serious ; and all his Attention, all his Care, all his Passions, and even his Diversions, should tend to one only End ; which is, to procure Success in the Affairs with which he is charged.

It is not enough for him to execute literally what is contained in his Instructions ; but his Zeal and his Knowledge ought to be imployed in observing all that passes, in order to take Advantage of all the favourable Conjunctions which may offer, and to use his Endeavour to procure such favourable Conjunctions as may tend to the Advantage of his Master, and to give him, from time to time, such Intelligences as may readily procure new Orders from him. There are sometimes such pressing and important Occasions, that he is obliged to determine himself upon the Spot, and to make some Advances, without waiting for Orders from his Master, when he cannot receive them in Time ; but it is necessary that he should have Judgment enough to be able to foresee all the Consequences of such his Proceed-
ing,

ing, and that he should, beforehand, have acquired, in the Mind of his Prince, a certain Degree of Confidence, founded on the Proofs which he has already given him of his Capacity, which contributes much to make his Prince approve of every thing he does, and obliges him to rely much on his good Conduct.

Without these Conditions, it would be Rashness in a Minister to enter into any considerable Engagements in the Name of his Master, without his express Order. But he may, when the Occasion presses, give Assurances that may serve to keep the Affairs in a Condition of being concluded to his Master's Advantage, or to hinder the Conclusion of such as he fancies may be prejudicial to him, until he receives his Orders.

It is proper, that, with all these Qualities, a Minister, and especially he who has the Title of Ambassadour, should be a Man of a plentiful Fortune, that he may be able to support the Expences that necessarily attend that Employment, for the right Discharge of it. But a judicious Prince ought not to fall

fall into a Fault that is common enough to many Princes, which is, to look upon this Quality as the most necessary one in an Ambassador. It is much better to chuse a Skilful Man with a slender Fortune, than a Rich Man with indifferent Parts; because it is not sure, that a rich Man will know how to make the right Use of his Riches; whereas it is certain, that an able Minister will employ his Parts to good Purpose.

The Prince ought likewise to consider, that he may easily furnish a Man that serves him well, with the Means to serve him yet better; but that it is not in his Power to give Understanding to one that has it not.

It is likewise to be wished, that an Ambassador be a Man of Birth, especially if he is employed in the chief Courts: And it would not be amiss, if, with all these Qualities, he had a noble Mien, and an agreeable Personage, which may facilitate to him the Ways of pleasing, and prevent his suffering Affronts upon account of his poor Appearance; as the General *Phi-*

lopemenes

Iopemenes was served, who was made to draw Water for his own Service, because they took him for one of his own Slaves.

There are some Embassies which are transitory, and serve only for Show, which require only a great Name, and a great deal of Wealth, in the Persons who are employed in them; such as Embassies for the Solemnity of a Marriage, a Christening, a Compliment upon a Prince's Accession to the Throne, and others of the like Nature. But when there is Business to be transacted, there a Man is necessary; an Idol will not do; unless he have an able Partner joined with him, who is trusted with the Secret of the Negotiation, and the Management of it; whilst the Man of great Quality, and no great Stock of Sense, takes upon him the Care of making the great Figure, by a sumptuous Table, and a magnificent Equipage.

CHAP. V.

*Of the Knowledge that is necessary and
useful to a Minister.*

A Man who is born with the Qualities that are proper for the Management of Publick Affairs, and perceives in himself an Inclination to apply his Thoughts that Way, ought to begin with informing himself of the present Situation of the Affairs of *Europe*; of the principal Interests which govern therein, and which divide it; of the Form of the several Governments therein establish'd; and of the Character of the Princes, Generals, and Ministers therein, who are in greatest Credit and Esteem.

To have a particular Knowledge of the Interests of the Princes and States of *Europe*, it is necessary, that he learn exactly wherein the Strength, the Revenue, and the Power of each Prince, and of each Commonwealth, does consist,

sist, and how far it extends ; that he inform himself of the Manner in which that Government was established, and of the Pretensions which every one of the said Princes makes to Countries which are not in their Possession ; because those Pretensions maintain, in their Minds, a Desire to get Possession of them, whenever they meet with a favourable Opportunity ; and it is necessary that he distinguish between Claims which have been yielded up by Treaty, and those which are not.

In order to be well instructed in these Particulars, he ought to read, with Application, all the Publick Treaties, both General and Particular, which have been made between the Princes and States of *Europe* ; and he may look upon the Treaties concluded between *France* and the House of *Austria*, as those which give the principal Form to the Affairs of Christendom, because of the Dependance which other Sovereign Princes have on these two great Monarchs. And seeing the Disputes between these two Families do chiefly derive their Origin from those which
were

were between King *Lewis XI.* and *Charles* the Last Duke of *Burgundy*, to whom the House of *Austria* succeeded; it is fitting, that he should inform himself of all the Treaties that have been made since that Time; but more especially of those which have been concluded between the chief Potentates of *Europe*, beginning from the Treaties of *Westphalia*, down to the present Time.

Let him study carefully *the Modern History of Europe*; let him read the several Memoirs, Instructions and Dispatches which we have of many able Ministers, both in Print and Manuscript, which treat of the Affairs where-with they were charged; and which, as they inform us of many Facts that are necessary to the Knowledge of Publick Affairs, so they serve to form the Mind of the Reader, and to give him an Idea of the Manner in which he is to carry himself on the like Occasions.

And one of the best Books he can read for this Purpose, is *Cardinal D'Os-
sat's Letters*; of which we may say to all Ministers, what *Horace* said to all the Poets of his Time of the Works of

D

Homer;

Homer ; That they ought to have them in their Hands Day and Night, if they have a mind to perfect themselves in their Art. There reigns, in the Dispatches of that *Cardinal*, under modest and simple Expressions, a Force and a Dexterity, which, notwithstanding the Ancientness of the Style, give Pleasure to those who have any Relish for that Sort of Writing. One sees thereby, how, by his Dexterity alone, without the Advantage of Birth, without a Title, and without any other Character than that of Agent to Queen *Louisa of Vaudemont*, Relict of *Henry the Third* ; he knew how to carry on the great Work of reconciling *Henry the Great* to the See of *Rome*, after that Ambassador of great Renown had miscarry'd therein ; with what Artifice he overcame all the Subtilties of the Court of *Rome*, and all the Obstacles which the House of *Austria*, then so powerful, threw in the Way of that *Negotiation*. We there see, that nothing escapes his Penetration ; he takes notice even of the least Motions of *Pope Clement VIII*, and of the *Cardinal Nephew* ; he makes Advantage of
every

every thing; he is firm where it is necessary so to be, and he is flexible and complaisant as there is Occasion; and he has the Art to make People desire and ask of him what he has Orders to offer to them, and to obtain more than was hop'd for.

There are, in the Manuscript Collection of the Dispatches relating to the Treaty of *Munster*, Memoirs of Cardinal *Mazarin*, which he sent to the French Plenipotentiaries, which are Master-pieces of this Kind. He there examines all the Interests of every Potentate of Europe; he proposes Ways and Expedients for adjusting them, with a Capacity and a Clearness that is surprizing, and that in a Language to which he was originally a Stranger.

His Dispatches touching the *Pyrenean* Treaty, wherein he gives an Account to the King of his Conferences with *Don Louis D'haro*, First Minister of the Court of Spain, are likewise most excellent in their Kinds; and it is easie to discover in them the Superiority of his Genius, and the Ascendant which he

had over the Spirit of the Spanish Minister, with whom he treated.

There are a great many other *Dispatches* in Manuscript, worthy to be mentioned, which are to be seen in the King's Library, and in other Libraries; such as the Embassies of Noailles, Bishop of *Acs*, and of *Monsieur*; Bishop of *Valence*, in which one discovers two Geniuses of the first Magnitude, and of great Abilities.

We have also the Letters of President *Jeannin*, a Man of excellent Sense and solid Judgment; who contributed much to the Settlement of the State of the *United Provinces* in its Infancy, by the Truce of Twelve Years, which he procured for them, and by his sage Advices touching the Form of the Government of that Commonwealth. The reading of his Letters is very proper to form the Judgment of him who reads them with due Attention.

The *Italian Mercuries* of *Vittorio Siri*, and his *Memorie recondite*, are filled with a Number of most curious Facts, and very useful to a Minister, for his Instruction in the Modern History.

They

They are Extracts of Dispatches and Instructions to several Ambassadors; they contain a great Number of *Memorials*, *Manifestos*, and other *Papers* relating to the different Interests of the Princes of *Europe*, which he treats of very freely, and with a particular Knowledge of the Motives of their Disputes, their Projects, and their Undertakings.

In order to attain to a thorough Knowledge of the principal Interests of the Princes of *Europe*; to the Knowledge of the Things already mentioned, we ought to join that of the Genealogies of Sovereign Princes, together with their Alliances by Marriage, because that is the principal Source of their Claims and Pretensions to several Dominions.

It is likewise necessary to know the Laws and Customs that obtain in the several Countries, and especially those which relate to the Succession to the Sovereignty.

The study of the Form of Government, according to the present Establishment, in every Kingdom of *Europe*,

is very necessary to a Publick Minister. It is not prudent for him to defer the Study of the Government of every Country to which he is sent till he arrives there; for that is to travel into unknown Countries, and to expose one's self to the Danger of going astray.

The Ministers of our Country, who have not travel'd before they be employed in Embassies, and who have not studied these Matters, are usually so full of our own Manners and Customs, that they believe that those of all other Nations ought to resemble *them*; and yet commonly the Resemblance is but very imperfect, and there are very essential Differences between the Authority of one King, and that of another; although there is no Difference in the Name of their Dignity. There are some Countries where it is not enough to have agreed with the Prince and his Ministers; because there are, *there*, other Powers which are a Ballance to his, and who are able to hinder his Resolutions from taking Effect, and can oblige him to take quite contrary Measures. This is what we have seen in
England,

England, where the Authority of the Parliament often obliges the Kings to make Peace or War, against their Will; and in *Poland*, where the general Diets have yet a much greater Power, and where there needs only to gain but one Nuncio of the Diet, and to get him to protest against the Resolutions taken by the King, by the Senate, and by all the other Nuncios or Deputies, of the Provinces, in order to hinder them from taking Effect. It is therefore advisable for a good Minister to know wherein these Differences of Governments do consist; that he may be able, according to the several Conjunctions, to make use of those opposite Powers, in order to attain his Ends.

Besides the general Interests of States, there are particular Interests, and predominant Passions of Princes, and their Ministers or Favourites, which often influence the Resolutions in publick Affairs; so that it is necessary, that an able Minister should be well inform'd of these particular Interests, and of the Passions which prevail over the Minds of those with whom he has to Nego-

tiates, and of those on whom they have their Dependence, that he may act according to the Knowledge he has thereof; whether it be by flattering their Passions, which is the most common way; or by finding out Means to make them quit their Prejudices, and prior Engagements, and to enter into new ones, which is the great *Art of Negotiation*.

A great Man † has said, in the Treatise which he has published touching the Interests of the Princes of *Europe*, that *Princes govern the People, and that Interest governs Princes*. But one may add, that the Passions of Princes, and their Ministers, govern frequently their Interests.

We have a great many Instances of Princes, who have suffer'd themselves to be drawn into Engagements very prejudicial to their State, and to themselves; and it is what we are not to wonder at, seeing whole Nations do often commit the same Faults, and ruine

† The Duke of *Rohan*.

themselves, only to gratify their Hatred, their Revenge, and their Jealousie; which are Passions that are often very opposite to their true Interests. It would be an easie thing to prove this by modern Examples, without having recourse to ancient History; and those Examples might serve to convince us, that Men have not any stable and certain Maxims by which they govern themselves; that they act oftner out of Passion, and according to their Constitution, than by Reason. But seeing the Passions and Caprices of Men in Power govern the Fate of those who are subject to them: it is the Duty of an able Minister, to inform himself as exactly as is possible, of the Inclinations; the Character, and the Designs of those Men who are placed in Authority; in order to imploy the said Knowledge for facilitating his Success in the Affairs committed to his Care. And we may depend upon it, that every Minister who has not made it his Business, to acquire the Knowledge of all these several things before mention'd; will never reason justly on the Affairs with

which he is intrusted, and will be apt to give false Advices, and false Views, to the Prince who employs him.

But in order to attain to the Knowledge of these things, it is not sufficient to search for them in Books; they are acquired much better by conversing with Men imployed in those kinds of Affairs; and by travelling into *Foreign Countries*. For how much so ever any one may have studied before Hand the Manners of other Countries, their Interests, and the Passions of those who govern them; yet all things appear with a different Air, when we come to view them near at Hand; and we cannot form just Ideas of them, but by knowing them our selves.

It were therefore to be wished, that whoever hath a desire to be imploy'd in *Negotiations*, had travell'd over the principal Courts of *Europe*; but travelled after another manner than our young People usually do; who, after having finished their Courses in the Schools, or Academies, go to *Rome*, to see the fine Palaces, the Gardens, and the Remains of some old Edifices; and to

Venice

Venice, there to see the Opera's, and the Courtifans. They ought to travel when they are more advanc'd in Years, and more capable of Reflexion ; that they may learn the Form of the Government of each Country ; know particularly the *Prince* and his *Ministers*, and that with a view of returning back thither sometime or other with a Character. And this would oblige them to remark what passes with greater Attention : And if they have not of their own wherewith to defray the Charges of their travelling ; it would be proper for them to accompany the King's Ambassadors or Envoys, as Gentlemen belonging to their Retinue ; according to the Practice of the *Spaniards* and *Italians*, who look upon it as an Honour for them to accompany the Ministers of their Master in these sorts of Voyages ; that they may thereby have an Opportunity of informing themselves of what passes in Foreign Countries, and of qualifying themselves for being sent thither upon Embassies.

Every Subject of *France*, who has a view of being imploy'd in Negotiations

for the King's Service, ought to understand the *German*, the *Italian* and *Spanish* Languages; together with the *Latin* Tongue, which it would be a Shame for a Man imploy'd in publick Business to be ignorant of; that *Tongue* being the common Language of all the Christian Nations.

It is likewise very useful and fit, that those who are charged with the *Interests* of *States* and upon whose Conduct the Welfare of whole Nations does often depend, should have a general Knowledge of the Sciences that are proper to enlighten their Understanding: But they ought to be Masters of them, so as not be master'd by them; that is, they ought not to esteem them above their true Value, and should consider them only as means of rendering them wiser and abler, and not take occasion from thence to be puffed up with Pride, and to despise those who do not know the same things as they do. They ought likewise not to bestow too much of their time on those Studies; one that is engaged in publick Business, ought to consider that he is design'd for
an

an active Life, and not to spend too much of his time in his Closet; that his chief Study ought to be, to inform himself of what passes among the Living, preferably to what past among the Dead; to penetrate into the inward Recesses of Men's Hearts, and to learn the Art of managing them, and leading them to the end which he proposes.

If we could establish it as a firm and lasting Maxim in *France*, not to employ any Persons in *publick Negotiations*, except those who have gone through this kind of Apprenticeship, and these sorts of Studies; and who are able to give a good account of the Countries where they have been; in the same manner as they have laid it down for a constant immutable Rule, not to bestow any considerable Employment in the Army, except on those who have served several Campaigns; it is easie to judge, that the King would be better serv'd in his *Negotiations*, and that a greater number of able Ministers would be brought up, which is the more to be desired; because there are several Occasions where the Perfection of the Art
of

of War, which reigns in *France* at present with so much Glory for the whole Nation.

But since Men have not that degree of Perfection as to serve without hopes of Reward; it were to be wish'd, that there were in *France* more degrees of Honour and Fortune for those who have served well in Embassies; in the same manner as there are in the other Courts of *Europe*, where Persons who have distinguish'd themselves in these Employments, are almost sure to rise by that way, to the chief Employments, and to the greatest Dignities, of the State: And we cannot be at too great Pains in raising a Profession which hitherto has been too much neglected among us, and which may be of great Benefit to the Service of the King, and Grandeur of the Monarchy.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Of Ambassadors, Envöys and Residents.

BEFORE we enter into the detail of all the Duties incumbent on Ministers in general ; it will be proper to mention the different *Titles* which are given them, together with the *Functions* and *Privileges* annex'd to their *Employments*.

Publick Ministers may be divided into two kinds ; the first and second Order. Those of the first Order, are *Ambassadors Extraordinary*, and *Ambassadors Ordinary* ; those of the second Order, are *Envöys Extraordinary*, and *Residents*.

Ambassadors Extraordinary do receive some Distinctions which *Ambassadors in Ordinary* have not : *Ambassadors Extraordinary* of *Crown'd Heads*, are lodged and defray'd in *France* three Days successively, by the King's Order, in the Palace appointed for the Reception of
Am-

Ambassadors Extraordinary. *Ambassadors* in Ordinary are not lodged, nor defray'd at the King's Expence ; but, that excepted, they have the same Honours, and the same Privileges, as *Ambassadors Extraordinary* : The chief of which are, to enjoy for themselves, and their Domesticks, the Security which they are entitl'd to by the *Law of Nations* ; to be cover'd in the King's Presence when they have their publick Audiences, because on that solemn Occasion they represent their Masters ; to be carried to their Audience in the King's Coaches, and to enter with their Coaches into the innermost Court of the Louvre. They have Canopies in the Apartment where they give Audience ; their Wives have the Privilege of sitting on a Stool when they have Audience of the Queen, and are allow'd to have stately Covers for the Roofs of their Coaches.

The Ambassadors of the Dukes of Savoy had in France the same Honours as those of Crown'd Heads, both for themselves and their Wives.

The

The King's Ambassadors have different Ceremonials, according to the Customs established in the respective Countries where they reside. The Ambassador of *France* at the Court of *Rome* gives place in his own House to the Ambassadors of Crown'd Heads, and to that of *Venice*; and gives it not to the Ambassadors of other Sovereign Princes, to whom the King's Ambassadors give place in other Courts. The Ambassador of *France* takes place of all the Ambassadors of other crown'd Heads, in all the Ceremonies at *Rome*, next to the *Emperor's* Ambassador. These two Ambassadors receive *there* on all Occasions the same Treatment, and treat one another upon the same Foot.

The Ambassadors of Crown'd Heads at *Rome*, sit and are uncover'd when they have Audience of the *Pope*.

There are several Courts where the King's Ambassadors give place in their own Houses, to dignified Persons in the Countries where they reside; as at *Madrid* to the *Grandeos* of *Spain*, and to the chief Officers; in *London* to the Peers of the Kingdom; in *Sweden* and *Poland*.

Poland to the Senators, and to the great Officers; and in no Country do they give place to the Envoys of other Crowns.

The King never sends any Ambassadors to the Electors, and he *Negotiates* with them by the Intervention of Envoys.

Envoys Extraordinary are a sort of publick Ministers, who have not the right of Representation, that being solely annex'd to the Title of *Ambassador*; but they enjoy the same Security which the *Law of Nations* gives to all the Ministers of Sovereign Princes. They do not make publick Entries in *France*, as Ambassadors do; they are conducted to their Audience of the King by the Introducer of Ambassadors, who goes and takes them up at their own House in one of the King's Coaches. They speak to the King standing and bare headed, the King being seated and cover'd.

The *Emperor* receives all the King's Envoys standing and cover'd, and remains so during all the time of the Audience;

dience; the Envoy being all alone with the *Emperor*, standing and uncover'd.

The Temporal Electors receive them, and speak to them standing and bare headed, during the publick Audiences which they give them; and they are seated and cover'd when they have Audience of the Spiritual Electors.

The *Sovereign Princes of Italy* are cover'd, and make the Envoys be cover'd; except the Duke of *Savoy*, who did not make them cover themselves, even before his Accession to the Crown of *Sicily*; and who spoke to them standing and cover'd, whilst they stood and were uncover'd.

The Title of *Plenipotentiary* is given to Envoys as well as *Ambassadors*, according as there is Occasion. The Ministers whom the King keeps at the Diet of *Ratisbnone*, have there the Title of *Plenipotentiary*, although they be not *Ambassadors*.

Residents are also publick Ministers; but this Title begins to be in Disrepute, now that at the Court of *France*, and at that of the *Emperor*, a Difference is made between them and Envoys. This Difference

Difference has been the Occasion that almost all the Ministers of Princes who had the Title of Resident in *France*, have laid it aside by Order of their Masters, who have given them the Title of Envoy Extraordinary. However, this Title subsists still at *Rome*, and in other Courts and Republicks, where Residents are treated on the same Foot as Envoys.

There are *private Envoys*, who have only private Audiences of the *Kings*, or other *Sovereigns*, with whom they treat, and who ought to enjoy the same Safety that publick Envoys have, and to be acknowledged as *Ministers*, so soon as they have delivered their Credentials from their *Masters*, who give them that Quality.

There are likewise *Secretaries*, or *Agents*, who follow the Court, to solicit *there* the Affairs of their Masters; but in *France* they are not admitted to an Audience of the King; they have Audience only of the Secretary of State, or the Minister who has the Charge of Foreign Affairs. And although they be not looked upon as Ministers, yet they

they enjoy the Protection and Security which the *Law of Nations* gives to Foreign Ministers.

The King does not any longer receive any of his Subjects in the Quality of *Ministers* from other Princes; and they cannot take upon them the Charge of their Affairs in *France*, otherwise than as *Agents* who attend the Levees of the Secretary of State; except the Ambassador of *Malta*, who is commonly a *French Knight*. The King does him the Honour to allow him to be covered at his publick Audiences, as representing the Great Master of the Order, who is owned for a *Sovereign Prince*.

It is only *Princes* and *Sovereign States* that have Right to give the Character of *Ambassador*, of *Envoy*, or of *Resident*. Those are called *Deputies*, whom the Estates of a Country, or the Magistrates of a Town, send to their Sovereign, and they are not Publick Ministers; they are subject to the Jurisdiction of the Country, as other Subjects are; and they do not enjoy the Privilege of the *Law of Nations*, which reaches only to the Stranger, and not

to the Citizen. But the Deputies of Provinces and Towns, although Subjects, ought, nevertheless, to be in Safety, during their Deputation, by vertue of the *Publick Faith* which Princes keep to their Subjects, as well as to particular Strangers; who come into their Territories upon the Faith of their Passports; provided that neither the one, nor the other, do any thing contrary to the Laws of the State, or the Publick Peace.

There are, in *Italy*, some Towns that are in Subjection, which have preserved the Right of sending Deputies, with the Title of *Ambassador*, to the Sovereigns to whom they are subject; such as the Town of *Bologna*, and that of *Ferrara*, which send *Ambassadors* to the Pope; and the Town of *Messina*, which sent likewise *Ambassadors* to the King of *Spain*, before the last Revolt. There are also some Towns in *Spain*, which have retained the same Privilege; but these pretended *Ambassadors* have only an honourable Name, and an empty Title, without enjoying the Privileges which appertain to true Am-

Ambassadors, and to the *Envoys* of a *Prince*, or *Sovereign State*, to another *Sovereign*.

These *Ambassadors* of *Towns*, or *Provinces*, that are in Subjection, are like those whom the *Roman People* received in old Times on the Behalf of the *Provinces*, the *Towns* and *Colonies*, that were subject to their Empire, to whom they gave the Name of *Legati*; which is given at this Day in *Latin* to *Ambassadors*. And it is this Similitude of Name that has given Occasion to the Error of Lawyers, who are not very well versed in the Rights of Sovereigns, and which they confound with what they meet with in the *Roman Law*; believing that *Ambassadors* are subject to the Jurisdiction of the Country where they reside, without considering the Difference there is between those *Ambassadors* whom the People of *Rome* received from their Subjects, or from those who paid them Tribute, and the *Ambassadors* of *Princes* and *States* that are *Independent*, who represent their Sovereigns in all the Countries to which they are sent.

There

There are in the Free Cities, and Towns of Commerce, as at *Hamburg* and *Lubeck*, Merchants who procure to themselves the Title of Commissioners of certain Princes; but they are only *Factors* and *Agents*, to buy Things for them, to receive their Letters, and make Remittances of Money by Bills of Exchange. They are not owned as *Ministers*, no more than the *Consuls* of Nations; who are established in Sea-Ports, and Trading-Towns, to decide the Differences which arise among the Merchants of their own Nation; and who enjoy, nevertheless, certain Privileges, and the Publick Security which the Law of Nations allows to Ministers. They are even looked upon as Ministers in the Scales of the *Levant*; that is to say in the principal trading Towns of *Asia* and *Africa*; such as *Aleppo*, *Smyrna*, *Grand Cairo*, *Alexandria*, *Tunis*, *Algier*, and others.

There are some Ministers who have attempted to introduce a new Character, between that of Ambassador, and that of Envoy; some under the Title of *Commissary-Plenepotentiary*, which the Ministers of the Emperor to the Diet of the

the Empire take to themselves; and the others under the Name of *Deputy Extraordinary*, which the States General of the *United Provinces* give to some of their Ministers. But those who have these Titles, have never as yet been owned otherwise than as Envoys. And every Foreign Minister, who has not, in his Credentials, or in his Powers, the Title of Ambassador, whatever other Title he may have there given him, has no Right to pretend, with respect to the Publick Ceremonial, to be received any otherwise than as an Envoy. He may, perhaps, obtain particular Distinctions in Consideration of his Birth, his Credit, and the Rank which he has about the Prince, or in the State, which sends him: But he ought not to pretend to the Honours that are due only to Ambassadors, and which are paid to them, only because of the Right of Representation, which is annexed to that Title alone.

Although the Quality of Ambassador Extraordinary has something in it more honourable than that of Ordinary, yet they treat one another upon an equal

E

Foot,

Foot, when there is an Equality between the Princes whom they represent; the Title of Extraordinary giving no Superiority over the Ambassador in Ordinary; only this last gives place to the Ambassador Extraordinary of his own Prince, when they are in the same Country with these different Titles. But an Ambassador in Ordinary of a Crowned Head takes the Hand, in a Third Place, of an Ambassador Extraordinary of an inferior Potentate, and does not yield the Place to an Ambassador Extraordinary of a Prince of equal Dignity with his own.

Envoys Extraordinary, and Residents, treat one another in the same Manner on like Occasions; that is to say, the Resident of a Prince of a superior Quality takes place of an Envoy Extraordinary of a Prince of an inferior Rank.


It is not the same thing between Ambassadors and Envoys. An Envoy of a Crown'd Head is obliged to give place to an Ambassador of a Sovereign Prince of a lower Degree. Of which here is an Instance:

An

An Envoy of the Emperor's, at the Court of *France*, being some Years ago present at a publick Show, took the Place which was designed for the Ambassador in Ordinary of the Duke of *Savoy* at the same Court, and pretended a Right to take place of him, because of the Difference of the Qualities of their Masters: But the Dispute was decided in Favour of the Ambassador, as having a superior Character, without having any Regard to the Difference of the Ranks of their Princes. And the Emperor's Envoy was obliged to quit the Place which he had taken Possession of, and to leave it for the Ambassador of *Savoy*.

The Title of *Excellency* is given to all Ambassadors, Extraordinary and Ordinary; and it is not given to Envoys, unless they pretend to it by reason of some other Quality, such as that of Ministers of State, Senator, or Great Officer of a Crown. This Title of *Excellency* is not used at the Court of *France*, as it is in *Spain*, in *Italy*, in *Germany*, and in the Northern Courts; and it is only Strangers that give it in

France to the Ministers, and Officers of the Crown; and who receive it from them, when they have Titles or Qualities, that give them a Right to pretend to it.



C H A P. VII.

Of Legates, Nuncio's and Internuncio's.

THE Court of Rome has Three different Degrees in the Titles which it gives to the Ministers whom it sends to Foreign Courts.

The First is that of *Legate à latere*; The Second is that of Nuncio in Ordinary, or Extraordinary; And the Third is that of Internuncio.

The *Legates à latere*, are always Cardinals, to whom the Pope usually gives very ample Powers, both for Negotiating the Affairs they have in Charge, and for granting Dispensations, and other Favours of the Holy See. They are received by all the Catholick Princes with extraordinary Honours.

In

In *France*, they are attended by Princes of the Blood, at their Publick Entries; they sit and are covered when they have Audience of the King; whereas the Pope's Nuncio's and Ambassadors speak to him standing.

The Legates have likewise an Honour paid them which Nuncio's and Ambassadors have not in *France*; which is that of sitting at the King's Table at the Entertainments of Ceremony which the King gives them. They have a Crucifix carry'd before them, as an Ensign of their Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction; which is very much limited in *France*, and owned only in some particular Cases, which are specified in the Approbation of the Bulls of their Legation, which is done in the Parliament of *Paris*; where they are obliged to present them before they can make any Use of them. The Character of Nuncio, Ordinary or Extraordinary, is seldom given to any other besides Prelates, who are consecrated Archbishops, or Bishops. They are received in *France*, and conducted, by a Prince, to their first Audience of Leave, with-

out any Difference between a Nuncio Extraordinary, and a Nuncio in Ordinary, unless it be, that the first has the Precedency of the Nuncio in Ordinary, when there are two of them together, with these different Qualities.

However, the Prelates of the Court of *Rome* prefer the Title of Nuncio in Ordinary in the Courts of *France*, *Spain*, and that of the Emperor, to the Title of Nuncio Extraordinary; because the first procures to them more certainly a Cardinal's Hat, which is the Dignity they aspire to.

When the Pope is about to name a Nuncio in Ordinary for the Court of *France*, he orders a List of several Prelates to be given to the King's Minister at *Rome*, and the King rejects such of them as are not agreeable to him.

The Pope's Nuncio's in *France* give place, in their own Houses, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and do not yield it to Bishops, nor Archbishops, when they receive their Visits in Ceremony. They have here no Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, as they have at *Vienna*, in *Spain*, in *Portugal*, in *Poland*,

Poland, and in other Catholick States; where they give Judgment in several Causes, and grant Dispensations, in the same manner as the Archbishop, or Bishop, who is the Ordinary. They receive only in *France* the Professions of Faith of such Persons as are named by the King to Bishopricks, and the Informations touching their Life and Manners.

They give the Hand in their own Houses to Ambassadors of Crowned Heads, and to the Ambassador of the Republick of *Venice*, who are in the same Court with them; and all Ambassadors give them the Hand in a Third Place, except the Ambassadors of Protestant Kings, who have no publick Commerce with them. In speaking to them, People give them the Title of *Seigneurie Illustrissime*, and in writing to them, some give them the Title of *Excellency*, as to Ambassadors; and they receive it commonly very willingly, although it be a Lay-Title.

The Internuncio's are a kind of Residents of the Pope, who has usually one at *Brussels*, residing with the Governor of the *Netherlands*. The Auditors of

Nuncio's remain often with the Quality of Internuncio's in several Courts, from the Departure of one Nuncio, until the Arrival of another. The Court of *France* does not receive them in this Quality; but only as Auditors of the Nunciature. They are not admitted to have Audience of the King, but only of the Secretary of State, or of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the Functions of a Minister.

THE Functions of a Minister who is sent into a Foreign Country, may be reduced to two principal Heads; the one is, to Negotiate there the Affairs of his own Prince; and the other is, to discover those of others.

He Negotiates the Affairs of his Master with the Prince, or with one of his chief Ministers, with a Council, or with Commissioners who are appointed to examine his Propositions. In all these

these different Ways of Negotiating, he ought to found chiefly the Success of his Negotiations on the Uprightness and Integrity of his own Proceeding; if he pretends to succeed by Subtilties, and by the Superiority of Genius which he may fancy he has over those with whom he treats, he may be very readily deceived. There is no Prince, or State, which has not a Council able enough to know his true Interests. Even the People who, to outward Appearance, are the least refined, are those who understand their Interest best, and who pursue it most steadily. So that a Minister, let him be never so able, must not pretend to put upon them in that Matter; but his Business is to employ all his Wit and Understanding, to convince them of the real Advantages which they will find in the Things which he has in Charge to propose to them. It is the Saying of an ancient Philosopher, That the Friendship which is between Men, is only a Commerce wherein every one seeks his own Interest; the same Thing may be said with much greater Reason of the Engagements

E;

gements and Treaties which are made between Sovereign Princes. There are none of them but what are founded on their mutual Advantages; and when both Sides do not find their Advantage by the Treaties, they do not subsist long, and they fall of themselves. So that the great Secret of Negotiation, is to find out the Means of reconciling those common Advantages, and of making them, if it is possible, to keep even Pace together. It is necessary likewise, that the most powerful of the two Sovereigns who treat together, should make the first Advances, and be at the necessary Charges for compleating this Union; because he has in view much greater Objects, and Advantages much more considerable, than the Money which he lays out, in Subsidies to an inferior Prince, and Gratuities or Pensions to his Ministers; to engage them to assist him with their Forces, and to favour his Designs.

If a Minister, instead of using soft and fair Means, and endeavouring to gain his Point by the Force of Reason
and

and Persuasion, will give himself haughty Airs, pretending to threaten People into a Compliance with his Proposals; he ought to have an Army ready at Command to enter the Country where he Negotiates, in order to back his Pretensions. Without that, he may reckon upon it, that his Proposals will not be complied with, although they should be never so advantageous to the Prince to whom he makes them in the Manner he does.

When a Prince, or a State, is powerful enough to give the Law to all his Neighbours, the Art of Negotiation becomes useless, because he has only to declare his Will. But when the Forces may be balanced, a Prince, or State, that is Free and Independent, does not determine himself to favour one of the two Parties, except in Consideration of the Advantages which may redound to himself thereby, and the kind Usage which he receives from him.

A Prince who has not any longer Enemies that are capable of gainfaying his Pleasure, imposes Tributes on the other Neighbouring Potentates. But a

Prince who labours to aggrandize himself, and who has potent Enemies, ought to be liberal and bountiful towards his Inferiors, that he may augment the Number of his Friends and Allies ; and he ought not to exert his Power, except in doing Good.

The principal Function therefore of the Minister, is to labour to form a strict Union between his own Prince and the Person to whom he is sent ; or to cultivate it, in Case it be already form'd, and to augment it by his Care and good Offices. If there be any Misunderstanding between them, he must do his Endeavour to remove it, and to prevent the bad Effects which may arise from it. He is to maintain the Honour and Interest of his Prince, in the Country where he resides ; he is to protect and defend the Interests which the Subjects of his Prince have in that Country ; he is to encourage their Trade there, and to maintain a good Correspondence between them and the Subjects of the Prince to whom he is sent.

He

He ought always to suppose, that there is no Prince, or State, that will be willing that their Minister should involve them in Broils, that Princes who seek new Quarrels, never want the Means of raising them; that they arise oftner than they would desire by unforeseen Accidents; and that it is therefore Prudence in a Minister to avoid every thing that may give occasion to new Disputes, and to govern himself in such a manner, as that he may be no ways blamed for having contributed to them.

His second Function being to discover what passes in the Court, and in the Council of the Country where he resides; he ought in the first place, to get from his Predecessor in the same Country all the Light that he is able to give him, and to be introduced by him to such Acquaintances as may be proper to help him to a right Intelligence of what passes. He ought afterwards, to cultivate a Friendship with those Acquaintances which his Predecessor left him; and to endeavour to procure new ones, if he thinks that the former are not

He

not able to give him all the Information he wants.

It would be very useful to imitate in this matter the Order that is establish'd by the Republick of *Venice*; which makes its Ambassadors give in a Relation in Writing, of the State of the Court from whence they return; as well for the Information of the Republick, as for the Instruction of the new Ambassadors who succeed them, which is a great help to them at their Arrival. And it has been observ'd, that there are usually no Ministers better informed of the State of the Courts where they have resided, than those of *Venice* are.

In order to discover what passes in a strange Country, it is necessary to know by whom, and in what manner we are to make the Discovery.

A Minister who arrives in a Court, or in a Republick, may gather several Lights from other Foreign Ministers whom he finds in the same Country; for as they all labour to discover what is doing there, they commonly communicate to one another very freely several Advices which may respect their
common

common Interests; provided their Masters be not engaged in opposite Parties.

As to the People of the Country, and the Information that may be gathered from them; when a Minister serves a great Prince, the surest and shortest way is to engage in the Interests of his Master some one of the Council of the Prince, or State, to which he is sent, by such ways as a prudent and skilful Minister knows how to make use of, when his Master is willing to furnish him with the Means. But he ought to know well how to make choice of his Correspondent, that he be not made his Bubble.

There are in Negotiations, as in War, double Spies, who take Pay of both Sides. There are some who give at first very good Advices, that they may be the better able afterwards to impose upon the Minister who receiv'd them. There are even some Princes, who have the Cunning to detach some of their Confidants, who under the Appearance of a strict Friendship with a Foreign Minister, give him false accounts

counts of things; the better to conceal the true Designs of their Master. And there are some Ambassadors so weak as to suffer themselves to be put upon that way.

There was in *England*, in the Year 1671. a *Dutch* Ambassador, whom King *Charles* the Second's Councillors persuaded so fully that the King their Master had no Intention to make War against the *States*; that the said Ambassador assured his Masters, by all his Expresses to them, that they had nothing to fear from that Quarter; ridiculing all the Advices which they receiv'd from other Hands of the Resolution taken at *London*, to come to a Rupture with them; and it has been since discovered, that those *English* Intelligencers were employ'd by the Court to lull the said *Dutch* Ambassador asleep. There have been in our Days Ambassadors of other Countries who have fallen into the same Snare.

An able Minister does not readily give Credit to all the Advices which he receives; he examines before-hand all the Circumstances, the Interests and Passions

Passions of those who give them ; by what means they may have discover'd the Designs which they give Advice of ; if they agree with what he knows otherwise of the State of Affairs, whether any Motions or Preparations are made, which render those Advices probable ; and a quantity of other Signs, from which a Man of Skill and Penetration may be able to draw just Consequences, and concerning which it is to as little purpose to give Rules to those who are not born with such a discerning Faculty as is necessary on those Occasions, as it is to speak to Men that are deaf ; neither is it indeed for the Information of such that these Remarks are written.

A Minister may discover the Secrets of the Country where he resides, either by the help of those who have a share in the Administration of Affairs, or of those in whom they confide. It is hardly possible but there will be some interested Persons who may be gain'd, indiscreet Persons, who often tell more than they ought, discontented and passionate Persons who oftentimes divulge things.

things of Consequence, to discharge their Spleen.

The Ministers who are the most dexterous, and even the most trusty, are not always upon their guard; we have known some who have had very upright Intentions for the Service of their Prince, and for the Welfare of his State; and who nevertheless have let slip Words and outward Signs, by which People have discover'd their most secret Ties and Engagements.

There are some Courtiers, who, although not of the Council, discover by a long Knowledge of the Affairs of their Court, what has been resolv'd on in Council; and who are willing enough to tell it, that they may be admir'd for their Penetration.

It is not an easie matter to conceal from a Minister that is active, attentive, and of a penetrating Judgment, a Resolution of Importance; which is attended with divers Circumstances, capable of making it take Vent; although he should have no manner of Advice of it from those who have an Opportunity of knowing it.

He

He ought to send an exact account to his Prince of all the Advices which he receives, with all the Circumstances that attend them ; that is to say, from whom, and in what manner he has receiv'd the said Advices ; and he ought to send his own Conjectures thereupon, that the Prince may be able to judge if the Consequences which his Minister draws from thence be well or ill founded.

There are some things which a dexterous Minister may be able to know of himself, of which he ought to give an account to his Master, the Knowledge whereof may be very useful to him for enabling him to penetrate into the most hidden Designs.

He may and ought to discover what are the predominant Passions and Inclinations of the Prince with whom he resides ; whether he be Ambitious, whether he be a Man of Application and Industry ; whether he loves War, or prefers his Ease or Pleasures to Business ; whether he governs of himself, or is govern'd by others, and how far ; what is the Genius, the Inclinations, and

and the Interests of those who have the Management of him.

He ought to inform himself exactly of the Condition of his Forces, both by Land and Sea; the number of his strong Towns and Castles, and whether they be well fortified, and in good Condition; of the State of the Sea Ports, his Navy and his Arsenals; what Troops he is able to bring into the Field, Cavalry as well as Infantry, without draining his Garrisons and Frontiers; what are his ordinary and extraordinary Revenues, and what Credit he has to borrow of his Subjects; whether they be ill or well affected towards him: He ought to know the Intrigues that are in the Court, whether there be Factions and Divisions in the State, and among the Ministers, touching the Administration of the Government, or concerning Religion; his annual Expence, both for the Household, and for the Maintenance of his Army, and for his Pleasures; what Alliances, Offensive and Defensive, he has with other Princes; what are the Potentates who are at Enmity with him, or suspected by

by him ; and what Princes and States court his Friendship ; what Advances they make on their Part, and for what End ; what is the principal Trade that is carried on in his Dominions ; and whether his Country be barren or fruitful.

He must be very assiduous in giving his Attendance at the Prince's Court, and must endeavour to make himself as familiar there as he can, that he may often see and speak to the Prince without Ceremony, and by that means be always in the way of discovering what passes, and have frequent Opportunities of insinuating to the Prince what is most agreeable to the Interests, with which he is charged.

If he resides in a Commonwealth, or in a Kingdom where the People have a share in the Government, he ought to assist at all their Diets, or Assemblies ; ought to keep a good Table, that he may thereby engage the Deputies to be often at his House ; and he ought by his Civilities and his Presents, to gain those of greatest Esteem, and who are most capable of diverting the Resolutions that

that are prejudicial to the Interests of his Master, and of favouring his Designs.

A good Table is the easiest and best way of getting Intelligence of what passes, when the People of the Country are at Liberty to go and dine with the Ambassador. And the Expence which he is at on that Score, is not only honourable, but likewise very profitable to his Master, when the Minister knows rightly to apply it.

It is the natural Effect of good Eating and Drinking to beget Friendships, and to create a Familiarity and Frankness among those who eat and drink together; and when People begin to be a little warm'd with Wine, they often discover Secrets of Importance.

There are several other Functions annex'd to the Employment of a publick Minister; such as that of notifying to the Prince, or State, where he resides, the Occasions of Joy or Grief, which happen to the Prince whom he represents; and that of making Compliments of Congratulation, and of Condolance,

dolance, on the like Occasions, to the Prince in whose Court he resides.

A Minister who knows his Business, is always among the first to pay this Civility; and he does it in such Terms as to persuade the Prince to whom he makes the Compliment, that his Master does really and truly interest himself in whatever befalls him: He ought not to delay the doing of this until he receives his Master's Orders, but ought to signify to the Prince, that he knows his Master's Intentions so well, that he can assure him before hand of the part he takes in every Event that happens to him, be it good or bad; and that he expects daily Orders from his Master to make him particular Compliments thereupon.

The Functions of the publick Minister cease by the Death of the Prince who sent him, or by the Death of the Prince to whom he is sent, until he receives new Credentials. They cease likewise, when he is recalled by his Prince, or when there happens a War to be declared by either of the two Sovereigns against the other. But the Pri-

Privileges which are annex'd to his Character by the Law of Nations, subsist still notwithstanding the Declaration of War, and the other Causes of the Cessation of his Functions, until he returns to his Master.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Privileges of Foreign Ministers.

AL L Ambassadors, Envoys and Residents have a right to a free Exercise, in their Houses, of the Religion of the Prince, or State, whom they serve, and to admit to it all the Subjects of the same Prince who happen to be in the Country where they reside. These Ministers are not subject to the Jurisdiction of the Judges of the Country where they have their Residence; and their House ought to be exempted from being search'd by Magistrates, and Officers of Justice, being looked upon as the House of the Sovereign

reign whose Ministers they are, and as a Sanctuary in that respect.

We cannot enough condemn those Foreign Ministers who abuse the Right of Sanctuary, by sheltering, in their Houses, profligate and flagitious Wretches, who are sentenced to Death for enormous Crimes, and who drive a scandalous Trade with the Protection granted them. A wise and able Minister ought never to engage his Master's Authority on such Occasions, and for a Cause so odious as that is, of establishing the Impunity of Crimes in the Country where he is. It ought to satisfy him, that his Right of Sanctuary be acknowledged, and be not violated; but he ought not to make use of it, except on important Occasions, for the Service of his Master, and never for his own Benefit.

A Prince, or Common-wealth, ought never to suffer any of his Officers of Justice, or any others of his Subjects, of whatever degree of Quality they be, to violate the *Laws of Nations* in the Person of any Foreign Minister, who is own'd as such in his Dominions. And

if any of his Subjects has the temerity to contravene the said Law, the Prince is oblig'd to procure speedy Satisfaction to be made to those Ministers for the Insults which have been offer'd to them, in the same manner that he would expect Satisfaction to be made in the like Case to his own Ministers in other Countries.

There are several Ministers who make a very bad use of the Right of Exemption, which they are allow'd in some Countries, by which they are freed from paying the usual Duties of such Wares and Provisions as are necessary for the use of their House; and who under that Pretext import a much greater Quantity for the use of Merchants, from whom they receive a Tribute, for lending them their Name to defraud the Sovereign of his Dues. These kinds of Profits are unworthy of a publick Minister, and render him, as well as the Prince who authorizes him in these Practices, odious to the State which receives Prejudice thereby. A wise Minister ought to content himself with the Franchises which he finds established

ed in the Country to which he is sent, without ever abusing them for his own particular Advantage, either by extending them beyond their due Bounds, or partaking in Frauds which are practis'd under his Name.

The Council of *Spain* has been oblig'd for some Years past to regulate these Privileges of Exemption for all the Foreign Ministers who reside at *Madrid*, and in lieu thereof to allow to every one of them a certain Sum of Money yearly, according to their respective Characters, in order to prevent these Abuses. And the Republick of *Genoa* takes the same Method, with respect to the Ministers of Crown'd Heads who reside with them.

The Privileges which the *Law of Nations* gives to Foreign Ministers, allow them to use their Endeavours to discover what passes in the Councils of the Country where they are, and to gain for that end such Persons as are able to give them Intelligence; but they are not thereby intitled to form Cabals for disturbing the Peace and Quiet of the State. The same *Law of Nations* which

secures their Persons, ought likewise to provide for the Safety of the Prince or Government, to which they are sent. They cannot form any Parties against the establish'd Government of the Country where they are, without violating the Publick Faith; and whenever they attempt any thing of that kind, they expose themselves to be treated there as Enemies.

Charles Emanuel, the first of the Name, Duke of *Savoy*, held Correspondence and entred into Cabals in *France*, with many of the chief Nobility of the Court of King *Henry IV.* He went thither in Person, under Pretext of paying his Respects to the King; but his true Errand was to carry on his Intrigues, and to strengthen his Party by his Dexterity, and by his Liberality; and so to put it out of the King's Power to force him to restore the *Marquiship of Salusse*, which he had usurped during the Disorders of the League. The King discover'd the Duke's Intrigues, and it was debated in Council, what was proper for his Majesty to do thereupon. The Council was of Opinion, that the Duke being
come,

come, under a false Colour of Friendship, to disturb the Quiet of the Kingdom, the King had right to seize on his Person, as an Enemy, without violating the Law of Nations; and that he ought not to let him go out of *France*, until he had made Restitution of the *Marquisship of Salusse*. But the King was of a different Sentiment from his Council. *The Duke*, said he, *is come to see me on my Word; if he fails in what he owes to me, I will not follow so bad an Example; I have too noble an Example of this kind in my own House, not to imitate it.*

He meant that of King *Francis the First*, who suffer'd the Emperor *Charles the Fifth* to pass through *France*, without obliging him to restore the Dutchy of *Milan*, which he kept from him; although many of the King's Council were of Opinion, that it was proper to lay hold on that Occasion for recovering the said Dutchy, which the Emperor had usurped from him, and which he had oftentimes promised to restore. But King *Francis the First* preferred the Honour of keeping his Word to all other Interests.

It was upon the same Principle that *Henry the Fourth* let the Duke of *Savoy* go out of his Kingdom, after having received there all possible Civilities, and all the Honours due to his Rank. But so soon as the Duke was got back to his own Territories, the King caused him to be summoned to restore the Marquisate of *Salusse* according to his Promise. The Duke having refus'd to comply therewith, the King took all *Savoy* from him, and forced him to make good his Promise, by the Exchange which the said Duke made of the Marquisate for the Country of *Bresse*, and the Lands of *Eugey*, *Val Romain*, and *Gex*; which he made over to the King by the Treaty which was concluded at *Lyons*, the 17th of *January* 1601.

Those who are of Opinion, that it is lawful to secure the Person of a Sovereign who breaks his Word, will make no doubt but one may. with much greater Reason, secure the Person of a Minister who represents him; and may proceed against him when he forms Cabals and Intrigues contrary to the Welfare of the State. But those who
are

are better instructed in the *Law of Nations*, and in the Rights of Sovereign Princes, are of Opinion, that a Foreign Minister not being subject to the Justice of the Country where he resides, one cannot exercise any other Power over him, besides that of obliging him to go out of the Territories; and that it is necessary to apply to his Master, and to demand of him Satisfaction for what his Minister has done amiss: And if the Prince shall refuse to give Satisfaction, it is the Prince himself that we ought to take Vengeance of, and not his Minister; who was only the Executor of his Master's Orders. This Privilege of Foreign Ministers extends even to their Domesticks. Of which here is an Example.

King *Henry IV.* who may be proposed as a Pattern for the greatest Princes, was informed, by the Duke of *Guise*, of the Conspiracy of one *Merargue*, a Gentleman of *Provence*, who had treated with *Don Balthazar de Zuniga*, the Spanish Ambassador, for delivering the Town of *Marseilles* into the Hands of the *Spaniards* in time of Peace. *Merargue* was

taken up, and with him the Secretary of the *Spanish* Ambassador, whose Name was *Bruneau*. They were both of them convicted of the Conspiracy; *Merargue* was beheaded; and the King ordered the Secretary to be delivered to his Master, the *Spanish* Ambassador, contenting himself with intimating to him, That he must forthwith depart out of the Kingdom, and that he would demand Satisfaction of the King, his Master, for the Injury he had done him.

If Princes had a Right to proceed against a Foreign Minister who Negotiates with them he would never be almost in Safety; because those who should have a mind to get rid of him, would never want Pretexes for colouring such a Resolution. And if once the Practice were introduced of taking up Publick Ministers who may have given just Cause to complain of their Conduct, there would be Danger afterwards of doing the same Thing on slight Suspicions, and Calumnies; which would be the ready Way to break off intirely
that

that Commerce that is so necessary between independent Princes and States.

It is true, that a Minister who violates the Publick Faith, does not deserve that it should be kept to him; and more especially he who carries on Intrigues and Conspiracies against the Prince, or against the Government of the Country where he resides. But to avoid breaking in upon the *Law of Nations*, which ought always to be held sacred; it is much better to send back such Ambassadors, than to punish them. Guards may be put upon them, to hinder them from continuing their Practices, until they be out of the Kingdom; and this may be done under a Pretext of taking care of their Safety.

A wise Ambassador ought to avoid the engaging in such Intrigues: For although the *Law of Nations* may protect him from being punished by the Prince, or Governors of the Republick where he resides; yet it does not always secure him against the Rage of the Populace, which is easily stirred up against him, and of which one can

easily clear himself, by saying, he had no Hand in it.

A Minister is to be pitied when he has Orders from his Master to form dangerous Cabals in the Country where he is ; and he has Occasion for all his Skill, and all his Courage, to get well rid of such a ticklish Business.

There are hardly any Services but what a good Subject, and a faithful Minister, owes to his King, or Country ; however, Obedience has its Bounds, and it does not extend so far as to oblige one to act against the Laws of God and Justice ; which do not allow of conspiring the Death of a Prince, of stirring up his Subjects to Rebellion, of usurping his Dominions, or disturbing the Peace and Quiet of his Subjects, by raising Civil Wars among them, when one has been received there under the Title of Friendship. An Ambassador ought, by his Counsels, to dissuade his Prince from engaging in such Undertakings ; and if the Prince, or State, persists in his Resolution, the Ambassador may and ought, in that Case, desire

fire to be recalled, and, in the mean while, to keep his Master's Secret.

We ought to do Justice to the greatest part of Lawful Sovereigns, by telling the World, that there are very few of them who, of their own free voluntary Motion, embark in such Designs. Almost all the unjust Attempts and Cabals which are carry'd on under their Names in other Countries, are suggested to them by Ministers, or some Agents, who, instead of diverting them from such Undertakings, draw them into the Project, by offering to charge themselves with the Execution of it. And those Ministers are not to be pitied, when they happen to be caught in the Snare which they had laid for others. We could give several Instances of the Truth of this Remark; and we shall find ten Instances against one, where the Ministers have been the Authors and Solicitors of Undertakings of this Kind, in order to make their Court to their Sovereigns.

But there is a great deal of Difference to be made between debauching the Subjects of a Prince, in order to engage

them in Conspiracies against him, and gaining them only so far as to learn by their means, what passes in the State. This last Practice has always been allowed to a Foreign Minister; and it is only the Subject who lets himself be corrupted; that is to blame, and that deserves Punishment.

Besides the Consideration of the *Law of Nations*, the Interest of the Publick Tranquillity requires, that the Privileges of Foreign Ministers should be preserved, for avoiding the Danger of a new War; to which that Prince, or State, is often exposed; who attempts to do himself Justice on the Minister of another Prince, who has a Right to revenge it. And the Prince who takes these violent Councils, is justly blamed by all other Princes, and exposes his Subjects to gratify his own Passion.

He ought therefore to demand Satisfaction of the Prince, for the Misbehaviour of his Minister, if he is in a Condition to take Satisfaction in case it be refused, and if it suit with his Interest to take it. If not, it is prudent for him to wink at it, and to show a
Disdain.

Disdain for the Ambassador, and his Practices, by sending him away loaded with the Confusion which he has drawn upon himself.



CHAP. X.

Of the Ceremonies, and Civilities, which are practised among Foreign Ministers.

WHEN a Minister is arrived in a Court, and has notified it to the Prince, he ought to give notice of it to all the Foreign Ministers who are in the same Court, by a Gentleman, or by a Secretary. They pay him, upon that, the first Visit, which is due to the last Comer. If he fails to notify his Arrival to any of the Foreign Ministers who are in the Court where he arrives, that Minister ought not to make him a Visit, until he has first received that Civility from him.

When there are Ambassadors of several Kings, he who arrives ought to make

make his first Visit to the Ambassador of *France*; who has, every where, the first Rank; and who ought not to receive his Visit otherwise.

The *Spaniards*, after having, in vain, struggled, ever since the last Age, to avoid acknowledging the Precedency which the Crown of *France* is in Possession of, Time out of Mind, before all the other Crowns of Christendom, did at last own it by a publick Declaration which the King of *Spain*, *Philip IV.* caused to be made of it to the King in 1662, by the *Marquis de la Fuente*, his Ambassador in *France*, after the Dispute that happened at *London*, between the Count *d'Eftrades*, and the Baron of *Vatteville*; and the Ambassadors of *Spain* absent themselves from all Ceremonies where there is an Ambassador of *France*.

Some other Crowns attempted, during the Negotiation of the Peace of *Munster*, to introduce a pretended Equality among all the Kings of *Europe*; but, notwithstanding that Innovation, which was ill grounded, and unheard of till that Time, *France* has remained

in

in Possession of its antient Right of Preeminence, which all its Ambassadors maintain with Splendour in all Courts, where they make the Ambassadors of all other Crowns give way to them, at least by absenting themselves.

Cardinal *Savelli*, a *Roman*, having been made Cardinal in the Year 1647. the Count *d'Ognate*, Ambassador of *Spain*, paid him the first Visit, before he was visited by the Marquis of *Fontenai Mareuil*, Ambassador of *France*. The Cardinal returned his Visit to the *Spanish* Ambassador; and then went to see the *French* Ambassador; who let him come into his own Court, and as he was alighting out of the Coach, one came to tell him from the Ambassador, That he would not see him, because he had failed in his Duty to the Crown of *France*. The Cardinal complained of the Affront which the Ambassador had put upon him; to which Answer was made, That he had no Body to blame for it but himself, that he could not but know what was due to the Ambassador of the first King of Christendom; and if he was ignorant of it,
he

he needed only to take the Trouble of looking into the Records of the Court of *Rome*. The Cardinal caused afterwards a great many Excuses to be made to the Ambassador of *France* in his Name, acquainting him, That he had committed that Mistake through the bad Counsel of some Prelates, who had told him, that he was to return his Visits in the same Order in which he had received them.

This Example serves to inform us, that although the Ambassador of *France* should be the last to make the first Visit to an Ambassador newly arrived, or to a Cardinal newly created, he ought nevertheless to have the first Visit paid to him ; because he does not admit of any Competition for Precedency between himself and the Ambassador of other Kings, upon any account whatsoever.

When there are several Ambassadors of the same Crown in the same Places, as it usually happens at Conferences for a Peace, the Ambassadors of *France* do not suffer any Difference to be made between the First, Second and Third Ambassador, and so of the others, if they

they were there in a much greater Number. And if after having visited the first Ambassador of *France*, they should visit the first Ambassador of *Spain*, before paying a Visit to the other *French* Ambassadors, they would not, and ought not to receive it, because they are equal in Titles, and compose the same Body of Embassy, which cannot be separated.

Monsieur *D'Avaux*, and Monsieur *Servien* being Ambassadors and Plenipotentiaries of *France* for the Peace of *Munster*, the Deputies of the *Hans* Towns sent to desire Audience of them at the House of Monsieur *D'Avaux*, the first Ambassador, where they were received in the Year 1645. And they were told, that after that Audience they might see, the same Day, or next Day, Monsieur *Servien* at his own House. Monsieur *Servien* was present at that first Audience; they made their Compliments to both, and thought they had discharged their Duty to the *French* Ambassadors; and so went thereafter to pay a Visit to the Ambassador of *Spain*, who received them in the same Manner.

Manner. The next Day they sent to desire a particular Audience of Monsieur *Servien*; he appointed them an Hour, and directed his Servants to receive them, and to conduct them into a Room; where, after they had waited a long time, a Message was brought them, That Monsieur *Servien* could not see them, because he understood that they had failed in what was due to his Character, they having visited the Ambassadors of *Spain* immediately after the Visit they had paid to Monsieur *D'Avaux*, before they had come to visit him, who had the same Quality as Monsieur *D'Avaux*; that in that respect, they had failed in the Duty which they owed to the King his Master; and that he made no doubt but they would be disowned in it by their Superiors.

The said Deputies attempted to justify themselves, saying that they had only one Letter for the two Ambassadors of *France*, and that they had fulfill'd their Commission, by delivering it to them both, and by visiting them before the Ambassadors of *Spain*; that Monsieur *D'Avaux* had given them an Answer both

both
that
whi
sieur
not
afte
of
com
drin
Duc
Th
thun
Am
to t
Wot
paid
goul
abo
bass
bass
if h
fore
Visi
Up
fer'd
Berb
reje
was

both for the one and the other, and that that second Visit was only a Civility which they paid to the Person of *Monsieur Servien*. But their Reasons were not approv'd, and *Monsieur Servien* being afterwards at *Osnabruck*, other Deputies of the same Towns repaired the Fault committed by their Colleagues, in rendering to *Monsieur Servien* what was his Due.

The Duke of *Angoulême*, the Count de *Bethune*, and Monsieur de *Chateaufort* being Ambassadors Extraordinary from *France* to the Emperor of *Germany*; my Lord *Wotton*, Ambassador of *England* at *Vienna*, paid the first Visit to the Duke of *Angoulême*, Chief of the Embassy, and was about to pay the second Visit to the Ambassador of *Spain*. The two other Ambassadors of *France* sent him Word, that if he saw the *Spanish* Ambassador before them, they would not receive his Visit, and would not treat with him. Upon which the *English* Ambassador offer'd to visit likewise the Count de *Bethune*, second Ambassador; but they rejected that Proposition, so that he was obliged to go and visit them all
three.

three separately, before he went to the *Spanish* Ambassador.

The Ambassadors of Crown'd Heads receive one another, and conduct one another mutually to the very Coach; and they make the first Visit to the Ambassadors of Inferior Potentates, when they come the last.

Envoys pay to one another the same Civilities that Ambassadors do at their Arrival, in respect of Compliments and Visits. The Envoys of *France*, and of other Crown'd Heads, give the Hand in their own Houses, in all Courts, to all the Envoys of other Sovereign Princes.


The Envoys of the Princes of *Italy*, dispute the Rank with those of Electors at the Court of *France*, and in all the other Courts, *Germany* excepted.

The Ministers of Princes who are at War, and who happen to be in the same Court, do not visit one another so long as the War lasts; but they pay to one another mutual Civilities when they chance to meet in a third place. War does not destroy the Rules of Civility, nor those of Generosity; nay, it even
affords

affords frequent Opportunities of praising them with greater Glory, both for the Minister who puts them in Practice, and the Prince who approves them.

The *Sieur de Gremonville* being the King of *France's* Envoy at *Rome* during the War between *France* and *Spain*, a *Portuguese* Monk discover'd to him the Resolution which he had taken to have the *Marquis de la Fuente*, the *Spanish* Ambassador, assassinated; because he pretended, by that means to procure the Liberty of *Don Duarte*, Brother to the King of *Portugal*, who was a Prisoner in the Hands of the *Spaniards*. The *Sieur de Gremonville* gave Advice of this to the *Marquis de la Fuente*; and his Conduct herein was highly applauded at the Court of *France*, and elsewhere, as so generous an Action truly deserv'd.

CHAP.



C H A P. XI.

Of Credentials, Full Powers, and Passports.

WHEN a Prince or a State, sends a Minister to another Sovereign, he gives him a Letter to deliver, by which he prays the said Sovereign to give Faith to what his Ambassador, or his Envoy, shall tell him from him. And it is this Letter which is called the Credentials; which establishes the Quality of the Person who delivers it, and which, for that reason, ought to be particularly specified therein.

There are in *France* two sorts of Credentials; one which is called *Lettre de Cachet*, and is prepared and countersign'd by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and is otherwise term'd *Lettre de la Chancellerie*, or Letter of Chancery. The other, which is called *Lettre de la main*, or Sign Manual, is
writ

writ by one of the Secretaries of the Cabinet, and signed only by the King, without being countersign'd. This last Letter is usually deliver'd at the first private Audience that the Minister has of the Prince to whom it is directed, and the first Letter is deliver'd at the first publick Audience.

When a Minister is sent by a Prince or Free State, to a Congress, or Assembly of Ministers, which is appointed for their treating together in the Names of their Masters; he is not charg'd with Letters of Credence. And it is in the Full Power that is given him, that his Quality ought to be express'd; in which Quality he procures himself to be owned and acknowledg'd by the Communication which those Ministers make to one another of their Powers.

The Full Powers are ample *Procurer*, or *Proxies*, which a Prince, or State, gives to one or more Ministers to treat of his Affairs; by which he promises to approve and ratify every thing that they shall conclude in his Name. Besides these general Terms, it is likewise
2 necessary

necessary that the Affairs in question be there particularly mention'd, to give them sufficient Authority to sign any Treaty; such as those of Peace, Suspension of Arms, Leagues, Alliances, Treaties of Commerce, &c.

There are two sorts of Full Powers. One comes immediately from the Sovereign himself; and the others from him who has a general Full Power, with a Faculty to substitute Plenipotentiaries in his Absence. And this way has been often practis'd by the Ministers of *Spain* who have assisted at Conferences with other Ministers. The *Spaniards* took up this Method, partly out of a vain Ostentation of Grandeur, and partly because of the great distance of the Court of *Madrid*; which oblig'd them to send usually a general Full Power to the Governour of the *Netherlands*, for the Affairs of the *North*; and another Full Power to the Governour of *Milan*, for the Affairs relating to the Princes of *Italy*, the Cantons of *Switzerland*, and the *Grisons*. Those *Spanish* Governours did often depute Envoys, who were own'd as Publick Ministers by the Princes

Princes and States to whom they were sent. And the Ambassador of *Spain* who resided in *Swisserland*, receiv'd usually his Commission from the Governour of *Milan*, to whom he gave an account of his Negotiations. There are likewise many Princes and States, who had their Ministers residing in the Courts of those *Spanish* Governours; and the *Pope* gives the Quality of Apostolical Nuncio to the Minister whom he sends to the Viceroy of *Naples*.

Passports are Letters, upon the Faith of which, those to whom they are granted, may and ought to pass in all safety through the Territories of the Princes or States, who have granted them; altho' they be in actual War with their Sovereigns. They are granted reciprocally, for the safety of the Ministers whom they send to treat in the places design'd for the Conferences. The Qualities of the said Ministers, whether Ambassador or Envoy, ought to be inserted in the Passports; which are usually deliver'd to the Ministers of the Princes who are receiv'd Mediators, that they may send them to the respective Parties
G concern'd.

Nothing can be done in Violation of the Faith of those Passports, without violating the *Law of Nations*.

C H A P. XII.

Of Instructions.

THE Instructions are a Writing which contains the Will and Pleasure of the Prince, or State, in the principal Points which may occur in the Negotiation; wherewith the Minister is charg'd. And they are given him in writing, as a help to his Memory, that he may have recourse to them upon Occasion, and govern himself accordingly: This Writing ought to be kept secret, and is made only for the Person to whom it is deliver'd. There are sometimes Occasions where he has Orders to communicate it, or to shew some Articles of it, to the Prince to whom he is sent, or to some of his Ministers whom he most confides in; that they may thereby be convinc'd of the

the Sincerity of his Master who sends him. It happens likewise, that sometimes there are two sorts of Instructions given; one which is call'd *Ostensive*, that is, made to be shewn, and the other *Secret*; which contain the true and ultimate Intentions of the Prince, or State, who gives them. But all Instructions are frequently altered in many Articles, by daily Dispatches which the Minister receives, and which are to be look'd upon as so many new Instructions, founded upon the Advices which he has sent from the Country where he is, and upon the Events which change the Situation of Affairs, and the Disposition of the Minds and Wills of the Princes, and their Ministers, on whom they depend.

They cannot, without violating the *Law of Nations*, force a publick Minister to shew his Instructions; and he ought never to communicate them without an exprefs Order from his Master. He wants no other Title to procure Faith to be given to what he says, in his Master's Name, besides his Credential Letters

ters which he has presented, or his Full Power which he has communicated.

Instructions, however judicious they may be, are more or less useful, in Proportion to the degree of Understanding which the Person who is charg'd with them is endow'd with. An able Minister knows not only how to execute the Orders of his Master with Dexterity, but he furnishes him incessantly with Advices and Expedients how to take Advantage of the favourable Conjunctions that offer themselves for bringing his Designs to bear. A Man void of Capacity, makes Advantage of nothing; he executes amiss the Orders that are given him, let them be never so clear; he is apt to mistake them, he takes an unseasonable time, or an improper way, to make the Propositions which he has in charge; he lets slip Occasions that are favourable to make them be complied with; and instead of making the Affairs of his Master to prosper, he often advances those of his Enemies.

It is wonderful to see the Inequality that often appears in the Conduct of Men


Men. There is no Minister, who having a Design to build a House, would not look out very carefully for the best Architect, and the ablest Workmen to imploy about it; and yet there are many, who having Affairs of the last Importance to *Negotiate*, and on which depends often the Welfare or Ruine of the Publick, commit the Management of them, not to Architects, but to Masons in that Art; that is to say, to Men without a Genius, and without the Capacity and Dexterity that is so necessary to these sorts of Employments.

Those who are in favour with the Prince or Ministry, are inexcusable, if they recommend to them unfit Persons for managing Foreign Affairs; because the Faults committed in the discharge of that Trust draw after them too great Inconveniences to be easily remedied. And it is a Fault in a Minister not to discover, and not to foresee the Resolutions that may be prejudicial to the Interests of his Master; and to enjoy the Place of another of greater Penetration and Application, who

would have discover'd them, and prevented their taking Effect.

The Faults which are committed by those who serve a Prince, in any Post within the Kingdom, may be redress'd by his own Authority. But seeing it is not the same thing with regard to Faults committed in *Negotiations* with *Sovereign Princes*, or with *Free States* the Minister who has the principal Direction of them cannot be too Circumspect and Inquisitive in the Choice he makes of the Persons whom he imployes in *them*. He ought to know them personally, and not to have any regard to Recommendations, nor to the Ties of Relation or Affinity, unless these Motives concur with the Merit and Capacity of the Persons propos'd for the Employment. Because he is to answer to his Prince for the Capacity and Fidelity of the Persons whom he chuses; their good Success does him Honour, and their Miscarriages are all laid at his Door, and he has often occasion for all his Industry to repair them. But a chief Minister is to be pitied, when by reason of the Intrigues and Cabals which

which reign in many Courts ; these sorts of Employments are given to Persons altogether unfit, and he depriv'd of the means of imploying Persons that are capable of discharging that important Trust.



C H A P. XIII.

What an Ambassador, or an Envoy, ought to do before he sets out.

WHEN a Minister is named to go to the Court of a Prince, or to a Republick, one of his first Cares ought to be ; to desire a Sight of the Dispatches of the last Minister, who resided there ; that he may learn from thence in what State he left Affairs there, and so follow the same Tract, beginning where he left off, and making use of the Knowledge of things past, as a Guide for him in what he shall have to *Negotiate*.

All the Affairs of a Court are so link'd together, that the Knowledge of
G 4
past

past Facts is absolutely necessary, especially in Matters of *Negotiation* between *free and independent States*, who govern themselves most commonly by their Interests, and by past Examples, more than by Reasons of Law and Justice.

When the new Minister has read with Attention the Dispatches of his Predecessor, he ought to make his Reflexions and Observations on the Difficulties which may arise in the course of his *Negotiation*, whether in regard to the *Ceremonial*, or to the *Affairs which he has in charge*; that he may ask of the Minister of his own Prince to whom he is to give an account of his *Negotiation*, the necessary Lights and Orders touching the said Difficulties, and may suggest to him the Expedients which he judges to be the most proper for removing them.

However able and skilful a Prince may be, or the Minister who is charg'd with the general Direction of his Affairs, it is difficult for him to be able to foresee every thing, and to give to Ministers that go into Foreign Courts, Instructions

Instructions ample and particular enough for all the Incidents that may fall out. And therefore it is fitting, that he who is charg'd with the Execution of the Orders of his Master in a remote Country, should labour carefully before he sets out to inform himself of his Pleasure touching the principal Points that may occur in his *Negotiation*, and that he should afterwards learn of him the means that are proper for bringing them to the desired Issue.

He ought likewise to inform himself of those who have *Negotiated* in the Country whither he is to go, or who have made a long stay there, of many Particulars which may be very useful for him to know for the better Government of himself. It is also proper for him to contract a particular Friendship with the Minister of the Country to which he is sent who resides at his Master's Court, that the said Minister may in his Letters give favourable Accounts of him; and he ought above all things, to endeavour to convince the said Minister of the desire he has to make

G 5 himself

himself agreeable to the Prince or State, to whom he is sent; and to contribute all that lies in his Power, towards keeping up a good Intelligence between their Masters. He ought also to assure the said Minister, that he will take all Opportunities of giving a favourable Testimony of his good Conduct, and of the Esteem which he acquired in the Country where he is; which may be a great Motive to engage the said Minister to do him good Offices by his Dispatches, and to procure him Friends in the Country to which he is to go. For Men are always very ready to oblige those who make it their Business to serve them; and reciprocal good Offices are the surest and most solid Foundations of their Friendship.

An able Minister ought likewise to be careful to make a good Choice of his Domesticks, that he may take with him none but Persons who are of a good Life and Conversation, and of a prudent Behaviour, that he may not receive any Reproaches upon their account in the Country to which he is going. And he ought more especially

to contribute to their good Behaviour by his own Example, and by his Severity in chastising all those who shall fail in their Duty, instead of encouraging them in their Disorders, as many Ministers do very imprudently; who are sometimes very disorderly themselves, and who abuse the Authority of their Prince, and the Privileges annexed to their Character, to gratify their own Humours and inordinate Desires.


But above all, let him choose for his Secretary a Man of Probity, Fidelity and Judgment, and let him look upon this Choice as one of the most important Affairs he has to do in preparing himself for his Embassy; for if he takes one that is either debauched, knavish, or indiscreet, he exposes himself to great Inconveniences. Some Years ago a Secretary of a *French* Ambassador having fold his Master's Cypher to the Court where he *Negotiated*, this Treachery gave occasion to intercept and decypher the Ambassador's Dispatches; which Thing made a Noise, and occasion'd a sort of Rupture, which was attended with fatal Consequences that

were prejudicial to both Courts, whose common Interest it was to have remained in a strict Union with one another.

The Necessity of chusing an able and faithful Secretary gives ground to believe, that it would be advantageous for the King's Service to re-establish the ancient Custom, which has of late been abolish'd in *France*; which was that of giving to our Ambassadors Secretaries of the Embassy, who were chosen and paid by the King; as is now practised by other Potentates with great Success. The Kings of *Sweden* have many Secretaries whom they call *Commission Secretaries*, whom they send with their Ambassadors and Envoys; and who rise to be Envoys themselves, and even Ambassadors, after they have served those who are so.

Secretaries of the Embassy, chosen and paid by the King, would be of great Use to preserve the Secret of the *Negotiation*; which is often intrusted with Persons of an indifferent Character, because the Ambassadors grudge the Expence that is necessary for procuring Men of Fidelity, and Capacity

city to serve them well. They would be a great Help to an Ambassador, to ease him of a great many particular Affairs, which it is dangerous to intrust with Persons who are either indiscreet, or unskilful. And such an *Institution of Secretaries* would be an excellent Seminary for the Education of able Statesmen, who are at present so rare, and so necessary, for these sorts of Employments.



C H A P. XIV.

What a Minister ought to do upon his Arrival in a Foreign Court.

WHEN a Minister is arrived in the Country to which he is sent, after he has notified his Arrival, according to the wonted Custom, and that he has let them know what Character he is vested with, he ought to procure, as soon as is possible, a private Audience of the Prince, and enlarge chiefly on the Desire which his Master has

has to cultivate a Friendship and good Correspondence with him, and to be united to him by stricter Ties and Engagements than in Times past; and this he ought to accompany with Declarations of the Esteem and Friendship which his Master has for the Prince, or State, to which he is sent, and of the Desire which he himself has to be able to contribute to the happy Union that is between them.

Having once got over all the Ceremonies that are necessary and usual upon a Minister's first Arrival, he ought in the next place to make it his Business to know well the Ground upon which he stands; that is, to observe carefully the State of the Court and Government. He ought especially to study the Prince, his Humour, his Inclinations, his Vertues and his Weaknesses, that he may be able to make a right Use of the Knowledge of those Things as Occasion shall offer: He may not only come at the Knowledge of these Things of himself, if he is a Man of Penetration, because of the free Access which his Employment gives him to the Prince; but

but also by the Lights he may have from the other Foreign Ministers, who have resided a long time in the same Court, and with whom it is useful for him, and oftentimes necessary, to contract a Friendship and Familiarity to a certain Degree.

Seeing there is no Prince but who has some Confident or other, to whom he imparts with more than usual Freedom his most important Affairs; it is therefore highly necessary, that the Minister should study at the same Time, the Temper of the Ministers and Confidents of the Prince to whom he is sent, that he may discover their Opinions, their Passions, their Prejudices, and their Interests; and how far the Credit they have with the Prince, or in the State, may extend, and what Share they have in the Resolutions that are taken in Council.

So soon as he is exactly informed of all these Things, he ought, in his Dispatches, to send a faithful Account of them to his Master, and to give his own Sentiments thereupon, touching the Means which he may imploy for obtaining

obtaining Success in the Affairs committed to his Charge.

After having attained to the Knowledge of these Things, his next Endeavour ought to be to make the right Use of the said Knowledge, by pursuing the proper Methods of gaining the Favour and Esteem of the Prince, of his Ministers and Favourites, and applying himself to find out the proper Ways of rendring them favourable to the Interest of his Master.

In order to succeed therein, the surest and best Way that an able Minister can take, is to examine all the Advantages that the Prince, or State, where he resides, may receive from the Union which he proposes; to endeavour to convince them of it; and to labour sincerely to procure them, and to make them concur with those of his Master. By this Means he becomes the Cement of their Friendship, and Union; and he gains most assuredly their Esteem and Confidence, by making their common Interests to flourish and prosper.


He

He may likewise sometimes take Advantage of the Passions of a Prince, or his Ministers, such as those of a Grudge for Injuries received, or a Jealousie against some other Potentate, to oblige them to take Resolutions favourable to the Interests of his Master; because, on those Occasions, the Passions prevail often over the greatest Interests.

This is what happens more commonly in the Courts of Princes, than in Republicks, unless these last be drawn in by a small Number of ambitious Men, who seize upon the principal Authority of the Commonwealth, and who sacrifice the Publick Interests to their own particular Views, and to the Advantages which they reap from thence.

CHAP.

He



C H A P. XV.

Means of insinuating one's self into the Favour of a Prince, and of his Ministers.

HOWEVER exalted Princes be in Dignity, yet they are Men as we are, that is to say, subject to the like Passions. But besides those which are common to them with other Men, the Opinion which they have of their Greatness, and the real effective Power which is annexed to their Rank, give them Ideas different from those of common Mortals ; and an able Minister must act with them in Conformity to their own Ideas, otherwise he may readily be deceived. He must therefore divest himself, in some measure, of all his own Sentiments, and put himself in the Place of a Prince with whom he treats ; he must as it were transform himself into his Person, take up his Opinions of Things, and his Inclinations, and then, after he has known the
Prince

Prince to be what he is, let him say thus within himself; *If I were in the Place of this Prince, with the same Power, the same Passions, and the same Prejudices, what Effect would those Things produce in me which I have to lay before him?* If he makes this Reflexion often, it will be of great Use to him for the Direction of his Conduct, and adapting his Discourses to the Temper of the Prince with whom he treats; which will be a Means of insinuating himself agreeably into the Prince's Favour.

One of the best Means of Perswasion, is to please. And to succeed in that, a Minister ought to make it his Business to say agreeable Things, and to soften, by the Choice of Words, by the Tone, the Air, and the Manner of Expressions, those Messages which are disagreeable in themselves.

Princes are accustomed from their Cradle, to the Submission, Respect, and Praises of those who are about them. And this makes them the more sensible of, and the more impatient to bear Contradictions, Discourses that are either too free or too familiar, Raillery, and

and certain Truths which seldom reach their Ears. A dexterous Minister will do all he can to avoid shocking the Pride that is natural to Persons of their Condition ; he ought not to praise them in fulsome Terms, nor to applaud them fordidly in Things that are worthy of Blame ; but he ought not likewise to neglect the Opportunities of giving them the Praises which they have deserved ; and if he be a Man of Judgment and Discretion, he will know how to do it in Terms that are decent, and becoming the Dignity of his Character.

The great Habit that Princes have of hearing themselves praised, makes them usually more delicate than the Generality of Men are in the matter of Praises ; and therefore the Compliments that are made them must be very ingenious and well-turned, in order to be agreeably received. In that respect, they are like unto those Persons of delicate Palates, who have refined their Taste by a long Use of the most delicious Meats ; and their Courtiers are incessantly occupied in preparing them

Praises

Praises dress'd up in a nice and delicate manner.

It is the greatest Art of a skilful Courtier, to know how to praise in the most acceptable manner. The best way of succeeding therein, is never to give false Commendations ; that is, not to attribute to a Prince those Qualities which he has not ; to commend and extoll those which he has ; and not to praise him but in things which are really Praise worthy.

It were therefore to be wish'd, that Ministers would not amuse themselves at all, or at least but slightly, in commending Princes on the Score of their Wealth ; or on the Beauty of their Houses, their Moveables, their Jewels, their Cloaths, and other Vanities which are Foreign to them ; but that they would praise them on account of those things which are essentially inherent in them, and which deserve to be prais'd ; for the Marks which they give of a true Heroical Courage, of Justice, Moderation, Clemency, Liberality, Goodness, Mildness, and for all their Actions that are truly virtuous ; for the

the Talents and Endowments of their Mind, their Wisdom, their Capacity in Business, and their Application to things of great Moment. One may likewise commend the external Beauties of their Persons, and especially in young Princes. But these sorts of Commendations seem to be fitter for Ladies, who are always more taken with Commendations of this kind, than any other Praises that can be given them ; and an able Minister ought never to neglect the giving them to Princesses that are in favour and credit, whenever he meets with proper Opportunities of making his Court to them that way. There are many Ministers, who have insinuated themselves into the favour of Ladies this way ; and who have made a good use of it for advancing their Master's Affairs. But there are likewise some, who have thereby involved themselves in troublesome Quarrels, by being too officious to please them ; and therefore a great deal of Prudence is necessary for a Man's right Government of himself in so delicate a Matter.

There

There are certain Marks of Affection, accompanied with the respect that is due to Sovereign Princes and Princesses, which contribute very much to make them have a Value and Esteem for a Minister who knows how to make the right use of them. It is a difficult matter to hinder our selves from conceiving an Affection for those who express it for us; and it is more commonly produced by assiduous Attendances, Cares, Complaisances, and small Services often repeated, than by Services of much greater Importance.

I knew a very eminent and skilful Ambassador, who did not neglect any of these Cares, and who playing often with a great Prince, suffer'd himself to lose, on purpose to put him in good Humour, which did not fail of having the desir'd Success; he by that Means procuring more favourable Audiences touching the Affairs which he had to *Negotiate* with him. And the small Loss which he sustain'd at Play in this manner, was not comparable to the great Advantages which he reap'd by
his

his good Success in obtaining his Favour.

The same Expedient contributed to the Advancement of one of the last *Popes*; who being only as yet a Prelate, play'd often at a Game call'd *Primero*, with a near Kinswoman of the *Pope's*. One Day, when there was a considerable Sum in Stake, the Prelate let the Lady draw it, although he had won the Game; and he threw down his Cards under the Table, after having cunningly shew'd them to the Lady's Gentleman, who was standing behind him. The said Gentleman, afterwards told the Lady how complaisant the Prelate had been. She was so taken with it, that she resolv'd to imploy all her Credit, which was very great, to have him made a Cardinal; and she succeeded accordingly.

What has been said touching the ways of getting into the Favour of the Prince, may be applied to his Chief Ministers. An able Minister ought to find out Means of interesting them in the good Success of his *Negotiation*, and engaging them to maintain the Conditions of
† the

the Treaty which he concludes with their Master. He ought for that End to know how to procure their particular Advantages without exposing them; and he ought to imploy all his Dexterity and Discretion to make it practicable for them to receive the Favours which he designs them; and this is the more necessary when he happens to be imploy'd by a great Prince to treat with one of an Inferior Rank. As the Inferior Prince commonly receives some Supply of Money from the greater, under the Name of *Subsidy*; so the Liberality of the greater Prince ought to extend it self likewise to the Minister, who has been instrumental in procuring their Union. And there are many Princes, especially in the *North*, who are not ill pleas'd, that their Ministers should reap some Benefit on the like Occasions; provided they do not let them perceive that the said Gratuities make any part of the Conditions of the Treaty, and that they be look'd upon only as a sort of Present flowing from the Generosity of the Prince who makes it.

H

But

But when a Minister treats on the part of a petty Prince, with one that is much more powerful, he has not the Advantage of the Means before mention'd; because his Master is not in a Condition to make those Presents; and the Ministers of a great Prince having only great Objects before their Eyes, they are not touch'd with small Matters, and seek only to establish themselves in the Favour of their Master. Seeing therefore this powerful Expedient is wanting to a Minister of this kind, he ought to supply that Want by a great deal of Cunning and Dexterity in his way of Negotiating, that he may render himself agreeable to the Minister with whom he treats.

For that Purpose, he ought to express on all Occasions a great Zeal and good Will for the Interests of the Court where he resides, and to impart to the Chief Minister all the good News for that Court that comes to his Knowledge, and to congratulate him thereupon, as well as upon the particular Advantages that may happen to the said Minister, and his Family. He ought to
speak

Speak always advantageously of the Affairs of the Prince with whom he resides, as also of his personal Qualities; and ought carefully to avoid falling into that gross Error of some Forreign Ministers, who being to live in a Court for several Years, render themselves unacceptable and suspected to the Prince and his Ministers, by excessively applauding the Conduct of their Enemies, and prophesying always to the Advantage of these last. This is such a want of Judgment, that it is inexcusable in a Minister, and yet it is what we see a great many fall into, who interest themselves passionately, without knowing for what Reason, in the general Affairs of *Europe*; and whose Indiscretion proceeds so far as to show an impotent evil Will to the Interests of the Court where they reside, and that in Presence of the Courtiers, who do not fail to make it known.

There are some who fancy, that this is the ready way of making themselves be courted; but this is a false Notion, and seldom or never succeeds. If they follow this Course to gratify their own

private Passions; they thereby give Proofs of their Incapacity, or want of Fidelity, by sacrificing the Interests of their Master to their own Humours. And a Prince who is well advis'd, ought to recall those Ministers who fall into this Error; because a passionate Man gives usually false Relations of the State of the Court where he is; and false Relations make the Prince who receives them to take false Measures.

But a Minister, who makes himself agreeable in the Country where he is, does not meet with so many Rubs and Difficulties in his Business as otherwise he might do; and his Success therein is frequently as much owing to his civil and engaging Carriage, as to the Nature of the Business it self.

Whatever Corruption and Malignity may reign in the Hearts of Men, yet still there are but few who do not listen to right Reason; especially when he who is Master of it to a certain degree of Perfection, studies always to imploy it to make himself useful and agreeable to them, as much as is in his Power.

Every

Every ingenious Man, who has a strong desire to make himself agreeable to another Man with whom he has Business, most commonly succeeds in it; and finds out Means to procure to himself a favourable hearing.

But if a Minister should find in the Person of a Prince, or Chief Minister; such a Perverseness of Mind, or so strong Prejudices, as not to be capable of hearing Reason, or apprehending his true Interest; he ought not for all that to abandon the Pursuit of his Design. He ought in that Case, to do what a good Watchmaker would, in the Case of a Watch's being out of Order; he would labour to mend whatever he found to be faulty in it. A Minister ought to look with the same Indifference, and the same Sedateness of Temper, upon the Obstacles which come in the way to thwart his Negotiations, without flying into a Passion against him who either will not, or cannot agree to his Reasons. Those Rubs are Briars which one meets with in his way, and which he ought to lay aside with Patience. The Conjunctions of

private Passions; they thereby give Proofs of their Incapacity, or want of Fidelity, by sacrificing the Interests of their Master to their own Humours. And a Prince who is well advis'd, ought to recall those Ministers who fall into this Error; because a passionate Man gives usually false Relations of the State of the Court where he is; and false Relations make the Prince who receives them to take false Measures.

But a Minister, who makes himself agreeable in the Country where he is, does not meet with so many Rubs and Difficulties in his Business as otherwise he might do; and his Success therein is frequently as much owing to his civil and engaging Carriage, as to the Nature of the Business it self.

Whatever Corruption and Malignity may reign in the Hearts of Men, yet still there are but few who do not listen to right Reason; especially when he who is Master of it to a certain degree of Perfection, studies always to imploy it to make himself useful and agreeable to them, as much as is in his Power.


Every

Every ingenious Man, who has a strong desire to make himself agreeable to another Man with whom he has Business, most commonly succeeds in it; and finds out Means to procure to himself a favourable hearing.

But if a Minister should find in the Person of a Prince, or Chief Minister; such a Perverseness of Mind, or so strong Prejudices, as not to be capable of hearing Reason, or apprehending his true Interest; he ought not for all that to abandon the Pursuit of his Design. He ought in that Case, to do what a good Watchmaker would, in the Case of a Watch's being out of Order; he would labour to mend whatever he found to be faulty in it. A Minister ought to look with the same Indifference, and the same Sedateness of Temper, upon the Obstacles which come in the way to thwart his Negotiations, without flying into a Passion against him who either will not, or cannot agree to his Reasons. Those Rubs are Briars which one meets with in his way, and which he ought to lay aside with Patience. The Conjunctions of

H 3 things -

things change, and the most resolute, and most head-strong Men, are often nothing but Inconstancy and Levity; all their Thoughts, all their Resolutions depend only on the present State of their Imagination, which is susceptible of several Ideas that are oftenimes very opposite. So that no one ought therefore ever to despair of being able to change their bad Will into a better, when we imploy proper Means for it; as we ought never to put so great a Confidence in their Favour, as to believe that it will be always lasting.



C H A P. XVI.

Observations on the Ways of Negotiating.

Negotiations are managed either by Word of Mouth, or by Writing. The first way, is most commonly practis'd in the Courts of Princes; the second is more in use in Treaties with Republicks, or in Assemblies, such as the Diets of the Empire; those of Switzerland,

serland, Conferences for Peace, and other Assemblies of Ministers who are vested with Full Powers.

It is more advantagious for a skilful Minister to Negotiate by Word of Mouth, because he has more Opportunities of discovering by this Means the Sentiments and Designs of those with whom he treats ; and of imploying his Dexterity to inspire them with Sentiments conformable to his Views, by his Insinuations, and by the force of his Reasons.

Most Men who talk of Business, are more intent upon what themselves have to say, than what is said to them ; they are so full of their own Notions, that they think of nothing but of getting themselves to be heard ; and can hardly prevail with themselves to hear others in their turn. This Fault is peculiar to the *French* Nation, who are naturally lively, impatient, and have Difficulty to stop the Impetuosity of their Temper. It is easie to observe this in the common Conversations of the *French* People, where they speak almost all at a time, and constantly interrupt the Person

H. 4+ who

who speaks, instead of waiting to give him an Answer, after he has finish'd what he has to say.

One of the most necessary Qualities in a good Minister, is to know how to hearken with Attention, and with Reflexion, to every thing that one has a Mind to say to him, and then to give a just and pertinent Answer to the things that have been propos'd to him ; instead of being over hasty to declare all he knows, and all he desires. He opens at first the subject Matter of his Negotiation, only so far as is necessary for founding Matters ; he governs his Discourses, and his Conduct according to what he discovers, partly by the Answers that are made him, and partly by the Motions of their Countenance ; by the Tone and Air with which they speak, and by all the other Circumstances which may contribute to enable him to penetrate into the Thoughts and Designs of those with whom he treats. And after having made a Discovery of the Disposition of their Minds, of their Capacity, of the state of their Affairs, their Passions, and their Interests ; he
makes

makes use of all those Helps to lead him by degrees to the Mark which he aims at.

It is one of the greatest Secrets of the Art of Negotiating, to know how to distill, as it were drop by drop, into the Minds of those with whom we Negotiate, the things which it is our Interest they should believe.

There are a great many Men, who would never be persuaded to embark in an Undertaking, let it be never so advantageous to them; if one should lay it open to them at first in its full Extent, and with all its Consequences; and yet they are easily prevail'd on to go to all the Lengths, when they are brought in by Degrees; because the first Step draws on the second, and so in the rest.

Seeing Negotiations are often red-dred perplex'd and intricate, by reason of the Difficulties which arise in adjusting the opposite Interests of Princes and States, who own no Supreme Judge of their Pretensions; it is therefore necessary, that whoever is imploy'd in them, should use all his Art and Skill to lessen and to remove the said Difficul-

H 5

ties;

ties; not only by the Expedients which his Reason may suggest to him; but likewise by a pliant flexible Temper, which may know how to yield and comply with the Passions, and even Caprices and Prejudices of those with whom he treats. A Man that is full of Difficulties, and of a rough contradictory Temper, augments the Difficulties that are naturally inherent in the Affairs themselves, by the Rudeness of his Temper; which exasperates and alienates the Minds of People; and he often converts Trifles and ill grounded Pretensions into Affairs of Moment, making thereof Shackles wherewith to fetter himself; and which stop him at every Moment during the Course of his Negotiation.

There is in the Art of Negotiating a certain Dexterity, which consists in knowing how to take things by the proper Handle; which an ancient Author expresses in these Terms. **Every thing, says he, presents us with two Handles; one*

* It is *Epictetus* in his *Manual*.

whereof

whereof makes it easie to be carry'd; and the other very difficult. Take it not by the wrong Handle; for by that thou shalt be able neither to take it, nor to bear it: But take it by the right Handle, and thou shalt be able to carry it without any Trouble.

The surest Way to take the right Handle, is to act in such a Manner, as that those with whom we treat, may find their Interest in the Propositions that are made to them; and to make them sensible thereof, not only by effectual Reasons, but likewise by an agreeable Carriage, expressing a Readiness to yield to their Sentiments in Things which are not essentially contrary to the Mark to which we have a Design to lead them; which engages them insensibly to a like Condescension on their Parts, in other Matters that are sometimes of much greater Importance.

There is hardly any Man that will own himself to be in the Wrong, or to be deceived; or can be prevailed on to lay aside his own Sentiments intirely in favour of those of others, when no other Method is taken with him, but

to contradict him by contrary Reasons, however strong and convincing the said Reasons may be. But there are many who are capable of being perswaded to depart from some of their own Opinions, when they are yielded to in others; which is done by certain Ways of managing them in such a Manner as to get them to lay aside their Prejudices. For this End, it is necessary to have the Art of finding out Reasons proper to justify what they have done, or what they have believed, for the Time past, in order to flatter their Self-Love; and then afterwards to show them Reasons much stronger, and backed with their Interest, for inducing them to change their Opinion, and their Conduct.

However unreasonable the greatest part of Men may be, yet they retain always that Respect for Reason, that they are willing others should believe they act agreeably to its Rules; and they are capable of submitting to it, when one has the Art to make them sensible of it, without offending their Pride, and their Vanity.

†

Men

Men often communicate their Passions and Humours to one another. A Man of a peevish contradictory Temper often excites him with whom he treats, to answer him with the same Spirit of Contradiction : And therefore 'tis necessary to avoid all sharp and obstinate Disputes with Princes, and their Ministers ; and to reason with them without too great Warmth ; and without endeavouring to have always the last Word : And when we begin to perceive that their Passion rises to a certain Height, and that their Mind is in no favourable Disposition, it is prudent to change the Subject Matter of the Conversation, and to defer it till a more favourable Opportunity offers itself, either by the Change of the Conjuncture of Affairs, or of the Disposition of their Mind and Humour ; which does not always continue the same, by reason of the Inequality and Inconstancy that is natural to Men. And a Minister must contribute, by his prudent Management, and by his obliging Carriage, to dispose the Prince with whom he treats, to hear, and to receive favourably the Things
which

which he has to lay before him ; which depends often as much on the Way of doing it, as on the Things themselves.

A Man of an agreeable Temper, and of a clear penetrating Judgment, who has the Art to propose Matters of the greatest Moment, as Things easie and advantageous to the Parties concerned ; and who knows to make the Proposition in a frank agreeable Manner ; has done more than the Half of his Work, and will find it an easie matter to accomplish it.

An able Minister ought likewise carefully to avoid the foolish Vanity of affecting to be thought a Man of Cunning and Dexterity ; that he may not give Occasion to those with whom he treats to have a Diffidence of him. He ought, on the contrary, to endeavour to convince them of his Sincerity, his Integrity, and the Uprightness of his Intentions ; to make the Interests he is charged with to suit with those of the Prince, or State, where he resides ; as being the true and only Mark he aims at in the whole course of his Negotiations.

He

He must beware likewise of putting on Airs of being a Man of great Capacity, by taking upon him to decide Magisterially in every thing that occurs; which serves only to expose him to the Aversion and Envy of others, if he be a Man of real Abilities; and to be laughed at in case he pretends to more than he really has. It is more for his Advantage to conceal some part of his Talents; and he ought always to deliver his Sentiments with an Air of Modesty, backing them with sound and solid Reasons, without despising the Sentiments of others.

He must not, however, suffer certain presuming Persons to get an Ascendant over him, who endeavour to abuse the Complaisance and good Nature of those who have not Vigour enough to withstand them.

If a Minister happens to be in the Service of a Prince whose Power raises Jealousie in his Neighbours, he ought much rather to extoll his Moderation than his Force; and to mention the last only as a means proper to maintain the Justice of his Right; and not to subject
Princes,

Princes, and Free States, to his Will and Pleasure.

It is the natural Effect of Threats, to exasperate the Mind: They often drive an Inferior Prince, or State, to Extremities which they would never have thought of, if Things had been represented to them in a soft and mild Strain. This happens, because all Men are vain, and sacrifice often solid Interests to their Vanity.

When a Superior Prince has just Grounds of Complaint against an Inferior One, and that he has a mind to be revenged on him, in order to deter others by his Example, it is necessary that the Blow should accompany, or at least immediately follow, the Threatning. And his Ministers ought to take care, not to drop any thing in their Discourse, that may give him Occasion to suspect the Storm that is coming; that he may not have the Time and Pretext to guard himself against it, by entring into Alliances with other Princes, who are either Enemies, or jealous of the Superior Prince's Power. And this Course the Inferior Prince chooses
always

always to take, rather than submit to the Will of him who threatens him.

The greatest part of the Ministers of powerful Princes hold it for a Maxim, to avoid the giving in Writing the Intentions of their Masters; and they choose always rather to explain them by Word of Mouth, because they have a greater Facility of interpreting what they have said by Word of Mouth, according to the several Conjectures which occur, than they have of that which is set down in a Memorial. There is also another Reason which determines them not to give in Memorials; and that is, because the Minister who receives them may make use of them to the Prejudice of the Prince on whose part they are given; by communicating them to the Ministers of the opposite Party, in order to get greater Advantages from them, or to make his Conditions better. This is what he cannot do with Propositions that are made him by Word of Mouth, because he can give no certain Proof of them.

However,

○ However, there are certain Occasions in which it is not an easie matter to avoid giving in Propositions, or Answers, in Writing; but it is convenient to prevent the making any bad Use of them, to give them in as late as is possible, and just when they are upon the point to conclude a Treaty, after that the main Conditions of it have been adjusted.

An able Negotiator ought to take upon himself the Care of reducing the Articles of the Treaty into Writing; because he who has the Penning of them, has the Advantage of having it in his Power to express the Conditions agreed on in the Terms that are most favourable to the Interests of his Master, without deviating in the least from the Particulars agreed on between the Parties. And when a Minister cannot have the Advantage of drawing up the Treaty, it is his Business to examine carefully the Expressions of the Articles that are offer'd to him; that he may hinder the putting in any Equivocal Words, which may be capable of being
in-

interpreted to the Prejudice of the Rights of his Prince.



C H A P. XVII.

Advice to Ambassadors, and other Ministers, who Negotiate in Foreign Countries.

A Wise and able Minister ought not only to be a good Christian, but likewise to appear always such in his Life and Conversation; and ought not to entertain in his House any Persons that are loose or disorderly in their Morals; nor to suffer any licentious Discourses, or such as may give a bad Example, to be held at his Table, or in his Presence.

He ought to be Just and Modest in all his Actions; Respectful towards Princes; Complaisant towards his Equals; Obliging towards his Inferiors; Gracious, Civil and Courteous to every Body;

He

He ought to accommodate himself to the Manners and Customs of the Country where he is, without showing any Aversion to them, or despising them, as many Ministers do; who are constantly praising the Ways of Living in their own Country, that they may have Occasion to find Fault with those of others.

A Minister ought to persuade himself once for all, that he has not Authority enough to reduce a whole Country to conform themselves to his Way of Living; and that it is much more reasonable that he should conform himself to that of the Country where he is, for the little Time that he is to remain in it.

He ought never to find Fault with the Form of Government; and much less with the Conduct of the Prince with whom he Negotiates. He ought, on the contrary, to praise every thing there that he finds to be Praise-worthy; without Affectation, and sordid Flattery. There is no Nation, or State, in the World, but has many good Laws mixed with some bad Ones; he ought to praise
the

the Good, and not to say any thing of the Bad.

It is proper for him to know, or if he does not, to study the History of the Country where he is ; that he may have Opportunities of entertaining the Prince, or his chief Courtiers, with the great Actions of their Ancestors, and of those which they have done themselves ; which is a very ready way for him to gain their Favour. He ought to put them often on such Discourses, and to engage them to recount those Passages to him themselves ; because he is sure of doing them a singular Pleasure in hearkning to them ; and it is his Business to embrace all Opportunities of pleasing them.

A Minister ought to have constantly in his View, the Ends for which his Prince sends him into a Foreign Country ; that he may do every thing that may help him to attain the said Ends ; and abstain from those which may hinder him.

The two principal Ends for which a Minister is sent into another Country, are, as has been said, to do the Affairs
of

of his Master, and to discover those of others. The Way to succeed both in the one and the other, is to gain the Esteem, the Friendship, and Confidence of the Prince, and of those who are in Credit about him: He ought for that purpose, in endeavouring to please them, to do what he can to remove all Suspicions and Jealousies that may give them any Distrust of him, ought to perswade them of his good Intentions towards them; and to excuse, in proper Terms, any Misunderstandings that may have happen'd in Times past; but so as not to lay the Blame thereof on his Master, nor even on the Ministers who preceded him in his Employment; unless those last have deserved it by their Conduct which cannot be justified.

When he has obtained the Promise of any Thing of Importance for the Service of his Prince, he ought to lose no Time in procuring the Accomplishment of it; and he ought, on the contrary, not to engage his Master, nor even Himself, but as late as he can: He ought first to have very positive Orders

ders in Writing, that he may not be blamed, nor disowned, as to what he has promised.

It is necessary, that he labour always to be well instructed, and to have the earliest Intelligence of whatever passes, not only in the Court where he himself resides, but likewise in all the other Courts; where he ought to keep good Correspondents, without grudging the Trouble of Writing, or the Expence of Letters; which is very well bestowed that Way, the said Intelligence being of great Use to him in his Negotiations.

A Minister that has good Intelligence, and is a Man of a quick Apprehension, finds, upon every Conjunction of Affairs, Reasons and Expedients for facilitating the Success of his Designs; he often gives useful Hints to his Prince; he entertains agreeably the Prince in whose Court he resides; and he has the Means of communicating to him, in the Manner that is most advantageous to the Interests of his Master, the several Events which happen in other Parts, and which he takes care to have the
earliest

earliest Notice of, with all the minutest Circumstances that attend them.

It is more especially and absolutely necessary for a Minister to be perfectly well informed of every thing considerable that passes in the Court of his Prince; both because of his own particular Concern, and likewise that he may be able to give proper Answers to the many Questions that will be asked him concerning those Matters. And since the Multiplicity of Business with which the chief Minister of his Sovereign is charged, does not allow him Time to send an exact Account of all those Particulars to every Minister, he ought therefore to have a settled Correspondence with some of his own Friends at Court, who will take the Pains to inform him particularly of every thing that passes; that he may be thereby enabled to dissipate the false Rumours, which the Enemies of his Prince often spread touching the Situation of Affairs, and to prevent the Prejudice which his Master's Affairs may suffer in the Country where he is by the said false Reports.

It

It is likewise necessary, that he should know very well the Plan of the Court which he serves; the Temper, the Humour and the Qualities of his Prince; the Inclinations and Interests of those who are in Credit about him, and what share they may have in the Resolutions that are taken. For if he be ignorant of those things, he is liable to be mistaken in his Views, and to labour in vain upon false Principles. Discord among the Chief Ministers of State, is very fatal to the Negotiations and Affairs of the Sovereign; in that when one of the Ministers promotes a Negotiation, and seconds the Negotiator who is charg'd with the Management of it; another Minister is often doing all he can to destroy it, and to hinder it from taking Effect.

A Minister is always to give favourable Accounts, of the Affairs of his Master in the Country where he is; but he ought to do it with Discretion, that he may not forfeit his Credit, as to the Advices which he communicates. He ought, for that Reason, to avoid the spreading of Lies, as do very often
I certain

It

earliest Notice of, with all the minutest Circumstances that attend them.

It is more especially and absolutely necessary for a Minister to be perfectly well informed of every thing considerable that passes in the Court of his Prince; both because of his own particular Concern, and likewise that he may be able to give proper Answers to the many Questions that will be asked him concerning those Matters. And since the Multiplicity of Business with which the chief Minister of his Sovereign is charged, does not allow him Time to send an exact Account of all those Particulars to every Minister, he ought therefore to have a settled Correspondence with some of his own Friends at Court, who will take the Pains to inform him particularly of every thing that passes; that he may be thereby enabled to dissipate the false Rumours, which the Enemies of his Prince often spread touching the Situation of Affairs, and to prevent the Prejudice which his Master's Affairs may suffer in the Country where he is by the said false Reports.

It

It is likewise necessary, that he should know very well the Plan of the Court which he serves; the Temper, the Humour and the Qualities of his Prince; the Inclinations and Interests of those who are in Credit about him, and what share they may have in the Resolutions that are taken. For if he be ignorant of those things, he is liable to be mistaken in his Views, and to labour in vain upon false Principles. Discord among the Chief Ministers of State, is very fatal to the Negotiations and Affairs of the Sovereign; in that when one of the Ministers promotes a Negotiation, and seconds the Negotiator who is charg'd with the Management of it; another Minister is often doing all he can to destroy it, and to hinder it from taking Effect.

A Minister is always to give favourable Accounts, of the Affairs of his Master in the Country where he is; but he ought to do it with Discretion, that he may not forfeit his Credit, as to the Advices which he communicates. He ought, for that Reason; to avoid the spreading of Lies, as do very often

I

certain

It

certain Ministers of our Neighbours ; who make no manner of Scruple to publish imaginary Advantages in favour of those of their own Party. Besides that a Lye is a thing unworthy of a Publick Minister ; it does more harm than benefit to the Affairs of his Master, because no Faith is afterwards given to any piece of News, which he is the Author of. It is true, that it is a difficult thing not to receive sometimes false Advices ; but one must give them such as he has them, without taking upon himself to warrant the Truth of them. And an able Minister ought so well to establish the Reputation of his Veracity in the Minds of the Prince and Ministers, with whom he Negotiates ; that they may not doubt of the Truth of his Advices, when he gives them for certain, no more than of the Truth of his Promises.

He should take care, in Writing to his Prince, not to promise too much upon the Success of his Negotiation ; unless he has good Authority in Writing for the Assurances which he gives him ; because Men are naturally changeable
and

and deceitful, and he would be justly charg'd with Levity, if he should advance things to his Master, which he should afterwards be oblig'd to retract. And it is always better for him, to do and obtain more than what he promises in his Dispatches ; that he may act securely, and surprize his Master agreeably with the Conclusion of the things which he desir'd.

It is good for a Minister so to order his Matters, that his Master may hear from different Hands, that he is well receiv'd and esteem'd at the Court to which he has sent him ; and it is likewise useful, that the Prince or State, where he resides, should be inform'd that he is much in favour with the Master whom he serves. And for that Purpose, he has occasion for the good Offices and Testimony of his Friends, both of those whom he left behind him at his Master's Court, and also of the Friends whom he has made in the Country to which he is sent.

An Ambassador ought to avoid receiving into the Number of his Chief

I 2

Domesticks,

Domesticks, Natives of the Country where he resides; because they are usually Spies upon all his Actions.

He ought to shew a good Example to his Servants, that he may thereby keep them from all manner of Debauchery, and have the more Authority to chastise them when they do any thing amiss; because he is in a manner answerable for all the Disorders they commit.

A Minister ought not to receive any Present from the Prince, or State, where he resides, without the Knowledge and Consent of his Master; except those which Custom has establish'd, and which are given to Publick Ministers at their Departure. Whoever receives a Gift, sells himself; it is a sort of Treason, thus to deliver himself up to a Foreign Prince; and it is putting himself out of a Capacity of maintaining vigorously the Interests of his Master.

An Ambassador ought to remember that he represents his Prince, when the Question is about any Function of his Employment; and he ought to be firm in asserting all the Rights and Privileges
† belonging

belonging to it. But setting that aside, he should forget his Rank, in order to live in a free, easie and familiar manner with his Friends, and that he may be civil and sociable with every Body. If he acts otherwise, and if he pretends to be always as is a *Herald King at Arms*, upon the Days of Ceremony ; he shews himself to be very unfit for his Employment, by thinking to maintain the Dignity thereof by a ridiculous and ill tim'd Gravity.

It is a Weakness that is commonly incident to Persons of a shallow Capacity, to value themselves much upon their Character, without considering that it is only a Part which they act for a little time ; that the vain Honours which they demand often without any reason, and contrary to the Intention of their Master, do no ways concern them ; and that the Reputation of being a courteous well bred Man, concerns them alone.


They ought likewise to be careful not to prostitute the Dignity of their Character, as those do who frequent Ta-

vern, and other Places of bad Reputation; and who have for their Friends and Confidents, Persons that are noted for their Vices, and their Debauchery.

A Minister ought not to be too ready to promise, but exact in performing what he has promis'd: A down right Refusal gives less Offence than a Breach of Promise.

When he has once well establish'd his Credit, by a strict Performance of his Promises, he is in a Condition to do great Services to his Prince, and may count upon Relief in a time of need; whereas one who is known to be a Cheat, and to have no regard to his Word, is abandon'd in such Cases by all who know him.

CHAP.



C H A P. XVIII.

Of Treaties, and Ratifications.

T H E R E are many sorts of Treaties between Sovereign Princes and States. The chief are those of Peace, Truces, or Suspensions of Arms, Exchange, Cession or Restitution of Towns, or Countries that are in Dispute, or have been conquer'd; Treaties for the Regulation of the Limits and Dependencies of Countries; Leagues Offensive and Defensive; Treaties of Guaranteeship; of Alliances by Marriage, of Commerce, &c.

There are Treaties which are call'd *Secret Treaties*, because the Execution and Publication of them remains for some time suspended. There are likewise Publick Treaties, to which are added some *Secret Articles*.

There are some Treaties which are call'd *Eventual Treaties*, because their Execution depends on certain Events,

which it is suppos'd may happen ; and without which, the said Treaties are null and void.

When the Ministers of two equal Potentates Sign a Treaty, they get two Copies made of it ; and every one of them names his Prince first in the Copy which he keeps, and Signs it in the first Place ; that they may not do any thing to prejudice their several Pretensions to the Precedency, when there is a Competition between them about it.

New Treaties of Peace have almost always a great Conformity to the former Treaties that have been made between the same Potentates ; some of the Articles of which they confirm, and derogate from the others. They are drawn up according to the Plan of the old Treaties, and are divided into Articles.

It is the Duty of an able Minister, to see that all the Conditions which are for the Advantage of the Rights, or Pretensions of his Master, be therein express'd very clearly and distinctly ; he ought not to content himself with their being mention'd in general Terms, that

that are liable to be interpreted divers ways ; but he ought to get them specified in such a manner, as not to leave the least room for Doubt. It is necessary for that end, that the Minister should be a perfect Master of the Language in which the Treaty is written, that he may know the full Extent of the Signification that may be given to the Terms in which it is worded ; and he ought to chuse the properest and most expressive Words. As to which it is an easie matter to impose upon a Minister who is a Novice, and ignorant of his Business, who knows not the force of Words, nor the Art of Writing, and explaining his Thoughts clearly. And it is from this Ignorance of one of the contracting Parties, and the Dexterity of the other, that the Difficulties arise between Sovereigns, touching the Explanation of the Conditions of their Treaties ; which occasions fresh Disputes, and serves as a Pretext for a Rupture, to him who has a Mind to begin the War again ; by giving a favourable Interpretation, for his own Advantage, to the Terms and

I 5


Expressions.

Expressions which are obscure, ambiguous or equivocal in some of the Articles of their Treaties.

Although the Ministers of Sovereign Princes and States treat by Vertue of their Full Powers; yet nevertheless, they do not conclude, nor sign any Treaty, but with the Clause of Ratification by their Masters. This Ratification consists of a Writing sign'd with the Prince's own Hand, and seal'd with his Seal; by which he approves and ratifies all the Contents of the Treaty concluded in his Name, by his Ministers. The said Treaty, is therein repeated Word for Word before the Act of Ratification; by which he promises to execute it faithfully. And the Ministers of the different Parties do afterwards exchange the said Ratifications within the time Stipulated. When there are Mediators, this Exchange is commonly made by them; who deliver the several Ratifications into the Hands of the respective Parties.

The Treaties are not publish'd till after the Exchange of the Ratifications; and they do take Effect only from the
Day,

Day of their Publication, unless it be otherwise ordered by an express Stipulation to the contrary.



C H A P. XIX.

Of Dispatches, and what is proper to be observ'd therein.

IT is not enough for a Minister to know how to manage the Interests of a Prince, or State, dexterously, in a Foreign Court; but it is likewise necessary to know how to give an exact and faithful Account of every thing that passes therein, not only with respect to the Negotiation with which he is charg'd, but also of all the other Affairs which happen there during his Residence.

The Letters which a Minister writes to his Prince, must be free from Preambles, and vain trifling Ornaments. He is at his first setting out to enter upon Business; and to begin with giving him an account of the first Steps he

I 6.

took

took upon his Arrival; and of the manner in which he was receiv'd. And according as he comes to the Knowledge of the State of the Court, and of the Affairs of the Country where he is, he ought to give an account thereof in his Dispatches; observing therein the Disposition of the Minds of those who are in the greatest Credit there, and of the Ministers with whom he treats; their Inclinations, their Passions, and their Interests. He must study to describe them, in such a clear and perfect manner, that the Prince or Minister, who receives his Dispatches, may be able to know as distinctly the State of the things which he sends him an account of, as if he were upon the place himself.

All the Ministers of *France*, both Ambassadors and Envoys, have at present the Honour to write directly to the King himself, to give him an account of the Affairs with which they are charg'd; whereas in former times, they seldom writ but to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; which ought to make them still more Circumspect,
both

both as to the Matter, and to the Style of their Letters.

He must be clear and succinct, without using any superfluous Words, and without omitting any thing that may serve to make his Meaning intelligible. There ought to be in his Letters, a noble Simplicity of Style ; equally remote from an Affectation of Learning and Wit, and from a Negligence and Clownishness in the Expressions. They ought to be equally free from certain new affected Ways of Speech, and from those which are low, and disused among the politer Part of Mankind.

He must relate the Facts, with the principal Circumstances that serve to put them in a true Light, and may help to discover the secret Motives which influence those with whom we treat. A Letter which gives only a bare Account of Facts, without entring into the Motives, can pass for nothing else but a *Gazette*.

Letters which are filled with good Reasoning, founded upon Facts, clearly described with all their Circumstances, do not appear to be tedious ; it is only

only the Superfluities in them that make one sensible of the Length of a Dispatch in matter of Business.

It is convenient, that a Minister, for the Ease of his Memory, should make a short Memorandum in Writing of the chief Points of which he is to give an Account ; especially at his coming out from his Audiences ; and that he have it lying before him whilst he is writing his Dispatches ; and that he divide his Letter into several short Articles, to render it thereby the clearer and more distinct, by separating and dividing all his Matters. The Number of Articles in a Letter, or in a Memorial about Business, produces the same Effect therein, as Windows in a Building.

He ought to keep Minutes of all the Letters which he writes to the Prince, or to his chief Minister ; and to rank them according to their Dates, that he may have Recourse to them on Occasion ; and especially when he receives Answers to them. And he ought to do the same Thing with the Letters which he receives.

He ought always to begin his Letters, with mentioning the Receipt and Date of those which he answers, and even the Day when he received them: He ought to have them before him, that he may answer all the several Articles contained in them in their respective Order: He ought likewise to make Duplicates of his own Letters, and to send them by different Ways, when they are to pass through suspected Countries; and he ought to write carefully every thing that passes.

There are some Ministers who write down every Night whatever they have learned, or discovered, the Day before; that they may be always in a Readiness to send away that kind of Journal upon any Occasion that may offer.

The Ministers of the Court of *Rome* have a peculiar Custom among them; which is, to write on certain Occasions to the chief Minister, distinct Letters, by the same Courier, on the different Matters concerning which they are obliged to write to him, instead of reducing them all into one Letter. The Reason

Reason of their so doing is, that the Minister who receives them, may communicate the Letter which relates to every different Affair to the Person whom it concerns, without imparting to him the other Matters contained in the Dispatch.

When one has Advices of Importance to communicate, he ought not to grudge the Expence of Extraordinary Couriers, that they may be conveyed with the greater Speed and Safety. But one ought likewise to beware of dispatching Expresses with Advices that are but ill-grounded; as it often happens to raw and unexperienced Ministers.

A Publick Minister ought not to descend so low, as to stuff his Dispatches with Adventures and Circumstances unworthy of the Attention of his Prince: especially when they have no manner of Relation to the Affairs which he is charged with.

He ought likewise to avoid filling them up with Invectives against the Prince with whom he resides, and ought not to enlarge on his Faults and Personal Weak-

Weaknesses, save only so far as is necessary for the Affairs he has in Hand to lay them open. But even in this Case, he ought to mention them very tenderly, and by way of excusing them. It is a Respect that we owe to Sovereign Princes, whom God has established over us, to speak of them always with Decency, and in a manner full of Circumspection, although we should be assured, that what we write of them would never come to their Knowledge: But there are few things which can remain long a Secret among Men who have a long Commerce together; the intercepting of Letters, and many other unforeseen Accidents, do often discover them; and it were an easie matter to quote several Instances of that kind here. It is therefore prudent in a skilful Minister, to think within himself when he is writing, that his Dispatches may possibly be seen by the Prince or Ministers, of whom he writes; and that he ought so to word them, as that they may have no just Occasion to find Fault with them. These Considerations however, ought not to weigh so much
with

with him, as to restrain him from discovering to his Master any important Truths, for fear of displeasing the Prince in whose Court he resides. There would be something servile and mean in this sort of Conduct; but he ought to know how to dress up these Truths in such a manner, as that he may be able to maintain and justify, with a good Grace, the Advices which he has given, when they come to be discovered; which depends not so much on the Things themselves which he gives an Account of, as on the Turn which he gives them, and the Intention which he has in recounting them.

There is another important Occasion, where the Minister stands in need of all his Prudence to govern himself rightly in it; and that is, when he has only unwelcome Accounts to send to a Prince who is wont to be flattered by his chief Ministers; and who, for their own private Interests, are willing to conceal the bad Success of Affairs. Of which I shall here set down an Example, which I had from a great Prince, and which seems very suitable to the present Subject,

Subject, and may serve to let us see the bad Government which the Court of *Spain* was under at that Time.

Don Estevan de Gamarre, had served the King of *Spain* a great many Years with Zeal and Fidelity, both in his Wars and Negotiations; particularly in *Holland*, where he resided a long time in the Quality of Ambassador: He had a Relation in the Council of *Spain*, who was ready on all Occasions to extoll his good Services; and yet nevertheless he never met with any Recompence, whilst new Comers were advanced to great Employments: He resolved on a Journey to *Madrid*, that he might discover the Occasion of his bad Fortune; and being arrived there, he made his Complaint to the Minister, who was his Kinsman, giving him a Relation of his long and important Services that had been forgotten. The said Minister, after having heard him very patiently, made answer to him, That he had no Body to blame for his Disgrace but himself; that if he had been as good a Courtier, as he was a Minister, and faithful Subject, he would have

have been advanced as well as others who had not done so good Service ; but that his Sincerity had been a Bar to his Fortune ; that all his Dispatches were filled only with Truths that were uneasy to the King his Master, and to his Ministers ; that when the *French* had gained any Victory, he gave a true Relation of it in his Letters ; that when they laid Siege to a Place, he was the first that sent the News of it, and foretold the Loss of it, unless speedy Care were taken to relieve it ; that when any Ally was discontented, and out of Humour, because the Court of *Spain* had broken its Word to him, he press'd the Court earnestly to perform its Promises, and forewarned them, that the said Ally was ready to abandon them, unless due Satisfaction were made him. Whereas the other *Spanish* Ministers, who knew better their own Interests, and the Ways to make their Fortunes, sent word, That the *French* were only a Pack of Scoundrels ; that their Armies were ruin'd, and not in a Condition to undertake any thing ; that when the *French* Troops had gained some Advantages, they

they assured the Court, that they had been well banged, and that their Enemies were preparing to enter *France*. To which the said Minister subjoined, That the King of *Spain*, and his Council, thought they could not too well reward those who sent them so good News; nor take too little notice of a Man like him, who never sent them any but bad.

Then *Don Estevan de Gamarre*, being surpriz'd at this Picture of the Court of *Spain*, which his Kinsman made him, reply'd to him in these Terms; Seeing there is nothing else required to make one's Fortune in this Country, but to beat the *French* by false Relations, I do not despair any longer of my Affairs. And he returned back to the *Low Countries*, where he made so good an Use of the Information which his Kinsman had given him, that he soon gained to himself several *Mercedes*, to use the *Spanish* Term. He saw his own Affairs prosper, in the same Measure as he laboured by his Dispatches to ruin, in Idea, the Affairs of the *French*.

From

From this one may gather, That the Court of *Spain*, at that Time, was willing to be deceived ; and that it gave its Ambassadors the Means to make their Fortune at the Expence of the true Interests of that Monarchy.

Other Examples may be brought of what has happened in other Courts of the same Kind. Some time ago there was an Envoy of the Emperor's at the Court of *France*, who procured himself to be in Credit at the Court of *Vienna*, and was advanced to great Preferments, for having sent, during the Stay he made at *Paris*, most false Relations of the State of that Kingdom : He represented it, in his Dispatches, as being intirely ruined, and exhausted both of Men and Money ; and he averred so strongly, that *France* was not in a Condition to maintain a War, that, upon his Assurances alone, which had like to have proved of fatal Consequence to the House of *Austria*, the Emperor's Ministers prevailed with him to enter into Leagues and Engagements, which occasioned then the Ruin of many of his Hereditary Provinces,
and

and gave rise to Insurrections, which had well nigh cost him a Part of his Dominions.

But although the sordid Flattery of a Minister in Foreign Courts should not produce so bad Effects as these, yet there are no Considerations, nor Views of any private Interest, that ought to divert him from fulfilling the first and most essential of all his Duties, which is, to tell always the Truth to the Prince whom he serves; that he may thereby prevent his taking false Measures: Which he seldom fails to do, when his Ministers are either unskillful enough, or corrupt enough, to write to him Things as he wishes them, instead of representing them such as they really are.

It is likewise necessary, that in the Relation which he sends to his Master, he take care not to irritate him without Ground against the Prince with whom he resides; and he ought to endeavour on the contrary, to keep up a good Correspondence between them, as far as lies in his Power. He ought for that Purpose, to do what he can to soften
and

and lessen the Discontents which often happen even between those Princes who are united by their common Interests, and by their Treaties ; and it is prudent for him not to write always bluntly to the Prince whom he serves, all the Effects of Peevishness and Impatience, which may inadvertently fall from the Prince with whom he Negotiates, when he does not foresee any dangerous Consequence they may have ; and when he is sensible that they proceed rather from his Humour, than from any ill Will which he bears to his Master. If he thinks it necessary to send an account of them, it is proper that he excuse them, or soften them ; that it may be in his Power to redress that which is capable of setting them together by the Ears. He ought more especially to beware of imitating certain vain ceremonious Gentlemen, who think that People never pay them Honour enough, answerable to the false Idea which they have form'd to themselves of their own Merit, and of what they conceive to be due either to their Birth, or to their Dignity. Ambassadors

dors of this Stamp, are proper only to sow Division between the Courts to which they are sent, and their own Prince, by the passionate Relations which they send him of Matters. They are like unto those bad Servants, who, to engage their Master in their Quarrels and private Piques, tell him, that others have spoken ill of him.

Wise Princes judge it often convenient to wink at Injuries that are done them, rather than to resent them; and the Minister who engages them to shew their Resentment, acts commonly in that against their Interest, and sometimes even against their Will; which exposes him sooner or later to their Indignation, when they consider him as the Cause of a violent Resolution, which often proves prejudicial to them in its Consequences.

A Minister ought carefully to distinguish in his Dispatches, doubtful News from what is certain; and when the News that is not certain may be of Importance, he ought to write it with all the Circumstances that may contribute to the clearing up the Truth; that he


K

may

may not leave his Prince in Suspence, upon the Advices which he sends him.

It is not enough, that the Minister inform his Prince exactly of all that comes to his Knowledge, touching the Publick Affairs; but he must likewise inform the Ministers which the same Prince imployes in other Countries; and he ought to have a settled Correspondence of Letters with them, that he may receive Intelligence from them of what passes there, and of what may be of any Service to the Interests of their common Master. The Knowledge of all these things is very necessary to him, because of the Connexion and Dependence there is between the Interests of the different States, of which *Europe* is compos'd; and that the Success of his Negotiations depends often on what happens in other Countries, and the Resolutions that are taken there.

CHAP.



C H A P. XX.

Of Letters in Cypher.

SECRECY being the Life of Negotiations, the Art of Writing in unknown Characters has been invented, for concealing the Knowledge of what is written from those who intercept the Letters; but the Industry of Mankind, which is refin'd by Necessity and Interest, has found out Rules for decyphering these Characters, and penetrating by that Means into the Secret of other Peoples Letters. However, although there are Decypherers that are very eminent in their way, and who have reap'd great Advantages by their Art; yet I may venture to say it here upon good Grounds, that they owe the Esteem they have gain'd solely to the Negligence of those who give bad Cyphers, and to that of Ministers, and their Secretaries, who make not a right use of them,

After having examined this matter thoroughly, together with the Rules of Decyphering; I am convinc'd, that a Letter well couch'd in Cypher, and that in a good Cypher, is not to be decyphered without Treachery; that is to say, unless one finds Means to corrupt some Secretary, to give a Copy of the Key of the Cypher. And one may assuredly defy all the Decyphers in *Europe*, to be able to decypher Cyphers that are very easie to those who have the Key of them; when they are made, as they ought to be, upon a general Model, which it is an easie matter to give, and out of which an infinite Number of different Keys may be made of a Cypher that cannot be decyphered. I do not speak of certain Cyphers, invented by Professors in an University, and founded upon Rules of *Algebra* or *Arithmetick*; which are impracticable by reason of their too great Length, and of the Difficulties in using them; but of common Cyphers which all Ministers make use of, and with which one may write a Dispatch almost as fast as with ordinary Letters.

It

- It would be necessary therefore, to prevent the decyphering of Letters, that every Minister should take the pains to make for himself a good Key of a Cypher, and to leave a Copy of it at the Secretary of State's Office, with the Person who has the Trust of decyphering the Letters; instead of using the Cypher that is given him out of the Secretary's Office, which is usually very easie to be decyphered, and is often common to several other Ministers of the same Prince; so that if any one of their Secretaries sells the Key, it may be made use of to decypher the Dispatches of those Ministers who are in different Countries; which may occasion great Inconveniencies, and do considerable prejudice to the Affairs of the Prince whom they serve, by the discovery of his most important Secrets.

It would be proper also, to direct every Minister to put the things which require Secrecy into a Letter by it self; the whole written in Cypher, and not to suffer their Secretaries to write, as they commonly do, a part of their Dispatches without Cypher, and to con-

K 3

tent

tent themselves with interrupting the Sequel by some Words in Cypher. So that which is written in plain Words, without Cypher, serves, by the Cohesion of the Discourse, to help one to guess at the meaning of what is wrapt up in Cypher, and to let one know in what Language the Dispatch is written; which cannot be guess'd at, when the whole Letter is in Cypher. And the Minister will do well, not to insert in the Minute of his Letter in Cypher, any thing but what is Essential; and to cut off all superfluous Words; that he himself may not lose his time in composing his Cypher, nor occasion the loss of it to those who have the charge of decyphering his Letters; and who conceive a just Indignation against him, when they find nothing in them that deserves the pains which the decyphering gives them.

CHAP.

C H A P. XXI.

Of the Choice of Ministers.

TO make a right Choice of Ministers, proper for the Employments for which they are design'd, it is necessary to have regard to their personal Qualities, to their Profession, to their Fortune; to the Prince or State, to whom they are to be sent, and to the Business which they are to have in charge.

There are Persons of so vast a Capacity, that one may without Scruple employ them in all sorts of Business, and in all sorts of Countries; who transform themselves as it were into the Customs and Manners of Living of all Nations; who are of all Countries, and of all Professions; who insinuate themselves equally into all sorts of Tempers; who know how to accommodate themselves to all sorts of Humours; and whose bright Parts, and great Dexter-

ty, render them fit for every thing. But seeing the Number of those extraordinary Genius's is but small, there is a Necessity often to make use of Persons of more ordinary Parts; who nevertheless do not fail of Success, provided care be taken to imploy them in the Countries, and in the Business, which they are fittest for, and that they be not over-loaded with a Weight which they are not able to bear.

The different Professions of Men may be reduced to three principal ones. The *First* is, That of Ecclesiasticks, of whom there are several kinds. The *Second* is, That of Men of the Sword; which, besides those who serve in the Armies, takes in likewise those who belong to the Court, and all Gentlemen, or who call themselves such; and who are not engag'd in any of the Employments of the Church, or Judicature. The *Third* Profession is, That of Lawyers, who are usually call'd Gentlemen of the Long-Robe.

There are few Countries where Ecclesiasticks can be imploy'd in Negotiations; one cannot with Decency send

send them into the Countries of *Heretics* or *Infidels*. At *Rome*, which seems to be their Center, the Love and Affection which they have for the *Pope*, and for the Grandeur of the Papal See; and the Desire which almost all of them have to acquire Honours and Benefices; that are depending on that Court, may render them suspected of too great Partiality and Condescension towards the Politicks and Maxims that reign there, often to the Prejudice of the Temporal Rights of Sovereigns.

The wise Republick of *Venice*, is so fully persuaded of the Partiality of its Prelates, and Churchmen in favour of the Holy See; that it does not content it self with not employing any of them in the Embassy to *Rome*; but it even excludes them from all its Deliberations which concern that Court, and makes them remove out of their Assemblies, whenever they are about to treat of any Ecclesiastical Matters.

Seeing the City of *Rome* is the greatest Theatre in *Europe* for Competitions about Precedency, a Gentleman of the Sword, and of great Quality, is much

properer for that Place than any other, to support the Character of Ambassador of a Crown'd Head, and to maintain there the Rights of his Master with Vigour. And it is for that reason, that the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, do not now a Days send any other Persons thither in that Quality, besides Gentlemen of the Sword.

The Cardinals and Prelates of the *French* and *Spanish* Nations, may sometimes be employ'd there in the Affairs of their respective Countries, and may do very good Service; but they are employ'd only as Assistants, and are to pursue the Orders which are given them in the Name of their Prince, through the Channel of his Ambassador; who ought to be the Depositary of his Intentions.

If we examine well what are the true Duties of Bishops, we shall find that they are not very consistent with Embassies, and that it is very indecent for them to be running over the World, instead of discharging their primary and most essential Obligations. A Kingdom must needs be very destitute of Persons
of

of another Profession proper for these sorts of Employments, for a Prince to be under a Necessity of drawing a Bishop out of the Heart of his Diocese, and dispensing with a Pastor's Care of the Flock committed to his Charge; to imploy him in the Management of Political Affairs, to which God has not call'd him. If he has such a Superiority of Genius, as to be thought properer than any other Person for rendering important Services to the State, whether in Embassies, or in the Chief Ministry; as we have had some Instances of that kind, it would be decent for him, nay, even his Duty, in this Case, to resign his Bishoprick; that he may acquit himself of the Obligations he lies under in that Capacity, and give himself up wholly to the Affairs of his Prince. A Cardinal, an Abbot in Commendam, and all Ecclesiastical Persons who have no Cure of Souls, may be imploy'd in such Matters with greater Decency, and less Scruple; both for themselves, and the Prince who imployes them.

Monks and Friars are sometimes proper to carry secret and important Mes-

sages, by reason of the Facility they have of getting Access to Princes, or their Ministers, under other Pretexts; but it would not be very decent to see them cloath'd with the Character of a Publick Minister.

Gentlemen of the Sword may be imploy'd to Negotiate in all sorts of Countries, without Distinction of Religions, and Forms of Government.

A good General Officer, may serve with good Success in the Quality of Ambassador, in a Country that is engaged in War; because he may give good Advice to the Prince or State, to whom he is sent, in Matters relating to his own Profession; which may be a means of gaining him Credit in the Country where he Negotiates, if that Country be in Friendship with his Master. And he is better able than any other Person to give a good account of the Forces of the Country where he is; of the Condition of their Troops, of the Experience of their Generals, of the Strength of their Fortified Towns, of their Arsenals and Magazines.

When

When an Embassy is to be sent to a Prince who loves his Ease and his Pleasures, a good Courtier is properer to be sent on that Embassy than a Soldier; because he is commonly more insinuating, and used to the Art of finding out ways to please those whose Favour he stands in need of. A Man that has been bred up at Court, turns and winds himself easily into all manner of Shapes; he makes it his Business to discover the Passions and weak Sides of those with whom he has to do; and he has the Cunning to take Advantage of them in order to gain his Ends. So that commonly he succeeds more easily in rendring himself agreeable to the Prince with whom he resides, than a Man who has spent a great part of his Life in the Army, where he must needs have contracted some Roughness in his Humour and Conversation. But if either the Soldier or Courtier, have not taken due Care to inform themselves of Publick Affairs, and to learn all the Sciences necessary for a Minister to know, the Experience of the One in the Art of War, and the Intriguing Temper

Temper of the Other become often useless to the Prince who charges them with the Conduct of his Affairs.

The Gentlemen of the Long Robe, are usually Men of more Learning, of greater Application, and of a more Regular and Orderly Life and Conversation, than Persons who are bred up either in the Army, or at Court. And there are many of this Sort who have had good Success in Negotiations, especially with Republicks, and in General Assemblies, for the making of Treaties of Peace, Leagues, or other sorts of Engagements. But they are not so proper in the Courts of Kings and Princes, who prefer Courtiers, and those of the Army before them; because they are more suited to their own Inclinations, and their Ways of Living; and have frequenter Opportunities to entertain them with Things which they spend the greatest Part of their Time about. Men of the Sword are also more likely to insinuate themselves into the Favour of the Ladies, who commonly have a good deal of Credit in most Courts.

The

The Functions of a Publick Minister are very different from the ordinary Occupations of a Magistrate : The One treats with a Sovereign Prince; or with his Ministers, and acts only by way of Insinuation and Perswasion ; The Other judges of Law-Suits between Clients, who are very submissive for fear of losing their Estates. This Habit of giving Judgment makes him assume an Air of Gravity and Superiority ; which renders him ordinarily of a less flexible Temper, of a more difficult Access, and of a less engaging Carriage, than Courtiers commonly are of ; who are accustomed to live with their Superiors, and with their Equals.

I know that there are among the Gentlemen of the Robe, many of a Superior Genius, who have all the Qualities necessary to please in the Courts of Princes. But when we observe the Faults of every Profession, it is not designed that this should extend to each Person belonging to it : For although there be a great many Soldiers who are brutal and unpolish'd, and many Courtiers who are ignorant and vain ;

vain; it does not follow from thence, that there are not a great Number of both these Kinds of Men; who are civil, knowing and skilful; in the same manner as there is a great Number of Persons of the Long Robe, who are polite well-bred Gentlemen, and of an engaging and agreeable Conversation.

But seeing the Qualifications and Learning that are necessary for the forming of good Ministers, are of a very large Extent, they are sufficient of themselves to take up a Man's whole Time, and their Functions are of Importance enough to make a Profession by itself; so that those that set themselves apart for that Service ought not to be distracted by other Employments which have no manner of Affinity with such sort of Business. And as it is not usual to give the Command of an Army to a Man, because he has bought an Office at Court, or procured some Civil Employment, when he has never served in the Army; so likewise none ought to be trusted with the Management of a Negotiation of Importance, who has not some way acquired the Experience
and

and Knowledge that are necessary to form an able Minister.

Much less should a Man be employ'd who has spent the greatest part of his Life without doing any thing in any sort of Profession whatsoever; and who makes use of the Credit of some powerful Relation, or Friend, to get him an Employment in a Foreign Country, for want of other Means of subsisting at Home, where he has ordinarily, in a foolish Manner, squandred away his Estate. Those who take upon themselves to place Persons of this sort in Employments that are so delicate, and so difficult in their own Nature, are answerable before God and Man for all the Prejudice which they do to the Affairs of the Prince, or State, who employs them. And it is one of the greatest Faults that a Prince, or chief Minister, can commit against the Maxims of good Government, to employ Persons that are unfit in the Courts of Sovereign Princes, and States. They ought to send thither those of the brightest Parts, of the most consummate Wisdom, and of the greatest Knowledge.

ledge in Publick Affairs; such as know how to take Advantage of the Conjunctions which happen even in the smallest Courts, and that often when one thinks the least of it. Besides, a Man of Penetration and Attention does not confine his Thoughts barely to the Country to which he is sent, but extends his Observations to what happens in the Neighbouring and more remote Countries; and gives Hints to his Prince how to take Advantage thereof.

People of ordinary Talents ought to confine themselves to Employments suited to their Capacity within their own Country; because the Faults which they commit there are easily remedied by the Authority of the Prince, or State, who employs them; whereas the Faults committed in an independent State, are oftentimes irretrievable.

The late Great Duke of *Tuscany*, who was a Prince of great Wisdom and Penetration, was complaining one Day to an Ambassador of *Venice*, who pass'd through *Florence* in his Way to *Rome*, That that Republick had sent him, in the Quality of Resident, a Man without

out Conduct, and without Judgment. Upon which the Ambassador made answer to him ; *I am not at all surprized at it, for we have Fools enough at Venice.* To which the Great Duke reply'd ; *We have likewise Our Fools at Florence ; but we do not send them abroad, to take Care of our Affairs.*



C H A P. XXII.

Observations touching the Choice of Ministers.

IT is of great Importance to Sovereign Princes and States, to choose Persons that are acceptable to the Countries to which they are sent. For that End, it is necessary to have Regard to the Difference of the Governments, and Inclinations, which prevail in each Country, and especially to the Religion established there.

In some of the preceding Ages, there was a Jest made, and not without Ground, upon the Court of France's having

ving sent a Bishop, in the Quality of an Ambassador, to *Constantinople*; and a bad Catholick to *Rome*, in the same Quality; which made the People say, That *the One went to convert the Great Turk; and the other to be converted by the Pope.*

When there arrives a new *French* Ambassador at *Constantinople*, the *Turks* enquire immediately of the Interpreter, whether he be an *Ichoglan*, or a *Cadi*. If he tells them, that he is an *Ichoglan*, they are well satisfy'd; but if he be a *Cadi*, they have a much less Esteem for him.

They mean by the Term *Ichoglan*, a Courtier, or a Man bred up at Court, the *Ichoglans* being Men bred up in the *Seraglio*, as a kind of Pages to the Grand Signior, and who are often advanced to the first Employments: And by a *Cadi* they mean a Churchman, or a Man of the Long Robe; a *Cadi* signifying, in their Language, a Judge, who decides Points of Law, and Matters of their Religion.

It is Prudence in a Sovereign, not to send into a strange Country a Person who has already rendred himself disagreeable there; and who has left behind

hind him bad Impressions of his Conduct, and of his evil Intentions against the State to which he is to be sent. Such a Person as this would not be very proper to convince them of the favourable Dispositions of his Master; he would make them believe on the contrary, that he were sent thither for no other End, but to form Cabals in order to disturb the Peace and Quiet of the State.

A Prince cannot be compelled to recall a Minister whom he has sent into a Foreign Country; but it is his Interest to send one thither who may be agreeable to the Prince to whom he sends him, and especially if he has any Affairs of Consequence to transact with the said Prince.

It is not proper likewise to send a Minister who is remarkable for his bad Life and Conversation. Such Representatives as these give, in a remote Country, a very disadvantageous Idea of the Prince whom they represent, and often even of the whole Nation; it being natural to judge of all the Inhabitants by the Conduct of the Minister; because it is not to be supposed, that

a Prince, or State, would pick out, among the most loose and dissolute Subjects they have, a Minister to represent him in a strange Court.

However, as there is no general Rule without an Exception; a hard Drinker succeeds sometimes better than a sober Man, in treating with the Ministers of the Northern Countries; provided he knows to drink without losing his own Reason, whilst he makes others lose theirs.

A Prince ought also to consider, that People ordinarily judge no otherwise of his Intentions, than by those which his Minister expresses. If he makes himself agreeable in the Country where he is, and if he gets himself to be belov'd and esteem'd there, they esteem, and they love the Master whom he represents. If he makes himself odious to them by a bad Conduct, and a haughty insolent Carriage, his Prince runs a great Hazard of being hated there likewise.

We have seen, many a Time, Foreign Ministers alter, by their bad Conduct, the good Intelligence that was be-

between two States, whose reciprocal Interest it was to maintain it. And on the other hand, we have often seen wise and able Ministers reunite two States that were divided, and engage Princes to quit antient Alliances, and to enter into new ones with their Master; because the said Ministers had the Art of gaining Faith and Credit with the said Princes, and of making themselves their Confidants, and their Friends. And this is what every able Minister ought to endeavour to succeed in. For which End, he ought to join to an agreeable and engaging Carriage, the Conduct and Behaviour of an Honest Man, always true to his Word; and ought never to found his Negotiations on poor Quirks and Subtilties, which serve only to discredit the Person who makes use of them.

Persons of great Quality are proper for Embassies, because their Names carry with them an Authority, and procure them Respect: But whatever Reverence People may pay to their Rank and Birth, yet nevertheless they have Occasion for a good Judgment,

for Learning and Experience, to manage right an Affair of Importance; and they will very readily be deceived, if they fancy, as many of that kind do, that nothing ought to be refused to their Quality.

It has been already said, That they are much properer for an Embassy which is designed only for some Ceremony of Splendor, and no great Duration, than for an Embassy where the Business is to treat of difficult Matters, which require a long Discussion; unless they have joined with them able Colleagues, who may ease them of this Burden. And it is necessary in this Case, to imploy the best Artists, as is usually done in all other Professions, without choosing particularly those who have the greatest Names, and who are best Allied.

It is not proper likewise to imploy Persons of so low a Quality as will make them contemned; or who have served in so mean Employments, as may be a Reproach to them. *Philip de Commines* observes very judiciously the Fault which King *Lewis XI.* was guilty of,

of, in sending *Oliver le Daim*, his Barber, to the Princess of *Burgundy* at *Ghent*, and how he was despised there, and was in Hazard of losing his Life, instead of succeeding in his Negotiation.

A young Minister is ordinarily presumptuous, vain, light and indiscreet; and there is Danger in trusting him with the Management of an Affair of Consequence; unless he be a Person of singular Merit, and whose happy Natural Temper has furnished him earlier with the Gifts which are usually attained only by Age and Experience.

An old Man is peevish, full of Difficulties, finding Fault with every thing, condemning the Pleasures which he himself is not longer able to partake of, very improper to insinuate himself into the Favour of the Prince, or his Ministers, and in no good Condition to act, by reason of the Slowness and Infirmities that attend Old Age.

A middle Age is the properest for Negotiations; because there one finds Experience, Discretion and Moderation, which are wanting in Young

L

People;

People ; and Vigour, Activity and an Agreeable Humour, which forsake Old Men.

A Man of Letters is much properer than a Man of no Learning to make a good Minister. He knows how to speak and answer justly upon every thing that is said to him ; he speaks knowingly of the Rights of Sovereigns, he explains those of his Prince, and justifies them by Facts and Examples, which he knows to quote to the purpose ; whereas an Ignorant Man has no other Reason to offer but the Will and Power of his Master, and the Orders which he has received thereupon ; which are no Law to Princes and States that are free and independent, and who often yield to the judicious Remonstrances of a Man of Learning and Eloquence.

Ministers that are Ignorant, and puffed up with a conceited Opinion of the Grandeur of their Master, are very subject to take his Name in vain, that is to say, to quote him without any reason in things which have not the least Relation to his Interests, and that only to countenance their private Passions.

sions. Whereas a wise Minister takes care not to engage the Name or Authority of his Prince, and never quotes him but when it is necessary.

We have seen Ministers who threatened, on the part of the King their Master, all those who did not approve of their irregular Proceedings, and bad Conduct.

The Knowledge of Facts, and History, is one of the principal Qualifications of an able Minister ; because Reasons being often Problematical, the greater part of Mankind are led by Examples, and determine themselves according to what has been done in the like Case before.

A Minister who is without Study, is liable to fall into a great many Inconveniences, by the Obscurity and bad Construction of his Discourses, and Dispatches. It is not enough to think well of an Affair ; but a Man must know likewise how to explain his Thoughts distinctly, clearly and intelligibly. And it is necessary that a Minister should have a Facility to speak well in Publick, and to write well ;

which is very rare and difficult to be attained by one who has not studied.

Formerly Ambassadors were called by the Name of *Orators*, to show that it was necessary they should know to speak well. But the Eloquence of an Ambassador ought to be very different from that of the Pulpit and Bar. His Speeches ought to be fuller of Sense than Words, without affecting Terms that are too refined. He ought to accommodate his Discourse to the Persons to whom he addresses himself; and to take care that every thing he says may concur to the End which he proposes to himself; which is to convince them of the Things which he has in charge to represent to them, and to determine them to take the Resolutions which he desires. And this is the Proof of true Eloquence.

If he speaks to a Prince, he must do it without raising his Voice, but with the Tone of ordinary Conversation; with an Air of Modesty and Respect, and in a concise Style; after having well ponder'd and examined the Expressions which he makes use of. Prin-
ces

ces do not love long Discourses, nor great Talkers. An able Minister ought not to fall into this Error, which suits only with Scholars and Pedants. Wisdom and long Discourses seldom go together.

When a Minister speaks before a Senate, or to a Republick, it is allowable for him to be a little more florid and copious in his Discourse. But if he is too long, we may apply to him the Answer which the *Lacedemonians* made to the Ambassadors of the Isle of *Samos*, *That they had forgot the beginning of their Speech, that they had not listned to the rest of it, and that nothing of it pleas'd them but the end.* Meaning that by putting an end to their Speech, they had ceas'd to tire them.

A Minister ought to consider, that being the Organ by which his Prince, or his State, explain themselves; he ought to do it with Energy, with Justice, and with Dignity..

A Man of Letters is more on his Guard than an Ignorant Man, not to be over-reach'd in his Treaties. He knows how to unravel the Sophisms, the capti-

ous Propositions, and equivocal Expressions of those whom he treats with.

An Ignorant Man is very much to blame for engaging himself in those Employments, and for deferring to qualify himself for the due Execution of them, until he has obtain'd them. It is the same thing as if a Man should defer the giving Orders for the making of his Arms, until he has immediate occasion to use them.

There are some Courtiers who despise Sciences, because they are ignorant of them ; and maintain boldly, that nothing else is necessary to make a Man capable of the greatest Employments, besides good natural Sense ; and this they confirm by the Example of some illiterate Persons, who have given Proofs of their Capacity in the Management of the most intricate Affairs. I own, that good natural Sense is the first Quality requir'd in a Minister. But Sciences and acquir'd Knowledge, being join'd with a good natural Genius, makes a Man tread firmer and surer in all his Conduct. And there is as much difference
between

between a Man of Sense who has Learning, and a Man of Sense who has none, as there is between a rough Diamond, and a Diamond that is polish'd and well set; which owes its chiefest Beauty, and its greatest Splendor, to the Art which has brought it to Perfection.

A Man of good Sense cannot fetch every thing he wants out of his own proper Stock, nor remove all the Difficulties that may occur by his natural Reason. He wants to fortify that by Examples, of what has been done on the like Occasions, by the Knowledge of publick and private Rights and Interests, and by a chain of Facts, on which depend the greatest part of Affairs that come under Treaty, and which are not to be learned but by a long Experience. And if any one has succeeded by the bare Strength of his Genius, without Study, and without the Knowledge of Publick Affairs; it is an Example so rare, that it cannot, and ought not to be drawn into Consequence, nor persuade one to chuse an ignorant Man for the Management

of an important Negotiation, unless he is resolv'd to run the Hazard of seeing it miscarry in his Hands.

Great Courts do not always commit their Embassies to the properest and fittest Persons; and they content themselves with putting in Persons of ordinary Talents, who make interest for them, and obtain them; whilst those of brighter Parts, and of a superior Genius, who would be highly useful in those Employments, shun them instead of seeking after them; chusing rather to fix themselves near to the Person of the Prince; because the Recompences for that Service are much greater, and much more frequent, and because those that are absent are commonly forgotten; which makes them look upon an Embassy as a sort of an honourable Exile.

To remedy this Inconvenience, Princes and States who have a mind to be well serv'd in Foreign Countries, ought to annex Honours and Rewards to the Services that are done them in Employments of so great Importance to the good of their Affairs; and to have

have regard to the Expences which their Ministers are oblig'd to be at, for supporting the Honour of their Character, and procuring Success to their Designs. But as Princes have an essential Interest to reward well their good Ministers, so they have the same Interest to chastise the bad ones; and they ought to be perswaded, that Rewards and Punishments are the most solid Foundations of a good Government.

It is likewise necessary, that the Prince should make it known, that he puts a Confidence in the Persons whom he sends, if he has a mind that the Messages which they deliver in his Name should be regarded. For it is very difficult, for a Minister to gain Credit in a Foreign Court, unless they be there perswaded that he himself is in Credit with his Prince, and with his Chief Ministers.

It is very useful for an able Prince to have always about him a certain Number of good Ministers, well chosen, and well instructed in Publick Affairs, and to maintain them with Pensions, or other Bounties; that they may be al-

ways in a Readiness to serve him in Affairs that may fall out. It is not time to look for them at all Adventures, and to make a Choice, good or bad as it happens, when he has occasion for them. And the Difference that there is between a good Artift, and a sorry one, is of much greater Importance in this Profession, than in any other.

The nature of the Affairs that are to be Negotiated, ought also to be well consider'd, in the Choice of the Persons who are to be imploy'd in the Negotiation. If it is an Affair of Secrecy, a private Person, who is fit for the Business, and is without Pomp, is much properer to manage it with Success, than a Man of greater Rank. And it is necessary on these Occasions, to have a much greater regard to the Genius, than to the Fortune of the Person who is imploy'd.

The Quality of Ambassador carries along with it a great deal of Incumbrance, because of the great Train which it is necessary for Embassadors to have with them; the Ceremonies and Rank which they are oblig'd to observe,


serve, their Entries, their Publick Audiences, and all their Proceedings, which expose them constantly to the View of the Publick, and make them be watch'd too narrowly. An Envoy commonly requires less time to finish an Affair which he is charg'd with, than an Ambassador must have to prepare his Equipage. There are often *Spanish* Ambassadors, who after having been named to the Embassy, imploy many Years to prepare themselves for their Departure.

The most part of grand Affairs, have been concluded by Ministers sent privately. The Peace of *Munster*, one of the most intricate and most universal that have been Negotiated, was not the Work alone of the many Ambassadors who had a Hand in it. A Confident of Duke *Maximilian* of *Bavaria*, who was sent privately to *Paris*, adjusted the prime Conditions of it with Cardinal *Mazarine*. The Duke of *Bavaria* was then in a strait Conjunction with the *Emperor*, and yet that cunning Prince knew well enough, that it was the Interest of his Family not to deliver

himself up intirely to the Discretion of the House of *Austria*; and that he stood in need of the Friendship and Protection of *France*, to preserve to his Successors the Electoral Dignity, and the *Upper Palatinate*, which he had acquired during the War. And when he was once convinced that this was his Interest, he drew in the *Emperor*, and the whole *Empire*, and determined them to conclude the Peace with *France*, *Sweden*, and their Allies, pursuant to the Project which had been settled at *Paris*.

The Peace of the *Pyrenees* was concluded by the two first Ministers of *France* and *Spain*, upon the Treaty which had been made at *Lyons*, between Cardinal *Mazarine* and *Pimentel*, Secret Envoy of the King of *Spain*.

And the Peace of *Ryswick* was treated and agreed on by secret Negotiations, before it was concluded in *Holland*, in the Year 1697.



C H A P. XXIII.

Whether it be useful to send many Ministers to the same Country.

WHEN there is nothing to be done, but to entertain a good Correspondence with a Prince or State, in time of Peace, and to give account of what passes in the Country where one is, without having any Matters of Importance to manage there; it is sufficient to have one Minister only, either in the Quality of Ambassador, or Envoy. And it is even more advantageous to have only one in each Country, because the Jealousies which often arise between many Ministers of the same Prince, create him commonly a great deal of Trouble and Uneasiness by their reciprocal Accusations and Complaints, and may occasion Difficulties in the Execution of his Orders. But there are some Occasions where it is advantageous, and even necessary, to send

send to one and the same Place, or to the same Country, several Ministers of Ability, Application and Industry.

Those Occasions are Conferences for Peace, whether it be that the Princes send thither as Parties concern'd, or as Mediators, to procure Peace among Princes who are at War.

It would be a difficult thing for one Minister alone to be able to undergo the Fatigue of assisting at all the Conferences, drawing up all the Memorials, preparing all the Answers, both what are to be deliver'd by Word of Mouth, as well as in Writing, and of doing all the other things that are necessary on the like Occasions; for adjusting so many different Interests and Passions that divide Princes, and their Ministers. And it is with a great deal of Reason, that each Prince, and each State, sends thither usually several Ministers, that they may share that Labour among them, and concert together the Measures which they ought to take for conducting the Affairs with which they are charg'd, to the end which is propos'd.

It would be proper on these Occasions, to follow the same Method which was establish'd during the Treaty of *Munster*, between the Duke of *Longueville*, who was the chief of the Embassy, and Messieurs *d'Avaux* and *Servien* his Colleagues; which was, to make only one Dispatch for all the three, that they might preserve an Uniformity in the recital of the Facts, which might have been related differently, if every one of them had writ separately to Court. And as to their several Sentiments touching each Affair, which they gave account of, if they differ'd in Opinion, they marked it in their common Dispatch; saying after this manner: I Duke of *Longueville* am of such Opinion; and the Sentiment of me *d'Avaux*, or of me *Servien* is such. And every one gave his reasons for his Opinion; and the Court decided the matter by its Answer, which was likewise in common to all the three.

They had likewise many Persons of good Abilities, whom they deputed to *Osnabruck*; where were held the Conferences of the Protestant Ministers of
Germany,

Germany, and of the Northern Crowns, and at which they assisted in the Quality of King's Envoy or Resident. These Ministers of the second Order were a great help to the Ambassadors; and some of them have since that time become excellent Ambassadors, and have rendered great Services to the State.

It is also very useful, and often necessary, to employ more than one Minister in Free States, where the Government is divided among many; and in Countries where there is a Civil War, when a Prince has some Interests to manage with the Opposite Parties. It is likewise necessary to have more than one Minister in an Elective Kingdom, when Votes are to be made for the Election of a new Prince.

When there is only one Minister in a Country where the Authority is divided, it is not possible for him to transport himself to all the Places where his Presence is often necessary at one and the same Time, and to treat with all those Persons who are there in Credit. It likewise often falls out, that one and the same Minister does not succeed to
please


please all those who are in the Opposite Interests, and that it is enough for him to be a Friend of the Head of One of the Parties, to make him be suspected of the Others; which is remedy'd by another Minister who is not under the same Engagements.

It is convenient to choose, for one and the same Country, Ministers that are Friends with one another, and of suitable Tempers, thereby to avoid the Jealousies and Divisions which may be in Danger of hurting the Interests of their Master; which happens but too often. We saw, during the Negotiation of the Peace of *Munster*, an Example of this Division, between the two last Plenipotentiaries of *France*, which went so great a Length as to publish Manifesto's, the one against the other.

Cardinal *Richlieu* did not content himself with imploying several Negotiators for one and the same Affair; he often divided the Secret of his Designs between them; and he set many Wheels a going in order to accomplish them.

Besides the Publick Ministers which he sent into each Country, he often kept there

there secret Agents and Pensionaries, Natives of the same Country, who gave him Advice of every thing that pass'd there, without the Knowledge and Participation of the King's Ambassadors; who often knew nothing of the Commissions of those Emissaries. And they sent him an Account of the Conduct of the King's Ambassadors, as well as of the Transactions in the Court where they resided: By which means nothing escaped his Knowledge, and he was in a Condition to set the Ambassadors right, when they failed in any thing, either by their bad Conduct, or for want of Penetration.



C H A P. XXIV.

Of the Duties peculiar to a Minister.

A Minister that is charged with the Interests of a Prince, or State, in a Foreign Country, is obliged to take care that there be nothing published there contrary to the Honour and Reputation

tation of his Sovereign, and to resent it with Vigour, even to the insulting of those who fail in the Respect that is due to him; if the Prince with whom he resides does not procure Satisfaction to be made.

He ought to protect all the Subjects of his Master, who are in the same Country with him; to procure for them, in his House, the free Exercise of the Religion which the Prince whom he serves possesses; to let them take Shelter in his House when they are under any Misfortune, and unjustly persecuted; to adjust all the Differences and Quarrels that happen among them; to relieve them in their Wants; and to live with them in the same Manner as a good Father lives with his Children.

If any Subject of Quality of his Prince happens to be in the same Country with him, and neglects, or purposely shuns, to visit him, he ought to give him notice of it in a civil Manner, and to engage him to come to see him by all manner of Civility and good Treatment,

ment, before he writes to his Master, to lay his Commands on him.

When he has Publick Audiences, he should send Notice of it to all the chief Persons of the Nation; and invite them to accompany him to it, that his Train may appear the greater for the Honour of his Prince. After his first Audience he should present them to the Prince, one after another, should tell him their Names and their Qualities, and procure them an easie Access to the Prince, and Chief Persons of the Court.

When there are publick Feasts, or Diversions, to which he is invited, he should take care to procure them Admission, and convenient Places to every one according to their Rank, and must see that he himself be seated in the Place which belongs to his Character; especially if there are other Foreign Ministers who pretend to stand in Competition with him. Seeing in that Case, it concerns the Rank and Dignity of his Master, he must not part with a Jot of his Rights. But he ought to be of a more easie Deportment towards the Courtiers

Courtiers of the Country where he is, who are in no manner of Competition with him; and he should rather show them more Civility than they have Right to pretend to, than diminish any thing of what is due to them, out of a foolish Pride, which can produce nothing but bad Effects, both for himself, and his Prince, and serve to alienate their Affections, without any manner of Advantage.

It is proper also that he contract particular Friendship with the Ministers of the Allies of his Sovereign which are resident in the same Court; that he give them Intelligence of things that may be useful to their Interests, in order to receive the like from them when Occasion offers; that he do them good Offices with the Prince whom he serves; and that when they contribute any thing towards the Advancement of his Affairs, to procure them some Mark of his Esteem and Gratitude; that he assist them with his Credit and good Offices at the Court where they are, in the Affairs which they have to Negotiate, and in the Disputes in which they

they may be intangled ; that when they have any Quarrels among themselves, or with any of the Ministers of the Country, he imploy himself to accommodate them ; that he himself avoid carefully any sort of Quarrel with those who are in Credit there, and never occasion any Stop to his Master's Affairs by his own private Resentments, or by exciting those of the Ministers with whom he treats : And he ought to lay down this as a firm and unchangeable Maxim, to employ all the Credit which he has, either by the Power of his Master, or his own proper Industry, to do all the Good he can.

If he observes exactly this Conduct, he will render himself useful to the Interests of his own Prince, and agreeable to the Princes, and States to whom he shall be sent ; he will acquire their Esteem, and he will leave behind him, in all the Places where he shall have resided, a good Character and Reputation ; which he ought to look upon as the most agreeable and most desirable Reward he can have of his Ability.

He

He ought likewise reasonably to expect, that the Proofs which he has given of his Capacity in the Management of the Great Affairs which he has Negotiated, will procure him, at his Return, Honours and Preferments answerable to the Importance of his Services; and that the Prince, or State, whom he shall have well served, will employ his Talents, and his Wisdom, in his Councils, for the Management of his principal Affairs. But although he should fail of these sorts of Recompences, he has wherewithal to comfort himself, by the inward Satisfaction he will find, in having faithfully and successfully discharged the Functions of those Employments which he was intrusted with, for the Service of his Prince and Country.

F I N I S.

The dog: like a...
expect, that the...
given of the...
more of the...
known, that...
twelve to the...
services; and...
whom he shall...
employ his...
in the...
of the...
he should...
pence; he has...
himself, by the...
will find, in...
celessly...
those...
trusted...
Prince and...

2 1 1 2

